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Nuclear Power Hazard Control Policy provides an analysis of the elements that influenced the development and type of policies on the hazard control of nuclear power in Britain. The book starts with an account of the nuclear hazards and its legal and administrative basis of control. A section of the book is focused on the creation and implementation of policies. The book analyzes some types of radiation and how it is released. The diseases that develop from certain exposure to radiation are also explained. The economic aspects of nuclear power utilization are discussed in detail. Some historical accounts of significance to the study are evaluated. Events such as the British bomb and the arrival of nuclear power are some of the events. The final chapter of the book discusses a possible policy- making system that considers the changes in the environment surrounding the system. The text is intended for legislators, lawyers, nuclear physicists, students, and researchers in the field of law.
Arguing that the accident risk of present-day nuclear power plants has not been scientifically established, a nuclear-reactor engineer assesses three major types of reactors being used and developed in the United States and explores the potential consequences of accidents.
Hazard Control Policy in Britain examines the general nature of Britain's hazard control policy and the factors that appeared to influence its formation up to 1973, that is, prior to the implementation of the recommendations of the Robens' Committee on Safety and Health at work. Attention is directed mainly at identifying the apparent roles and goals of the various organizations associated with policy making. Comprised of five chapters, this book begins with an overview of the nature of hazards and their technical causes, as well as the risks to life that they pose. Hazard control policy is then considered and a model of the policy making process is postulated. The role of interest groups in the policy-making process is also analyzed. Case studies that give a clear indication of the general nature of the hazard control policy-making process are presented, covering road transport, air transport, factories, nuclear power reactors, and air contamination. This monograph should be of value to policymakers involved in hazard control.
On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.
The present report is a revision of Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988), updating the statements made on the objectives and principles of safe design and operation for electricity generating nuclear power plants. It includes the improvements made in the safety of operating nuclear power plants and identifies the principles underlying the best current safety policies to be applied in future plants. It presents INSAG's understanding of the principles underlying the best current safety policies and practices of the nuclear power industry.
Nuclear energy issues facing Congress include federal incentives for new commercial reactors, radioactive waste management policy, R&D priorities, power plant safety and regulation, nuclear weapons proliferation, and security against terrorist attacks. Contents of this report: (1) Most Recent Developments; (2) Nuclear Power Status and Outlook: Possible New Reactors; Federal Support; Nuclear Production Tax Credit; Standby Support; Loan Guarantees; Global Climate Change; (3) Nuclear Power R&D; (4) Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation; (5) Nuclear Waste Management; (6) Nuclear Weapons Proliferation; (7) Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs; (8) Legislation in the 111th Congress. Charts and tables.
Safety in the process industries is critical for those who work with chemicals and hazardous substances or processes. The field of loss prevention is, and continues to be, of supreme importance to countless companies, municipalities and governments around the world, and Lees' is a detailed reference to defending against hazards. Recognized as the standard work for chemical and process engineering safety professionals, it provides the most complete collection of information on the theory, practice, design elements, equipment, regulations and laws covering the field of process safety. An entire library of alternative books (and cross-referencing systems) would be needed to replace or improve upon it, but everything of importance to safety professionals, engineers and managers can be found in this all-encompassing three volume reference instead. - The process safety encyclopedia, trusted worldwide for over 30 years - Now available in print and online, to aid searchability and portability - Over 3,600 print pages cover the full scope of process safety and loss prevention, compiling theory, practice, standards, legislation, case studies and lessons learned in one resource as opposed to multiple sources
Since the dawn of the Atomic Age, nuclear experts have labored to imagine the unimaginable and prevent it. They confronted a deceptively simple question: When is a reactor “safe enough” to adequately protect the public from catastrophe? Some experts sought a deceptively simple answer: an estimate that the odds of a major accident were, literally, a million to one. Far from simple, this search to quantify accident risk proved to be a tremendously complex and controversial endeavor, one that altered the very notion of safety in nuclear power and beyond. Safe Enough? is the first history to trace these contentious efforts, following the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as their experts experimented with tools to quantify accident risk for use in regulation and to persuade the public of nuclear power’s safety. The intense conflict over the value of risk assessment offers a window on the history of the nuclear safety debate and the beliefs of its advocates and opponents. Across seven decades and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, the quantification of risk has transformed both society’s understanding of the hazards posed by complex technologies and what it takes to make them safe enough.
Originally published in 1986. Nuclear power is now regarded as essential to survival in the twenty-first century. But the safety of nuclear power stations is a highly controversial topic, and where they will be sited is a most vital question. In this independent critique, based on four years of research, Stan Openshaw argues that reactor siting provides a simple means of offering additional, design-independent margins of safety. Reactor siting policies in the UK and USA are examined and it is suggested that UK siting practices need to be updated. The large number of potential alternative sites should be used to devise new planning strategies – strategies which will minimise both the residual health risks from accidents and the danger that a future change in public opinion might lead to calls for the closure of many existing sites on safety grounds.
The book has been developed in conjunction with NERS 462, a course offered every year to seniors and graduate students in the University of Michigan NERS program. The first half of the book covers the principles of risk analysis, the techniques used to develop and update a reliability data base, the reliability of multi-component systems, Markov methods used to analyze the unavailability of systems with repairs, fault trees and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), and failure modes of systems. All of this material is general enough that it could be used in non-nuclear applications, although there is an emphasis placed on the analysis of nuclear systems. The second half of the book covers the safety analysis of nuclear energy systems, an analysis of major accidents and incidents that occurred in commercial nuclear plants, applications of PRA techniques to the safety analysis of nuclear power plants (focusing on a major PRA study for five nuclear power plants), practical PRA examples, and emerging techniques in the structure of dynamic event trees and fault trees that can provide a more realistic representation of complex sequences of events. The book concludes with a discussion on passive safety features of advanced nuclear energy systems under development and approaches taken for risk-informed regulations for nuclear plants.