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This book provides an economic analysis of various aspects of ‘market quality’, a new concept which emerged in the 21st century, using the tools of ‘oligopoly theory’ and ‘auction theory’ that evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the economics literature the link between the theories of oligopoly and auctions with market quality remains largely unexplored. This book attempts to forge such a link as it brings together relevant theoretical results in the literature on these topics under a unified framework. While the book is mainly theoretical in nature, it also discusses some specific issues related to the problems of market quality in emerging economies like India. Illustrated by carefully chosen examples, this book is highly recommended to readers who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of the new field of market quality economics and are interested in some open research problems in this area. How should auctions and other allocation mechanisms be designed for oligopolistic industries to achieve such goals as efficiency, high-quality output and fast production? Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar’s book offers novel analysis of this question and also some interesting answers. Highly recommended. Eric S. Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics
This open access book presents the first step towards building socio-life science, a field of science investigating humans in such a way that both social and life-scientific factors are integrated. Because humans are both living and social creatures, a human action can never be understood fully without knowing both the biological traits of a person and the social scientific environments in which he exists. With this consideration, the editors of this book have initiated a research project promoting a deeper and more integrated understanding of human behavior and human health. This book aims to show what can, and could be, achieved through our interdisciplinary project. One important product is the newly formed three-party collaboration between Pasteur Institut, Kyoto University, and the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. Covering many different fields, including medicine, epidemiology, anthropology, economics, sociology, demography, geography, and policy, researchers in these institutes, and many others, present their studies on the COVID-19 pandemic. Although based on different methodologies, the studies show the importance of behavioral change and governmental policy in the fight against a huge pandemic. The book explains the unique genome cohort-panel data that the project builds to study social and life scientific aspects of humans.
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Pepall's Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications, 5th Edition offers an accessible text in which topics are organized in a manner that motivates and facilitates progression from one chapter to the next. It serves as a complete, but concise, introduction to modern industrial economics. The text uniquely uses the tools of game theory, information economics, contracting issues, and practical examples to examine multiple facets of industrial organization. The fifth edition is more broadly accessible, balancing the tension between making modern industrial analysis accessible while also presenting the formal abstract modeling that gives the analysis its power. The more overtly mathematical content is presented in the Contemporary Industrial Organization text (aimed at the top tier universities) while this Fifth Edition will less mathematical (aimed at a wider range of four-year colleges and state universities.
Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Traditionally engineers devised communication services without reference to how they should be priced. In today's environment pricing is a very complex subject and in practice depends on many parameters of the actual market - including amount of traffic, architecture of the network, technology, and cost. The challenge is to provide a generic service model which accurately captures aspects such as quality and performance, and can be used to derive optimal pricing strategies. Recent technology advances, combined with the deregulation of the telecommunication market and the proliferation of the internet, have created a highly competitive environment for communication service prividers. Pricing is no longer as simple as picking an appropriate model for a particular contract. There is a real need for a book that explains the provision of new services, the relation between pricing and resource allocation in networks; and the emergence of the internet and how to price it. Pricing Communication Networks provides a framework of mathematical models for pricing these multidimensional contracts, and includes background in network services and contracts, network techonology, basic economics, and pricing strategy. It can be used by economists to fill in the gaps in their knowledge of network services and technology, and for engineers and operational researchers to gain the background in economics required to price communication services effectively. * Provides a broad overview of network services and contracts * Includes a primer on modern network technology and the economic concepts relevant to pricing and competition * Includes discussion of mathematical models of traffic flow to help describe network capability and derive pricing strategies * Includes coverage of specialist topics, such as regulation, multicasting, and auctions * Illustrated throughout by detailed real examples * Suitable for anyone with an understanding of basic calculus and probability Primarily aimed at graduate students, researchers and practitioners from electrical engineering, computer science, economics and operations research Pricing Communication Networks will also appeal to telecomms engineers working in industry.