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This book presents a new economic theory developed from physical and biological principles. It explains how technology, social systems and economic values are intimately related to resources. Many people have recognized that mainstream (neoclassical) economic theories are not consistent with physical laws and often not consistent with empirical patterns, but most feel that economic activities are too complex to be described by a simple and coherent mathematical theory. While social systems are indeed complex, all life systems, including social systems, satisfy two principles. First, all systems need to extract resources from the external environment to compensate for their consumption. Second, for a system to be viable, the amount of resource extraction has to be no less than the level of consumption. From these two principles, we derive a quantitative theory of major factors in economic activities, such as fixed cost, variable cost, discount rate, uncertainty and duration. The mathematical theory enables us to systematically measure the effectiveness of different policies and institutional structures at varying levels of resource abundance and cost.The theory presented in this book shows that there do not exist universally optimal policies or institutional structures. Instead, the impacts of different policies or social structures have to be measured within the context of existing levels of resource abundance. As the physical costs of extracting resources rise steadily, many policy assumptions adopted in mainstream economic theories, and workable in times of cheap and abundant energy supplies and other resources, need to be reconsidered. In this rapidly changing world, the theory presented here provides a solid foundation for examining the long-term impacts of today's policy decisions.
On account of the impressive yield of empirical science since the dawn of modern era, theorists of human behavior have sought eagerly to adopt its methodology to explain and predict behavior in the same way that natural science does with respect to natural phenomena. Thus, the positivist principle endorsed the unity of science approach to both the natural and social worlds. Modern social science, in its specific forms of sociology, economics, and so on, confidently embraced the positivist principle. In a short period of time, political economy was transformed into economic science. The goal was to purge the social sciences of their supposedly evaluative content. In due course, the idea of objective scientific truth came to be questioned along with the positivist paradigm. Epistemological relativism à la Kuhn is to be credited with this intellectual shift. But this novel theoretical approach was more easily accommodated by epistemologists of science than scientists themselves. Scientists hardly questioned their methodologies of research and the cognitive field of successful theories. Similarly, in the social sciences, neoclassical economics remained dominant. The neoclassical motto was that economics as science answered only questions of efficiency, not evaluative questions of social justice. The Human Project and the Temptations of Science argues that the model of epistemological unity, at one time embracing positivism, at another time supporting epistemological relativism, is questionable. While empirical science does yield knowledge of the natural world, knowledge of the social world - the world of humans - is necessarily value-laden. Despite the quantitative veneer of neoclassical economics - the dominant paradigm in economics - economic analysis cannot avoid questions of value. The reason is that its foundational concepts, such as rationality and the maximization of expected utility, reflect the necessary value-oriented nature of human behavior. The question posed, then, by The Human Project and the Temptations of Science is what sort of optimal values should humans adopt.
This work examines the claim to scienific status made by supporters and practitioners of neoclassical economics. The approach taken is that of the history and philosophy of science. Analysis points to the conclusion that theories of economic choice are necessarily normative, essentially because of the nature of human behavior.
There are quite a lot of recent books on the methodology of economics, but all proceed from one or more of the following three fundamental assumptions: 1) Meta-apriorism: it is a priori believed that the results of the philosophy of science of the past decades, associated with the names of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, yield conceptual frameworks that can be used to describe the product of the economist's endeavours. 2) Synchronism: it is believed that the inspection of a "theory" of economics, the presentation of some economic belief at a point in time, reveals its logical structure and ipso facto the "method" by which the "theory" is constructed. 3) CreduZity: it is believed that what economists themselves say on their own methods is true, or at least of primary relevance. In this book, I endeavour to show that these assumptions are false. First, the philosophies of science by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos did not succeed in constructing a conceptual framework capable of describing theory development in economics. Secondly, this can only be seen as soon as not Zogic but history is taken to be the referee judging the adequacy of metatheories (diachronism). Thirdly the results of metaempiricaZ (not-meta-aprioristic), diachronic (not-synchronic) research reveals that even economists themselves turn out frequently to have inadequate metatheories upon which it is dangerous to rely (suspicion instead of credulity) .
In this original and important book, Harold Kincaid defends a view of the special sciences -- all sciences outside physics -- as autonomous and nonreducible. He argues that the biological and social sciences provide explanations that cannot be captured by explanations at the level of their constituent parts, and yet that this does not commit us to mysterious, nonphysical entities like vital forces or group minds. A look at real scientific practice shows that the many different sciences can be unified in a way that leaves them each an autonomous explanatory role. This book will be of great interest to philosophers of science and social scientists.
'...the history of economic theory at its best.'-EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
First published in 1990, this unique explanation of the rise of neoclassical economics views social change as an engine promoting change in theory. It attempts to develop a theory of the origins, consolidation and rise to dominance of the neoclassical school of thought. In so doing, it addresses the contest between the labour and utility theories of value; both are placed in historical context, and reasons are offered for the relative success of each in particular historical periods. It is argued that the eventual dominance of neoclassicism, a theory based on the social changes then taking place, resulted not from its scientific superiority but from its non-social perspective which ignores the social order upon which it depends.
For more than two decades, the law and economics movement has been one of the most influential and controversial schools of thought in American jurisprudence. In this authoritative intellectual history, James R. Hackney Jr. situates the modern law and economics movement within the trajectory of American jurisprudence from the early days of the Republic to the present. Hackney is particularly interested in the claims of objectivity or empiricism asserted by proponents of law and economics. He argues that the incorporation of economic analysis into legal decision making is not an inherently objective enterprise. Rather, law and economics often cloaks ideological determinations—particularly regarding the distribution of wealth—under the cover of science. Hackney demonstrates how legal-economic thought has been affected by the prevailing philosophical ideas about objectivity, which have in turn evolved in response to groundbreaking scientific discoveries. Thus Hackney’s narrative is a history not only of law and economics but also of select strands of philosophy and science. He traces forward from the seventeenth-century the interaction of legal thinking and economic analysis with ideas about the attainability of certitude. The principal legal-economic theories Hackney examines are those that emerged from classical legal thought, legal realism, law and neoclassical economics, and critical legal studies. He links these theories respectively to formalism, pragmatism, the analytic turn, and neopragmatism/postmodernism, and he explains how each of these schools of philosophical thought was influenced by specific scientific discoveries: Newtonian physics, Darwin’s theory of evolution, Einstein’s theories of relativity, and quantum mechanics. Under Cover of Science challenges claims that the contemporary law and economics movement is an objective endeavor by historicizing ideas about certitude and empiricism and their relation to legal-economic thought.