Download Free Negotiating The Us Japan Alliance Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Negotiating The Us Japan Alliance and write the review.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of abbreviations -- List of persons -- Introduction -- Part I The foundations of U.S.-Japan security arrangements -- 1 The Kennedy-Reischauer line, 1961-1963 -- 2 The Vietnam War and the U.S.-Japan alliance, 1964-1968 -- Part II Secrecy in the U.S.-Japan alliance -- 3 U.S. foreign policy formulation -- 4 Japanese foreign policy formulation -- 5 U.S.-Japan negotiations -- 6 The November 1969 U.S.-Japan summit -- Part III Where is Japan heading? -- 7 Japan's defense build-up -- 8 Impact of U.S. rapprochement with China on the U.S.-Japan alliance -- 9 The U.S.-Japan defense cooperation -- Conclusion -- Selected bibliography -- Index
In recent years, the U.S.–Japan alliance has marked several anniversaries, including 40 years since the 1969 decision on the reversion of Okinawa. These occasions have provided crucial opportunities to reassess the continuing significance of U.S.–Japan security and diplomatic relations, prompting this investigation into major issues in negotiations between the two countries. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative analysis of the U.S. and Japanese foreign policy formulation and implementation processes from 1961 to 1978, which also explores the long-term strategic significance of the U.S. deterrence in East Asia. It is based on numerous declassified and previously unused U.S. and Japanese documents, oral histories, and the author’s interviews with former officials. The book traces the origins of contemporary security and diplomatic issues back to the 1961–1978 U.S.–Japan negotiations involving secret arrangements in the reversion of Okinawa, Japan’s defense build-up, including the question of Japan’s nuclear option, and U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. Through a systematic assessment of the behind-the-scenes discussions, Dr Yukinori Komine demonstrates that external security calculations were consistently primary factors in U.S.–Japan relations. The book concludes by making policy-relevant suggestions, important for the "Pacific Century". This book offers crucial contributions to the ongoing debate regarding the increasing need for greater transparency and burden-sharing in the U.S.–Japan alliance. It will appeal to scholars and students of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific region, East Asia–U.S. relations, U.S. Politics and Japanese Politics, as well as Foreign Policy.
Explores four recent US-Japanese negotiations - two over trade and two over security-related issues - looking for patterns in Japan's approach and behaviour. Each study explains the cultural, as well as the political, institutional and personal factors, and assesses their influence.
Japan's modern international history began in 1858 with the signing of the "unequal" commercial treaty with the United States. Over the next fifteen years, Japanese diplomacy was reshaped to respond to the Western imperialist challenge. Negotiating with Imperialism is the first book to explain the emergence of modern Japan through this early period of treaty relations. Michael Auslin dispels the myth that the Tokugawa bakufu was diplomatically incompetent. Refusing to surrender to the West's power, bakufu diplomats employed negotiation as a weapon to defend Japan's interests. Tracing various visions of Japan's international identity, Auslin examines the evolution of the culture of Japanese diplomacy. Further, he demonstrates the limits of nineteenth-century imperialist power by examining the responses of British, French, and American diplomats. After replacing the Tokugawa in 1868, Meiji leaders initially utilized bakufu tactics. However, their 1872 failure to revise the treaties led them to focus on domestic reform as a way of maintaining independence and gaining equality with the West. In a compelling analysis of the interplay among assassinations, Western bombardment of Japanese cities, fertile cultural exchange, and intellectual discovery, Auslin offers a persuasive reading of the birth of modern Japan and its struggle to determine its future relations with the world.
Schoppa documents how U.S. pressure has been misapplied in the past, insisting on the need for a strategy more informed about internal Japanese politics. While a strategy reliant on brute force is liable to backfire, he argues, one which works with domestic politics in Japan can succeed.
No nation was more deeply affected by America’s rise to world power than Japan. President Franklin Roosevelt’s uncompromising policy of unconditional surrender led to the catastrophic finale of the Asia-Pacific War and the most intrusive international reconstruction of another nation in modern history. Japan in the American Century examines how Japan, with its deeply conservative heritage, responded to the imposition of a new liberal order. The price Japan paid to end the occupation was a cold war alliance with the United States that ensured America’s dominance in the region. Still traumatized by its wartime experience, Japan developed a grand strategy of dependence on U.S. security guarantees so that the nation could concentrate on economic growth. Yet from the start, despite American expectations, Japan reworked the American reforms to fit its own circumstances and cultural preferences, fashioning distinctively Japanese variations on capitalism, democracy, and social institutions. Today, with the postwar world order in retreat, Japan is undergoing a sea change in its foreign policy, returning to an activist, independent role in global politics not seen since 1945. Distilling a lifetime of work on Japan and the United States, Kenneth Pyle offers a thoughtful history of the two nations’ relationship at a time when the character of that alliance is changing. Japan has begun to pull free from the constraints established after World War II, with repercussions for its relations with the United States and its role in Asian geopolitics.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Like my two other books about security and territorial issues in the U.S.-Japan relationship, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-19523 and The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations, 4 this is first and foremost a study on the "intra-alliance" dynamics in which one country, the United States, continued to occupy and administer islands that were recognized as Japanese territory but, for a number of reasons, the United States and its wartime allies felt necessary to continue to administer. The longer this control continued, the more unnecessary it was seen by increasingly larger segments of the public and government of both countries due to the political erosion of the relationship caused by this friction. The question for policy makers and political leaders was finding the balance between security concerns, reversion demands, and national sentiment (in both countries), particularly as it related to the memory and sacrifices at Iwo Jima, in an effort to maintain friendly and cooperative relations. Eventually, the U.S. government agreed to Japanese requests to return the islands and this was done on 26 June 1968, a full four years prior to the even more problematic, but strategically important, Okinawa.
"A very good attempt to give a coherent and consistent account of the China-U.S. contacts during the Cold War.... [R]eaders will certainly gain a better understanding of this interesting and intricate history." -- Zhou Wenzhong, Chinese Ambassador to the United States Few relationships during the Cold War were as dramatic as that between the United States and China. During World War II, China was America's ally against Japan. By 1949, the two countries viewed each other as adversaries and soon faced off in Korea. For the next two decades, Beijing and Washington were bitter enemies. Negotiating with the Enemy is a gripping account of that period. On several occasions -- Taiwan in 1954 and 1958, and Vietnam in 1965 -- the nations were again on the verge of direct military confrontation. However, even as relations seemed at their worst, the process leading to a rapprochement had begun. Dramatic episodes such as the Ping-Pong diplomacy of spring 1971 and Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 paved the way for Nixon's historic 1972 meeting with Mao.
In Japan's Reluctant Realism , Michael J. Green examines the adjustments of Japanese foreign policy in the decade since the end of the Cold War. Green presents case studies of China, the Korean peninsula, Russia and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the international financial institutions, and multilateral forums (the United Nations, APEC, and the ARF). In each of these studies, Green considers Japanese objectives; the effectiveness of Japanese diplomacy in achieving those objectives; the domestic and exogenous pressures on policy-making; the degree of convergence or divergence with the United States in both strategy and implementation; and lessons for more effective US - Japan diplomatic cooperation in the future. As Green notes, its bilateral relationship with the United States is at the heart of Japan's foreign policy initiatives, and Japan therefore conducts foreign policy with one eye carefully on Washington. However, Green argues, it is time to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia, and to assess Japanese foreign policy in its own terms.