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One equipment control building designed to be blast resistant and two each of three standardized types of metal warehouse or utility buildings were exposed to the effects of a nuclear device detonation. One of the utility buildings was frameless, with deeply corrugated wall and roof sections; a second was very largely frameless, using interlocking channel sections; and the third the aluminum-panel wall and roof covering was supported by girts and purlins, which in turn were supported by steel frames. Because of atmospheric conditions at the time of an earlier detonation in the test series, one of each of the three types ot utility buildings was exposed to approximately 0.7 psi overpressure before the planned test. In the planned test, held during the open shot (Apple II), one of each of the three types was exposed to approximately 3.0 psi overpressure and one to 1.3 psi, with the intention of bracketing their overpressure survival range and obtaining data for possible economic redesign for improved blast resistance. The equipment control building used continuous-welded steel frames and reinforced-gypsum curtain-wall construction. The control building was exposed to apporximately 4.1 psi, in the anticipated fringe zone of major structural damage, to determine its protective capabilities. The blast-resistant equipment control building was not structurally damaged by the blast, thus exceeding the expectations of the design. Each of the three utility buildings received severe damage at the near range, one being completely destroyed, whereas at the far range the damage in every case was repairable.
Atomic-blast exposure tests on commercial communications equipment were conducted during Operation Teapot, Apple II shot. These tests were made to provide civil defense planners with data for qualitative predictions of the probable survival range, the extent of damage, and nature of repairs required to restore communication service after a blast. Approximately 150 widely diversified units of commuications equipment (mainly electronic, but including sirens) were exposed. Exposed items were in or near groups of structures located at approximately 4700 and 10,500 feet from ground zero. Where possible, identical products were exposed at these two locations, so that one set of items would be subjected to moderately severe damage and the other set to light damage. Tests showed that commercial communications equipment was generally more resistant to nuclear explosion damage than the structures in and near which the products were exposed.
The purpose of Project 39.3 was to measure the thermal flux per unit area at a series of specified distances from a nuclear detonation. The instrumentation chosen was an Eppley thermopile indicating on a strip-chart paper recorder. Two stations failed to yield results because of power failures and blast damage. Results were obtained at 5500, 6800, 10,500 ft. These results follow the inverse-square-law fall-off, within the limits of reasonable experimental error.
The objectives of Project 35.5 were to determine the effects of a nuclear explosion on various types of records and records storage equipment. In Apple II shot, materials and storage equipment normally found in government, business, and archival institutions were placed at 11 different unshielded distances from Ground Zero in a zone where sever damage to surface structures was expected. Other records and equipment were placed within different type structures located (1) in a zone where severe damage was expected and (2) in a zone where little damage was expected. Of 22 units of unshielded storage equipment containing records, only six units were accessible with contents intact. The records and equipment placed within the structures were virtually undamaged. This would indicate that records housed within the type of equipment tested would survive if protected by some type of structure, except for damage resulting from debirs, fire, and water. However, the best protection was afforded by the basement (below ground level) of the structures even though the upper stories collapsed and were destroyed.
To determine the durability of heavy-duty machine tools, 11 such tools of various types and sizes were exposed to the open shot of Operation Teapot. Two engine lathes and two knee type milling machines were installed on a concrete base simulating industrial installations at 2750 ft from Ground Zero. One 200-ton hydraulic press was installed immediately behind a two-story brick dwelling at 4700 ft from Ground Zero. Two vertical milling machines, two pressure vessels, and two drying ovens were placed in typical industrial buildings (Butler and Armco) at 6800 ft from Ground Zero. Positioning and anchoring of machines were varied to induce damage from breakage and flying debris. Also exposed to the blast were basic lubricating oils for machine tools. Damage was understandably the most severe at the 2750-ft station and was minor at the 4700- and 6800-ft stations. Only one machine was completely demolished, and it was discovered in a postshot inspection that the machine's subbase had been broken prior to the blast. Flying debris, not blast, created the major damage to the machines. Vulnerability of machines to damage appears to exist in the failure of fragile external parts; and even though none of the 11 pieces used in the test was large enough to be rated as a heavy-duty machine tool, the major castings and forgings were not damaged. The lubricants appeared to suffer no damage under the conditions of the test.