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For almost five decades, the United Kingdom made plans for a nuclear attack that never came. To help their citizens, civil servants, and armed forces prepare, those in power designed and published a variety of booklets, posters, and how-to guides. Most infamous among these was the Protect and Survive campaign, but just as fascinating are lesser-known materials prepared for the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation and the Royal Observer Corps, many of which are reproduced here for the first time. From terrifying images issued by central government, to local councils' sometimes amateurish survival guides, 'Nuclear War in the UK' is a look at the way Britain's authorities reacted to the Soviet nuclear threat.
Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.
This book constitutes an original archival history of government secrecy, public relations and the debate surrounding nuclear weapons in Britain from 1970 to 1983. The book contrasts the secrecy and near-silence of the Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments on nuclear issues in the 1970s with the increasingly vocal case made for the possession of nuclear weapons by the first Thatcher government following a shift in approach in 1980. This shift occurred against a background of rising Cold War tensions and a growing public nuclear debate in the UK. The book seeks to contextualise and explain this transformation, considering the role of party politics, structures and personalities inside the government, and external influences: notably the role of investigative journalists and think tanks in cracking open official secrecy and demanding justification for Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, and the peace movement in driving increasingly assertive public relations from 1980. The book draws on material from archives and interviews with key figures involved to provide an original and engaging account. It argues that this process of opening up saw significant disclosure of nuclear policy for the first time, and the most extensive public justification of the British nuclear capability to date, which has shaped public understanding of British nuclear weapons into the twenty-first century. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War studies, nuclear politics and security studies.
The primary mission assigned to the British Army from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War was deterring Soviet aggression in Europe by demonstrating the will and capability to fight with nuclear weapons to defend NATO territory. This is the first comprehensive account of how the British Army imagined nuclear war, and how it planned to fight it.
Cases of near nuclear use due to misunderstanding demonstrate the importance of the human judgment factor in nuclear decisionmaking. This report applies a risk lens, based on factoring probability and consequence, to a set of cases of near use and instances of sloppy practices from 1962 to 2013.
This book investigates the UK’s nuclear weapon policy, focusing in particular on how consecutive governments have managed to maintain the Trident weapon system. The question of why states maintain nuclear weapons typically receives short shrift: its security, of course. The international is a perilous place, and nuclear weapons represent the ultimate self-help device. This book seeks to unsettle this complacency by re-conceptualizing nuclear weapon-armed states as nuclear regimes of truth and refocusing on the processes through which governments produce and maintain country-specific discourses that enable their continued possession of nuclear weapons. Illustrating the value of studying nuclear regimes of truth, the book conducts a discourse analysis of the UK’s nuclear weapons policy between 1980 and 2010. In so doing, it documents the sheer imagination and discursive labour required to sustain the positive value of nuclear weapons within British politics, as well as providing grounds for optimism regarding the value of the recent treaty banning nuclear weapons.
Civil defence was an integral part of Britain's modern history. Throughout the cold war it was a central response of the British Government to the threat of war. This book will be the first history of the preparations to fight a nuclear war taken in Britain between the end of the Second World War and 1968.
War Plan UK is the result of more than five years' research into the real face of British civil defence. Duncan Campbell reveals the incredible history of how one government after another has planned to protect itself and survive. This is an authorised re-issue of the 1983 version of this book.
This collection offers a fresh interpretation of the Cold War as an imaginary war, a conflict that had imaginations of nuclear devastation as one of its main battlegrounds. The book includes survey chapters and case studies on Western Europe, the USSR, Japan and the USA. Looking at various strands of intellectual debate and at different media, from documentary film to fiction, the chapters demonstrate the difficulties to make the unthinkable and unimaginable - nuclear apocalypse - imaginable. The book will be required reading for everyone who wants to understand the cultural dynamics of the Cold War through the angle of its core ingredient, nuclear weapons.
The majority of narratives about the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War stress that air power did not play a dominant role. The deployment of strong, well-integrated air defenses by Egypt and Syria, that caused heavy losses to the Israeli air force early during that conflict, not only spoiled Israel's prewar planning, but prevented it from providing support for Israeli ground forces too. A cross-examination of interviews with dozens of Egyptian participants in that conflict, contemporary reporting in the media, and also intelligence reports, offers an entirely different picture. Accordingly, for much of that war, the Israelis flew heavy air strikes on Port Said, on the northern entry to the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked two major Egyptian air bases in the Nile Delta - el-Mansourah and Tanta - in turn causing some of the biggest air battles of this war. Indeed, in Egypt, the response to these attacks reached the level of legend: the supposed repelling of an Israeli air strike on el-Mansourah, on 14 October 1973, prompted Cairo to declare not only a massive victory, but also that date for the day of its air force. However, the actual reasons for Israeli air strikes on Port Said, el-Mansourah and Tanta remain unclear to this day: there are no Israeli publications offering a sensible explanation, and there are no Egyptian publications explaining the reasoning. Only a cross-examination of additional reporting provides a possible solution: el-Mansourah was also the base of the only Egyptian unit equipped with R-17E ballistic missiles, known as the SS-1 Scud in the West. As of October 1973, these missiles were the only weapon in Egyptian hands capable of reaching central Israel - and that only if fired from the area around Port Said. While apparently unimportant in the overall context, this fact gains immensely in importance considering reports from the US intelligence services about the possible deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads to Egypt in October 1973. Discussing all the available information, strategy, tactics, equipment and related combat operations of both sides, '1973: the First Nuclear War' provides an in-depth insight into the Israeli efforts to prevent the deployment of Egyptian Scud missiles - whether armed with Soviet nuclear warheads or not - in the Port Said area: an effort that dictated a lengthy segment of the application of air power during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and resulted in some of the most spectacular air-to-air and air-to-ground battles of that conflict. Illustrated by over 100 photographs, a dozen maps and 18 color profiles, this book thus offers an entirely new thesis about crucial, but previously unknown factors that determined the flow of the aerial warfare in October 1973.