Bjoern H. Seibert
Published: 2010-10-29
Total Pages: 138
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Based on the assessments made herein, this monograph recommends embracing the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This recommendation is based on the following key findings:* The new security environment increasingly requires cooperation between allies to address emerging security threats;* A militarily stronger Europe that carries a greater share of global responsibility is an important asset for U.S. foreign policy;* The EU's CSDP has the potential to deliver the political will needed for a militarily more proactive Europe;* The EU's CSDP may thus be critical to overcoming the recognized stagnation in capability improvements and mobilizing serious European capabilities development.To be successful, practical steps that entail shifts in U.S. thinking as well as organization are required. First, establish the necessary capacities to strengthen the U.S. understanding of the EU's CSDP in order to overcome existing blind spots and gain a deeper understanding of the CSDP. This may require organizational changes in U.S. embassies in Europe, as well as U.S. Missions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, in order to better identify, track, and decide whether and how to seek to influence the CSDP.Second, encourage European members to focus on increasing their defense budgets. Moreover, emphax size the need for more efficient defense spending in Europe through cooperation and pooling of assets. Concretely, this could be undertaken by improving the relationship between NATO and the European Defense Agency (EDA).Third, emphasize European responsibility for crises occurring on Europe's periphery. This would encourage a sense of ownership of crisis response and help Europeans undertake the critical steps needed to address existing capability shortfalls. Fourth, seek to improve the relationship between NATO and the EU. At the same time accept that Europe needs to have the necessary structures to act autonomously, including a limited permanent planning capacity outside NATO.Fifth, support the development of a common U.S.-EU framework for stability operations, including doctrine and training. This would allow for increased, but less ad hoc, coordination between the United States and the EU in the field, and encourage a sharing of lessons learned.