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Charles Brittain's elegant new translation of Cicero's Academica makes available for the first time a readable and accurate translation into modern English of this complex yet crucial source of our knowledge of the epistemological debates between the skeptical Academics and the Stoics. Brittain's masterly Introduction, generous notes, English–Latin–Greek Glossary, and Index further commend this edition to the attention of students of Hellenistic philosophy at all levels.
Scepticism, a philosophical tradition that casts doubt on our ability to gain knowledge of the world and suggests suspending judgement in the face of uncertainty, has been influential since is beginnings in ancient Greece. Harald Thorsrud provides an engaging, rigorous introduction to the arguments, central themes and general concerns of ancient Scepticism, from its beginnings with Pyrrho of Elis (c.360-c.270 BCE) to the writings of Sextus Empiricus in the second century CE. Thorsrud explores the differences among Sceptics and examines in particular the separation of the Scepticism of Pyrrho from its later form - Academic Scepticism - which arose when its ideas were introduced into Plato's "Academy" in the third century BCE. He also unravels the prolonged controversy that developed between Academic Scepticism and Stoicism, the prevailing dogmatism of the day. Steering an even course through the many differences of scholarly opinion surrounding Scepticism, Thorsrud provides a balanced appraisal of its enduring significance by showing why it remains so philosophically interesting and how ancient interpretations differ from modern ones.
What is knowledge? Is it the same as opinion or truth? Do you need to be able to justify a claim in order to count as knowing it? How can we know that the outer world is real and not a dream? Questions like these have existed since ancient times, and the branch of philosophy dedicated to answering them - epistemology - has been active for thousands of years. In this thought-provoking Very Short Introduction, Jennifer Nagel considers the central problems and paradoxes in the theory of knowledge and draws attention to the ways in which philosophers and theorists have responded to them. By exploring the relationship between knowledge and truth, and considering the problem of scepticism, Nagel introduces a series of influential historical and contemporary theories of knowledge, incorporating methods from logic, linguistics, and psychology, using a number of everyday examples to demonstrate the key issues and debates. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
This book offers an unprecedented study of the influence of the skepticism of the New Platonic Academy on David Hume’s and Immanuel Kant’s critiques of metaphysics. By demonstrating how the skeptical teachings of the Academy affected these authors’ Enlightened attacks on traditional metaphysics, this book deepens and broadens the burgeoning scholarship on the role that the Ancients schools of skepticism played in the configuration of Modern skeptical outlooks. It bolsters the newfound recognition that we must reconsider the conventional view that the revival of Pyrrhonism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave birth to Modern skepticism by incorporating the influence of Academic skepticism in the analysis. Giving a new impetus to this line of research, the author argues that Academic ideas and methods informed Hume’s and Kant’s critique of metaphysics in substantial and thus far unacknowledged ways. Specifically, she demonstrates the centrality of Academic skepticism to Hume’s epistemology and critique of religion through a detailed analysis of his theory of belief in the Treatise and the first Enquiry as well as of its application in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Likewise, her analysis reveals how Kant’s anti-metaphysical stance, developed in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, contains many skeptical insights of Academic inspiration, bequeathed to him by Hume.
Cicero's philosophical works are a rich source for the understanding of Hellenistic philosophy, and his Academic Books are of critical importance for the study of ancient epistemology, especially the central debate between the Academic sceptics and the Stoics. This volume makes Cicero's challenging work accessible to philosophers and historians of philosophy and represents the best current work in both fields. The ten papers published here are the work of leading authorities from North America, England and Europe; they were presented and discussed at the seventh Symposium Hellenisticum at Utrecht, August 1995, and deal with every aspect of the Academic Books, historical, literary and philosophical. Several papers make major contributions to the understanding of ancient scepticism and sceptical arguments, to the role of Socrates in later Greek thought, to the history of the Academy as an institution, and to the philosophical stance of Cicero himself.
This is the first book-length study of Philo of Larissa (159-84 BC), leader of the Platonic Academy in its final period as an Athenian institution, and also the principal philosophical teacher of Cicero. The appendix contains full testimonia and "fragments" of Philo.
Among the most important, but frequently neglected, figures in the history of debates over skepticism is Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE). His early dialogue, Against the Academics, together with substantial material from his other writings, constitutes a sustained attempt to respond to the tradition of skepticism with which he was familiar. This was the tradition of Academic skepticism, which had its home in Plato's Academy and was transmitted to the Roman world through the writings of Cicero (106–43 BCE). Augustine and Academic Skepticism is the first comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s critique of Academic skepticism. In clear and accessible prose, Blake D. Dutton presents that critique as a serious work of philosophy and engages with it precisely as such.While Dutton provides an extensive review of Academic skepticism and Augustine’s encounter with it, his primary concern is to articulate and evaluate Augustine’s strategy to discredit Academic skepticism as a philosophical practice and vindicate the possibility of knowledge against the Academic denial of that possibility. In doing so, he sheds considerable light on Augustine’s views on philosophical inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge.
Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.
This book explores the nature of scepticism, asking when it is legitimate, for example as the driver of new ideas, and when it is problematic. It also tackles how scepticism is related to contemporary social and political phenomena, such as fake news, and examines a radical form of scepticism which maintains that knowledge is impossible.
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), the great Renaissance skeptic and pioneer of the essay form, is known for his innovative method of philosophical inquiry which mixes the anecdotal and the personal with serious critiques of human knowledge, politics and the law. He is the first European writer to be intensely interested in the representations of his own intimate life, including not just his reflections and emotions but also the state of his body. His rejection of fanaticism and cruelty and his admiration for the civilizations of the New World mark him out as a predecessor of modern notions of tolerance and acceptance of otherness. In this volume an international team of contributors explores the range of his philosophy and also examines the social and intellectual contexts in which his thought was expressed.