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This book offers a set of essays, old and new, examining the positive obligations of individuals and the state in matters of criminal law. The centrepiece is a new, extended essay on the criminalisation of omissions-examining the duties to act imposed on individuals and organisations by the criminal law, and assessing their moral and social foundations. Alongside this is another new essay on the state's positive obligations to put in place criminal laws to protect certain individual rights. Introducing the volume is the author's much-cited essay on criminalisation, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?'. The book sets out to shed new light on contemporary arguments about the proper boundaries of the criminal law, not least by exploring the justifications for imposing positive duties (reinforced by the criminal law) on individuals and their relation to the positive obligations of the state.
Presently, many of the greatest debates and controversies in international criminal law concern modes of liability for international crimes. The state of the law is unclear, to the detriment of accountability for major crimes and of the uniformity of international criminal law. The present book aims at clarifying the state of the law and provides a thorough analysis of the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, as well as of the debates and the questions these debates have left open. Renowned international criminal law scholars analyze, in discrete chapters, the modes of liability one by one; for each mode they identify the main trends in the jurisprudence and the main points of controversy. An introduction addresses the cross-cutting issues, and a conclusion anticipates possible evolutions that we may see in the future. The research on which this book is based was undertaken with the Geneva Academy.
This book grounds judicial review in its deepest foundations: the function, authority, and objectivity of a legal system as a whole.
This book offers an in-depth study of the command responsibility doctrine, pursuant to which military commanders and civilian leaders can be held responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates that they failed to prevent or punish. This form of responsibility has gained much attention in the last years; however, it still presents several open questions and critical difficulties arise in its application. The author traces the roots of such criminal responsibility, from its military origins to its first appearances in international case law after World War II. Particular attention is given to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, which extensively elaborated on the issue, and to the provision of Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The book provides a systematic analysis of command responsibility, outlining its different forms and finding a proper role for it within the complex net of responsibilities that connotes the commission of international crimes. This book is an important contribution to the literature and worldwide discussion on command responsibility and therefore highly recommended to scholars of international law, criminal law and international criminal law as well as to all practitioners (judges, legal assistants, prosecutors, defence counsels) working at or with international tribunals, experts in the military field, investigators dealing with international crimes, NGOs and journalists. Chantal Meloni is working as a Researcher at the Criminal Law Department of the UniversitàdegliStudi of Milan, Italy. Since several years she specializes in international criminal law. She spent long research periods abroad, in particular at the Humboldt Universität of Berlin in Germany. She also worked at the International Criminal Court as a Legal Assistant in Chambers.
"Project of the American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Standards Committee, Criminal Justice Section"--T.p. verso.
Why be lenient towards children who commit crimes? Reflection on the grounds for such leniency is the entry point into the development, in this book, of a theory of the nature of criminal responsibility and desert of punishment for crime. Gideon Yaffe argues that child criminals are owed lesser punishments than adults thanks not to their psychological, behavioural, or neural immaturity but, instead, because they are denied the vote. This conclusion is reached through accounts of the nature of criminal culpability, desert for wrongdoing, strength of legal reasons, and what it is to have a say over the law. The centrepiece of this discussion is the theory of criminal culpability. To be criminally culpable is for one's criminal act to manifest a failure to grant sufficient weight to the legal reasons to refrain. The stronger the legal reasons, then, the greater the criminal culpability. Those who lack a say over the law, it is argued, have weaker legal reasons to refrain from crime than those who have a say. They are therefore reduced in criminal culpability and deserve lesser punishment for their crimes. Children are owed leniency, then, because of the political meaning of age rather than because of its psychological meaning. This position has implications for criminal justice policy, with respect to, among other things, the interrogation of children suspected of crimes and the enfranchisement of adult felons.
1.1 Opening Remarks and Objectives Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 2 be enforced. This is, perhaps, the most renowned citation from the judgment of the Int- national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”). In the six decades which have passed since the IMT judgment was handed down, the recognition of the c- cept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes has been significantly reinforced and developed, particularly since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) in the 1990’s and most recently the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The media has, of course, played a crucial role in increasing awareness of this concept, especially amongst the general populace. Indeed, the concept has, arguably, a much higher profile today, than ever before in its history. However, the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core inter- tional crimes is neither as straightforward nor as single-facetted, as might appear on first glance. While the general principle behind the concept does not generate too many difficulties, it is in its practical application that the more challenging aspects of the concept are brought to the fore. Each of these ‘challenging - pects’ can also be described as a ‘pertinent issue’ of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
What makes someone responsible for a crime and therefore liable tof punishment under the criminal law? Modern lawyers will quickly and easily point to the criminal law's requirement of concurrent actus reus and mens rea, doctrines of the criminal law which ensure that someone will only be found criminally responsible if they have committed criminal conduct while possessing capacities of understanding, awareness, and self-control at the time of offense. Any notion of criminal responsibility based on the character of the offender, meaning an implication of criminality based on reputation or the assumed disposition of the person, would seem to today's criminal lawyer a relic of the 18th Century. In this volume, Nicola Lacey demonstrates that the practice of character-based patterns of attribution was not laid to rest in 18th Century criminal law, but is alive and well in contemporary English criminal responsibility-attribution. Building upon the analysis of criminal responsibility in her previous book, Women, Crime, and Character, Lacey investigates the changing nature of criminal responsibility in English law from the mid-18th Century to the early 21st Century. Through a combined philosophical, historical, and socio-legal approach, this volume evidences how the theory behind criminal responsibility has shifted over time. The character and outcome responsibility which dominated criminal law in the 18th Century diminished in ideological importance in the following two centuries, when the idea of responsibility as founded in capacity was gradually established as the core of criminal law. Lacey traces the historical trajectory of responsibility into the 21st Century, arguing that ideas of character responsibility and the discourse of responsibility as founded in risk are enjoying a renaissance in the modern criminal law. These ideas of criminal responsibility are explored through an examination of the institutions through which they are produced, interpreted and executed; the interests which have shaped both doctrines and institutions; and the substantive social functions which criminal law and punishment have been expected to perform at different points in history.