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David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
The new digital economy has pronounced implications for corporate strategy, marketing, operations, information systems, customer service, global supply-chain management, and product distribution. This handbook examines most aspects of electronic commerce, including electronic storefronts, online business, consumer interface, business-to-business networking, digital payment, legal issues, information product development, and electronic business models. An indispensable reference for professionals in e-commerce and Internet business.
Do institutions matter in economic theory? Or is the economic analysis of institutions a distraction from the most important action? Indeed, does Vernon Smith’s notion of the “institution-free core” of formal economic theory encompass that most important action? To explore this question, this book opens with an informal tour of the economics of system design out of which an economics of adaptation ultimately emerged. The book then offers explorations, via the application of the economics of adaptation in both law and economics relating to how parties manage relationships within the firm, within the context of long-term contracts, and, most vividly, within the context of antitrust conspiracy.
It is increasingly recognized that the economic value of forests is not merely the production of timber. Forests provide other key ecosystem services, such as being sinks for greenhouse gases, hotspots of biodiversity, tourism and recreation. They are also vitally important in preventing soil erosion and controlling water supplies, as well as providing non-timber forest products and supporting the livelihoods of many local people. This handbook provides a detailed, comprehensive and broad coverage of forest economics, including traditional forest economics of timber production, economics of environmental role of forests, and recent developments in forest economics. The chapters are grouped into six parts: fundamental topics in forest resource economics; economics of forest ecosystems; economics of forests, climate change, and bioenergy; economics of risk, uncertainty, and natural disturbances; economics of forest property rights and certification; and emerging issues and developments. Written by leading environmental, forest, and natural resource economists, the book represents a definitive reference volume for students of economics, environment, forestry and natural resource economics and management.
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly expected to address environmental issues in their economic development lending. Yet the banks have been accused of failing to implement their own environmental policies, thereby contributing to environmental degradation in borrowing countries. In this book Tamar Gutner analyzes the environmental policies of three MDBs: the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank. She compares their performance in Central and Eastern Europe, where the need for economic and environmental reform has been particularly urgent, and where these MDBs are among the largest donors. Gutner finds many obstacles to efforts to "green" the three banks, most notably a mismatch between the environmental mandates and existing patterns of institutional design and incentives. The depth and scope of the banks' green activities reflect the degree of shareholder commitment to environmental issues and how demand-driven the MDB is designed to be. Surprisingly, the World Bank, the most scrutinized and criticized of the three MDBs, has been rather more responsive than its counterparts to its environmental mandate in the region. The discussion is framed by larger explorations of the behavior of international organizations and the sources of their innovation and inertia in addressing new policy issues. Gutner demonstrates the need to examine the impact of different stages of the policy process on new mandates and to incorporate both political and institutional variables when developing theories about the behavior of international institutions.
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
The New Institutional Politics is a comparative study of the impact of political institutions upon outcomes, and covers some of the major themes in the new institutionalism. It looks at how various democratic institutions like Konkordanzdemokratie or corporatism promote better outcomes than Westminster institutions. The evaluation of the performance of political institutions covers the executive, the legislature and the judicial system. The book also looks at economic outcomes such as affluence and GDP growth as well as social ones like income distribution and quality of life. It examines the problems of institutional effects in democracies and dictatorships and provides analysis of some of the major models in political science. This is an exploration of how political institutions matter for political, economic and social outcomes. It estimates their impact in relation to other major factors such as culture and social structure. It is written for political scientists and graduates studying comparative politics.
Managerial Dilemmas extends the use of analytical techniques from organisational economics to the spheres of organisational culture and leadership in politics and business.