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This book represents a detailed and comprehensive examination of the developments of NATO’s engagement in Kosovo, and the related policies of western countries. In addition to offering an in-depth analysis of historical developments in the relationships between Albanians and Serbs, the book also provides a constructive discussion of the events of the Kosovo conflict, which constituted one of the main concerns in the international agenda towards the end of the twentieth century. The basic theme set forth in this book is the reasoning behind NATO’s intervention in Kosovo during the spring of 1999, namely to end the conflict between Albanians and Serbs and to aid the Kosovo Albanians in achieving their freedom from the jurisdiction of the Serbian state. Based on extensive evidence, the author analyzes the contradicting stances conveyed at the Security Council regarding the conflict, NATO’s military intervention and the issue of Kosovo’s future. The book provides useful information for any scholars, students and readers interested in gaining a more detailed understanding of Kosovo’s historical developments on an international level. It offers the reader detailed insights into, and descriptions of, the events that took place in the military conflict in Kosovo; it provides various facts and figures, evidences and counterarguments in response to what happened in this politically volatile region.
A compelling account of the diplomatic and military actions that led to Kosovo's independence and their implications for future U.S. and UN interventions. Kosovo, after its incorporation into the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia, became increasingly restive during the 1990s as Yugoslavia plunged into internal war and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian residents (Kosovars) sought autonomy. In March 1999, NATO forces began airstrikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia in an effort to protect Kosovars against persecution. The bombing campaign ended in June 1999, and Kosovo was placed under transitional UN administration while negotiations on its status ensued. Kosovo eventually declared independence in 2008. Despite internal political tension and economic problems, the new nation has been recognized by many other countries and most of its inhabitants welcome its separation from Serbia. In Liberating Kosovo, David Phillips offers a compelling account of the negotiations and military actions that culminated in Kosovo's independence. Drawing on his own participation in the diplomatic process and interviews with leading participants, Phillips chronicles Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power, the sufferings of the Kosovars, and the events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. He analyzes how NATO, the United Nations, and the United States employed diplomacy, aerial bombing, and peacekeeping forces to set in motion the process that led to independence for Kosovo. He also offers important insights into a critical issue in contemporary international politics: how and when the United States, other nations, and NGOs should act to prevent ethnic cleansing and severe human-rights abuses.
Selected for the 2008 Royal Air Force Reading List In this revealing work, Dag Henriksen discloses the origins and content of NATO's strategic and conceptual thinking on how the use of force was to succeed politically in altering the behavior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, was the first war against any sovereign nation in the history of NATO and the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian purposes against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. This book examines the key political, diplomatic, and military processes that shaped NATO and U.S. management of the Kosovo crisis and shows how air power became the main instrument in their strategy to coerce the FRY to accede to NATO's demands. The book further shows that the military leaders set to execute the campaign had no clear strategic guidance on what the operation was to achieve and that the level of uncertainty was so high that the officers selecting the bombing targets watched NATO's military spokesman on CNN for guidance in choosing their targets. Henriksen argues that structures preceding the Kosovo crisis shaped the management to a much greater degree than events taking place in Kosovo and that the air power community's largely institutionalized focus on high-intensity conflicts, like the 1991 Gulf War, hampered them from developing strategies to fit the political complexities of crises. Because fighting and wars in the lower end of the intensity spectrum are likely to surface again, study of the Kosovo crisis offers lessons for future international conflicts in which the combination of force and diplomacy will play a very significant role.
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. Analyses the international response to the crisis in Kosovo, and its broader implications by examining its diplomatic, military and humanitarian features. Unravelling these implications can be challenging as it remains an event replete with paradoxes - the originality of this book's approach lies in its exploration of these paradoxes. The crisis in Kosovo has been a headline grabbing event - a serious study of the implications of the conflict on wider European security issues and institutions is urgently required.
Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.
Nato intervention in Kosovo marked a major turning point in post cold war international relations. While some western commentators argued that it was the first war to be fought on purely moral grounds, Serbian, Russian and Chinese assessments were sharply different.This highly original addition to the literature on Kosovo highlights the importance of perspective to an understanding of both the causes and consequences of war. It makes clear that the conceptual lenses, paradigms or frameworks through which political actors view reality in turn affect their understanding of the behaviour of others and their reactions to it. The authors, a team of regional experts on the countries covered, examine the way the war has been understood in countries involved in and peripheral to the conflict. Their aim is to provide a broad yet highly nuanced picture of this focal point of Balkan unrest.The book opens with an introduction to the historical and regional context of the conflict. The authors go on to present twelve case-studies, ranging from Serbia, and the other former Yugoslav republics, to the USA and to China. These detailed regional studies highlight the considerable variation in the key states' perceptions of their national interest and their perceptions of what constitutes legality or legitimacy. In each case, domestic constraints are explored and the ways in which differing perspectives of political and military leadership fed into the crisis are examined. Further thematic chapters determine the war's consequences and the lessons to be drawn in terms of the wider issues of refugees, humanitarian intervention, European security, and geopolitics.
George examines seven cases--from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf--in which the United States has used coercive diplomacy in the past half-century.
The war in Kosovo was a turning point: NATO deployed its armed forces in war for the first time, and placed the controversial doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' squarely in the world's eye. It was an armed intervention for the purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions-but without Security Council authorization.This report tries to answer a number of burning questions, such as why the international community was unable to act earlier and prevent the escalation of the conflict, as well as focusing on the capacity of the United Nations to act as global peacekeeper.The Commission recommends a new status for Kosovo, 'conditional independence', with the goal of lasting peace and security for Kosovo-and for the Balkan region in general. But many of the conslusions may be beneficially applied to conflicts the world-over.