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RAMADy, Mahdi OPec in a sHALE oil world –where to NEXT? With PREFACE by Dr. Sadad Al Husseini , former Board Member and Executive Vice President , Saudi Aramco. "OPEC has played an important role since its founding and continues to do so, but it has to recognize that this role has now changed and the organization has to adapt to new challenges. This book provides some possible solutions" Abdulsamad Al Awadhi, former Kuwait National Representative at OPEC . "Authoritative, well-informed, and excellent account of the role of OPEC in managing the oil market, present, past, and future" Hassan Qabazard, former Director of Research Division , OPEC. ". The call for action by Mohamed Ramady and Wael Mahdy in this book makes it clear that time, and not oil, is the precious commodity that is running out fast on OPEC’s side", Sadad Al Husseini , former Board Member and EVP Saudi Aramco “OPEC is dead. Long live OPEC”. The organization is now going through a mid life crisis in its 54 years of existence trying to figure out where it goes next in a world where OPEC has been relegated from being the energy swing producer, and Saudi Arabia as the ‘Sultan of the Swing,’ to one where it now faces competition from both non- OPEC traditional well as non-conventional shale producers. The Authors examine how OPEC has had to come to terms with the reality that the earlier decades ‘call on OPEC’ has now been replaced by a ‘call on non-OPEC’ and that a new ‘swing’ has been identified- the producers of shale oil. Drawing upon the Authors combined academic and practical first hand insights on OPEC, the book discusses how a new OPEC paradigm has emerged following the oil price rout of 2014, whereby the organization’s principal concern is now protecting market share, without being in charge unlike earlier fleeting periods of the late 1970’s, which brought with it a lasting myth of the OPEC cartel. Mohamed Ramady is Visiting Associate Professor, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Saudi Arabia; Wael Mahdi is Bloomberg OPEC Energy Correspondent.
In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers including US shale oil out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a "regime switch" by OPEC. These include: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries. We show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output.
In the early 1980s, industry and government took a hard look at the economics of extracting oil from vast deposits of shale that lie beneath the western United States. Oil prices subsided, and interest waned. With oil prices spiking and global demand showing no signs of abating, reexamining the economics of oil shale makes sense. In this report, the authors describe oil shale resources; suitability, cost, and performance of new technologies; and key policy issues that need to be addressed by government decisionmakers in the near future.
In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers including US shale oil out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a "regime switch" by OPEC. These include: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries. We show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output.
This book gives information on the OPEC nations' changing roles in the world oil market as they expand to "downstream" activities. It provides an overview of the production capabilities and policies of major oil exporters and examines the refinery overcapacity crisis in the developed world.
We show that OPEC's market power contributes to global warming by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We fully characterize the equilibrium of a cartel-fringe model and use a calibration to examine the importance of this extraction sequence effect. While welfare under the cartel-fringe equilibrium can be significantly lower than under a first-best outcome, almost all of this welfare loss is due to the sequence effect. Moreover, the recent boom in shale oil reserves may reduce social welfare and renewables subsidies can increase the carbon content of current extraction.
The paper analyzed shale oil development in the United States and its implications for the Nigerian economy. The analyses show that recent shifts in global energy market are characterized firstly by advancement in technology (horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking) as a result of rising global crude oil price making shale production cheaper to explore and second, increase demand from Asia. The analysis reveals an increase in global oil production, decline in U.S. oil import from the world with increased reference to Nigeria. Further, the Nigerian macroeconomy has largely been affected by the recent global shift in energy market. Oil revenue has declined alongside exchange rate and external reserves with external debt rising. The study recommends therefore that greater weight should be assigned to engineering diversification of the economy from over dependence on oil revenue to reduce macroeconomic instability.
A glut of oil, dropping prices, the threat of insolvency, a divided membership -- these developments in the early weeks of 1985 underline the cogency of Mohammed Ahrari's historical study of the OPEC oil cartel and his argument that economic forces, not politics, determine OPEC's action in the world arena. The impetus for the formation of OPEC in 1960 was the desire of the oil-producing states for greater income from their most valuable resource. The international oil corporations had secured lucrative concessions early in this century, and in the 1960s they still dictated both the terms of production and the prices paid the oil states. In the buyers' market of the 1960s, the organization found itself with little economic clout. But in the early 1970s, OPEC members succeeded not only in manipulating the price of crude oil but in reducing the status of the oil corporations to that of mere managers of upstream operations. In addition, they accumulated enormous numbers of petrodollars by exploiting increasingly tight markets in the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. The effects of OPEC policies on the consuming countries have been skyrocketing inflation and sustained recession, with profound political repercussions. But the OPEC members have found their apparent power an uncertain blessing, as Mr. Ahrari demonstrates. Their failure to develop pricing formulas sensitive to fluctuations in the international oil market have made them highly vulnerable. In addition, the political tensions emanating from the Iran-Iraq war and from the specter of repetition of Iranian-style revolution elsewhere in the Persian Gulf have made OPEC's continued viability highly uncertain.