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Most current U.S. nuclear warheads were built in the 1970s and 1980s and are being retained longer than was planned. Yet they deteriorate and must be maintained. To correct problems, a Life Extension Program (LEP), part of a larger Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), replaces components. Modifying some components would require a nuclear test, but the United States has observed a test moratorium since 1992. Congress and the Administration prefer to avoid a return to testing, so LEP rebuilds these components as closely as possible to original specifications. With this approach, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified stockpile safety and reliability for the past 12 years without nuclear testing. NNSA argues it will become harder to certify current warheads with LEP because small changes may undermine confidence in warheads, perhaps leading to nuclear testing, whereas new-design replacement warheads created by the RRW program will be easier to certify without testing. Critics believe LEP and SSP can maintain the stockpile indefinitely. They worry that untested RRWs may make testing more likely and question cost savings, given high investment cost. They note that there are no military requirements for new weapons. Others feel that neither LEP nor RRW can provide high confidence over the long term, and would resume testing. Another point of view is that either LEP or RRW will work without nuclear testing. This report provides background and tracks legislation. It will be updated to reflect final FY2010 congressional action on RRW. See also CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program, by Jonathan Medalia, which compares these two programs in detail.
Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Rationale for the PGS Mission; PGS and the U.S. Strategic Command; Potential Targets for the PGS Mission; Conventional BM and the PGS Mission; (3) Plans and Programs: Navy Programs: Reentry Vehicle Research; Conventional Trident Modification; Sub.-Launched Intermediate-Range BM; Air Force Programs: The FALCON Study; Reentry Vehicle Research and Warhead Options; Missile Options; Defense-Wide Conventional PGS: The Conventional Strike Missile; Hypersonic Test Vehicle; Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon; ArcLight; (4) Issues for Congress: Assessing the Rationale for CPGS; Reviewing the Alternatives; Arms Control Issues. A print on demand report.
"To be sure, manned systems could accomplish many if not all of the same goals. But "unmanned systems reduce the risk to our warfighters by providing a sophisticated stand-off capability that supports intelligence, command and control, targeting, and weapons delivery. These systems also improve situational awareness and reduce many of the emotional hazards inherent in air and ground combat, thus decreasing the likelihood of causing civilian noncombatant casualties." "UAVs have gained favor as ways to reduce risk to combat troops, the cost of hardware and the reaction time in a surgical strike" and "to conduct missions in areas that are difficult to access or otherwise considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground."--Page 3 (author).