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Concepts associated with nuclear strategy often go beyond any 'objective' logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have special roles in different national belief-systems, myths surround them, they have catalysed tensions already existing in societies, become symbols of power or of past sins. This book delves into the conscious and subconscious beliefs in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (all voiced in debates about nuclear strategy) about society, the State and power structures, each country's place in the world, the international system, allies and enemies.
The primary mission assigned to the British Army from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War was deterring Soviet aggression in Europe by demonstrating the will and capability to fight with nuclear weapons to defend NATO territory. This is the first comprehensive account of how the British Army imagined nuclear war, and how it planned to fight it.
This book explores what political conditions must be established and what obstacles overcome for the fi ve offi cial Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)— China, France, Russia, the UK and US— to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The different views and positions of a range of actors concerning nuclear weapons issues— including elite perspectives and public opinion— and the political assumptions underpinning them, are discussed to develop a more democratic approach to disarmament. Addressing the lack of detailed analysis concerning the meaning of nuclear disarmament for the domestic political orders of NWS, the book critically explores different approaches to and theories of disarmament within legal, political and technical literatures and orthodox and critical theory. It also builds on previous discussions of nuclear possession, restraint, arms control, and disarmament— concerning both nuclear possessor and non- possessor states— identifying the insights these works provide regarding how NWS disarmament may be advanced. Contributing to theoretical debates concerning how domestic politics interacts with and determines states’ international behaviour, the book will be of interest to all scholars and students of history, politics, international relations, security studies, military history, war studies, peace studies, confl ict, democracy, and global governance.
In this book, Michael Gardiner suggests that the conception of the ‘war-ending’ weapon was tied up with a longer commitment to unified space and singular progress. The mission for total weapons can be seen rising with the highly-technical defensive war of the later nineteenth century, and passing through twentieth century atomic research, then the targeting of the outsides of commercial empire, and the post-war consensus with deterrence as its foundation. The end of the Cold War brought an opportunity to fully naturalise deterrence, but also brought a tacit acceptance of nuclear violence while forms of violence against the individual were rigorously sought out. If the world-unifying role of deterrence has always been undermined by the rise of rival empires, it has also been questioned by critical communities including the consensus-sceptics of the 1950s–60s, 1980s–90s Nuclear Criticism and readers of ‘nuclear ism’, millennial campaigns for Scottish independence, and twenty-first century descriptions of nuclear colonialism. Recently it has become more obvious that an Anglosphere concept of ‘worldly’ deterrence was bound to a singular and ultimately nihilistic idea of progress.[bio]Michael Gardiner is Professor in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Warwick.
Examines the cast of mind that created and maintains the nuclear threat and suggests an alternative direction.
Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland’s west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK’s complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons—internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.
The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics, but sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War.
This book examines the moral dilemmas of nuclear dissemination, and the justifications of both nuclear pursuit and avoidance by contemporary states. Applying Constructivist methodologies and moral theory, the author analyses a core set of moral dilemmas that ensnare decision-makers amongst state and non-state nuclear aspirants, as well as amongst states committed to preventing horizontal proliferation. The book shows that the character, structure and implications of these dilemmas have not yet been adequately understood or appreciated, and that such an understanding is necessary for an effective set of nonproliferation policies. Furthermore, it shows that the dilemmas’ force and political policy import are evident in the 'discourses' that diverse actors undertake to defend their nuclear choices, and how the dilemmas of nuclear aspirants are implicated in those of nuclear preventers. The author advocates a number of policy recommendations that reinforce some already made by scholars and experts but, more importantly, others that advise significantly different courses of action. The book reveals how the moral dilemmas of nuclear aspiration, avoidance, and prevention constitute the security dilemmas and paradoxes that comprise much of the 21st century security environment. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international relations, ethics, and international security studies.