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The United States and the Soviet Union could drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals below the levels prescribed by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The end of the Cold War and the transformation of international security now under way present the United States with opportunities to develop new policies based on greater international cooperation with the Soviet Union and other major powers. This new book describes two lower levels of nuclear forces that could be achieved, as well as other related measures to improve international security.
This paper, which is included as a chapter in [U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase] (Cornell University Press, 1986), analyzes the nuclear arms control dimension of U.S.-Soviet relations as it enters a new phase. It reviews the developments and forces that led to the present impasse, discusses the nuclear arms agenda before the leaderships of the two states, and considers the prospects for future agreements. It includes an analysis of the Soviet and American arms control proposals of October and November 1985 and discusses prospects for agreement in the light of congruent and divergent aspects of the two proposals. The authors suggest that an arrangement between the superpowers that provided the Soviet Union with assurances against a U.S. strategic defensive breakout during the lifetime of any new far-reaching arms reduction treaty might facilitate conclusion of such an agreement. Constraints on flight testing might slow down the pace of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), depending on precisely where the line was drawn between permitted research and forbidden testing and for how long. However, in the context of a new treaty reducing nuclear offensive arms, continued U.S. conduct of a vigorous SDI research program within agreed constraints would provide the Soviet Union with strong additional incentives to comply more punctiliously than it has in the past with treaty provisions.
The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volume--based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)--describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.

The Future of Arms Control

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, and International Environment

Published: 1982

Total Pages: 242


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“An excellent contribution to the debate on the future role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in American foreign policy.” ―Contemporary Security Policy This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real-world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them. “Well-researched and carefully argued.” ―Foreign Affairs