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"Leading Asian and security studies experts consider the question: What would happen if North Korea "goes nuclear?" and their answers are critical. Scholars and policymakers alike need to understand the implications not only for northeast Asian regional security, but also for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moore's contributors evaluate political, economic, and security issues including: how South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia would react to such an event, and the possibility of a regional arms race; what diplomatic and strategic options the U.S. has; and how the global community's expectations regarding nuclear non-proliferation would be effected. Given the instability and mystery surrounding North Korean politics, scholarship on the implications of the country's nuclear capability is critical, which makes this volume with its unique focus a timely addition to the East Asian security studies field"--
North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Kim Jong-un’s regime now appears to be close, however. Sung Chull Kim, Michael D. Cohen, and the volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons? How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond, and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.
North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. The volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea.
This book explains the origin and historical development of North Korean nuclear weapon dated from the aftermath of World War II. The story of North Korea's nuclear program began when the United States dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 which led to Japan's immediate defeat. Surprised by the speed of Japan's surrender, North Korea's founding leader Kim Il-sung vowed to secure nuclear capability to avoid suffering the fate of its eastern neighbor. Based on the author's extensive experience in the academia, government, and intelligence circles, the book traces how the nuclear program has evolved since and explores wide-ranging issues including the positive function of nuclear weapon in Pyongyang's local politics, the history of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, the prospects of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the diplomatic and military options presented to US President Donald Trump in dealing with the nuclear threat, and the future scenarios of the North Korean regime and the possibilities of a reunified Korea.With the nuclear weapon crisis likely to persist in the foreseeable time, is it feasible for South Korea to achieve reunification in the Korean Peninsula? Will the six-party members like the US, China, Russia and Japan agree with reunification without denuclearization? Can the issues of nuclear weapon and unification be settled simultaneously in the future? The book seeks to address these questions and more.
The authors argue that the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) should pursue firm deterrence of North Korean nuclear weapon use--which might soon pose a serious threat to the United States and the ROK--rather than relying on negotiations.
What are the consequences of a successful nuclear program in North Korea? Despite near-universal opposition to North Korea's moves to acquire nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is determined to succeed. It is only a matter of time before the North Koreans are able to combine their extant nuclear weapons capabilities with a viable delivery system. The threat multiplies in light of the North Koreans having already demonstrated the willingness and ability to sell nuclear technology, materials, and know-how to other nuclear aspirants. In North Korean Nuclear Operationality, Gregory J. Moore asks leading experts in Asian and security studies to consider the international consequences of a North Korea with operational nuclear weapons. How will South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia react, and does it mean an arms race in the region is inevitable? How should the United States handle the situation, both diplomatically and strategically? North Korea has already destabilized the nuclear nonproliferation regime by being the only country ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and then openly test nuclear weapons. What are the repercussions for the nonproliferation regime of a successful North Korean move to nuclear weapons operationality? Given the importance of these issues and the lack of transparency surrounding North Korean politics, North Korean Nuclear Operationality offers critical and timely insight. A foreword by Graham T. Allison, founding dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, sets the stage for a rigorous look at the threats North Korea poses to regional security and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.
North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country—one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years—progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021? Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details—described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon—to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington. Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides. The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.
This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons.