Download Free Objectivity And The Language Dependence Of Thought Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Objectivity And The Language Dependence Of Thought and write the review.

Does thought depend on language? Primarily as a consequence of the cognitive turn in empirical disciplines like psychology and ethology, many current empirical researchers and empirically minded philosophers tend to answer this question in the negative. This book rejects this mainstream view and develops a philosophical argument in favor of a universal dependence of language on thought. In doing so, it comprises insights of two primary representatives of 20th century and contemporary philosophy, namely Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom. Barth offers an introduction to the debate concerning the language-dependence of thought and lays the methodological foundation for the subsequent argument in favor of a universal dependence of thought on language, presenting an account and defense of the transcendental method in reference to the writings of Peter F. Strawson. He then offers a transcendental argument in favor of a universal language-dependence of thought, beginning with a reevaluation of a basic idea for an argument originally presented by Donald Davidson. Later, two main objections to the conclusion of this transcendental argument are addressed and rejected using Robert Brandom’s inferentialist and normativist account of thought and language. In the course of doing so, the recent debate on Brandom’s work is addressed extensively, and main objections to Brandom’s work are presented and answered.
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective is the long-awaited third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson, whose influence on philosophy since the 1960s has been deep and broad. His first two collections, published by OUP in the early 1980s, are recognized as contemporary classics. Now Davidson presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations among language, thought, and the world. This new volume offers a rich and rewarding feast for anyone interested in philosophy today, and is essential reading for anyone working on its central topics.
Tyler Burge's study investigates the most primitive ways in which individuals represent the physical world. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, Burge outlines the constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, thus locating the origins of representational mind.
This book presents an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant’s philosophy together with those of the British empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant’s psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant’s philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. It also relates Kant’s psychologism to Wittgenstein’s later conception of language. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant’s philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.
Ontology and Providence in Creation critically examines a particular Leibnizean inspired understanding of God's creation of the world and proposes that a different understanding should be adopted. The Leibnizean argument proposes that God's understanding encompassed a host of possible worlds, only one of which he actualized. This proposition is the current orthodoxy when philosopher and theologians talk about the philosophical understanding of creation. Mark Robson argues that this commits the Leibnizean to the notion that possibility is determinate. He proposes that this understanding of creation does not do justice to the doctrine that God created the world out of nothing. Instead of possible worlds, Robson argues that we should understand possibility as indeterminate. There are no things in possibility, hence God created out of nothing. He examines how this conception of possibility is held by C.S. Peirce and how it was developed by Charles Hartshorne. Robson contends that not only does the indeterminate understanding of possibility take seriously the nothing of ex nihilo, but that it also offers a new solution to the problem of evil.
The essays in this volume, first presented at an international conference held at the University of Urbino, Italy, in 2011, explore the different senses of realism, arguing both for and against its distinctive theses and considering these senses from a historical point of view. The first sense is the metaphysical thesis that whatever exists does so, and has the properties it has, independently of whether it is the object of a person's thought or perception. The second sense of realism is epistemological, wherein realism claims that, in some cases, it is possible to know the world as it exists in and of itself. A third sense, which has become known as ontological realism, states that universals exist as well as individuals. The essays collected here make new contributions to these fundamental philosophical issues, which have largely defined western analytic philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to the present day.
This book offers new insights into the nature of human rational capacities by engaging inferentialism with empirical research in the cognitive sciences. Inferentialism advocates that humans’ unique kind of intelligence is discursive and rooted in competencies to make, assess and justify claims. This approach provides a rich source of valuable insights into the nature of our rational capacities, but it is underdeveloped in important respects. For example, little attempt has been made to assess inferentialism considering relevant scientific research on human communication, cognition or reasoning. By engaging philosophical and scientific approaches in a productive dialogue, this book shows how we can better understand human rational capacities by comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this vein, the author critically revisits and constructively develops central themes from the work of Robert Brandom and other "language rationalists": the nature of the assertoric practice and its connection to reasoned discourse, the linguistic constitution of the shared space of reasons, the social nature and function of reasoning, the intersubjective roots of social-normative practices and the nature of objective thought. Practices of Reason will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic.
"This work is essential for the philosophical assessment of Hume's contributions to our understanding of what moral agency is....It is written in a manner that is constantly sensitive to the philosophical perplexities that lie in wai for each position that the author, and Hume, considers, and it demonstrates, if anyone still needs this, just how resourceful Hume's moral theory is, even when judged in the light of our contemporary debates."--Ethics
In Europe, and later in the United States, the revitalization of the philosophy of language emerged from the need to address certain perplexities concerning formal disciplines and to work out certain complexities found within philosophy. In Uruguay, philosophy of language began with Carlos Vaz Ferreira as an analysis of the common and argumentative uses of language but then expanded to address typically philosophical questions. Edited by Carlos Enrique Caorsi and Ricardo J. Navia, Philosophy of Language in Uruguay: Language, Meaning, and Philosophy demonstrates the different directions in which philosophy of language has developed in Uruguay in the last twenty years, giving a representative picture of how philosophical approaches from a linguistic perspective have developed in this Latin American country. Uruguayan philosophy has a very small international presence, but it has long produced works within the philosophical explorations of language that are worthy of being better known. The contributors dissect these explorations through epistemology, linguistics, argumentation, and cognitive sciences to discover how philosophers of language such as Vaz Ferreira have grown to understand the complexities of language and how it affects us today.