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In numerous crises after World War II—Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East—the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats with the commonly accepted logic of nuclear deterrence and coercion. Rejecting standard explanations of our leader's logic in these cases, Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither consciously blufffing when they made nuclear threats, nor prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed. The author also challenges the myth that the 1950s was a golden age of low vulberability for the United Stateas and details how nuclear parity has, and has not, altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear blackmail in the past.
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.
What is Mutual Assured Destruction Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy which posits that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of rational deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Mutual assured destruction Chapter 2: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Chapter 3: Strategic Defense Initiative Chapter 4: First strike (nuclear strategy) Chapter 5: Minimal deterrence Chapter 6: Nuclear strategy Chapter 7: Nuclear utilization target selection Chapter 8: Fail-deadly Chapter 9: Nuclear arms race Chapter 10: Massive retaliation (II) Answering the public top questions about mutual assured destruction. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Mutual Assured Destruction.
For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.
Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 46. Chapters: Assured destruction, Balance of terror, Brinkmanship, Cost-exchange ratio, Counterforce, Countervalue, Credible minimum deterrence, Dead Hand (nuclear war), Decapitation strike, Deterrence theory, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence, Fail-deadly, First strike, Gen 75 Committee, Launch on warning, Letters of last resort, Madman theory, Massive retaliation, Minimal deterrence, Minimum Credible Deterrence (Pakistan), Mutual assured destruction, No first use, Nuclear blackmail, Nuclear peace, Nuclear strategy, Nuclear triad, Nuclear utilization target selection, Operation Dropshot, Plan Totality, Second strike, Single Integrated Operational Plan.
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