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Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes—the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.
Good verification and compliance arrangements can significantly promote confidence building in areas considering decreasing arms or, military capabilities fearing that reductions may compromise rather than, enhance their security. This publication provides basic guidelines on verification and compliance in the field of arms control and disarmament. It is a convenient handbook for officials involved in arms control and disarmament activities, students, researchers, and journalists. The book is a collaborative effort between United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Verification Research Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London. This bilingual publication contains information both in Arabic and English.
Since enactment of the INF Treaty, on-site inspection to monitor compliance has come to figure prominently in negotiations over strategic arms reductions, conventional force reductions, and specific weapons bans. This volume offers many perspectives on the future of on-site inspection in arms control. Experts in the field offer their evaluations of what on-site inspection can and cannot contribute to the realization of US arms control and national security goals in the coming decade. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
In this study, CISAC tackles the technical dimensions of a longstanding controversy: To what extent could existing and plausibly attainable measures for transparency and monitoring make possible the verification of all nuclear weaponsâ€"strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployedâ€"plus the nuclear-explosive components and materials that are their essential ingredients? The committee's assessment of the technical and organizational possibilities suggests a more optimistic conclusion than most of those concerned with these issues might have expected.
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control; (3) The Components of a Verification Regime: The Objectives of a Verification Regime; Assessing Verifiability; Monitoring and Verification in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control; Monitoring and Verification in New START (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty); National Technical Means of Verification; Providing Telemetry Generated During Missile Flight Tests: Telemetry Exchange in START; Telemetry Exchange in New START; Mobile ICBMs: Limits on Mobile ICBMs in START; Mobile ICBMs in New START; On-Site Inspections: On-Site Inspections in START; On-Site Inspections in New START; (4) Assessing the Verification Regime in New START. Illustrations.
Since 1957, the Pugwash Conferences have brought together influential scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger of nuclear war. Meeting in private as individuals, rather than as representatives of their governments or institutions, Pugwash participants exchange views with a combination of candour and flexibility seldom found i
This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.
This glossary provides clear and precise definitions of arms control terms and places them in a historical context. It introduces the reader to the primary themes and concepts in the field of arms control and explains relevant terminology. The publication looks at the major arms control and disarmament agreements related to conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The information is presented in English and Spanish.