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This official NASA document provides an interesting review of NASA's experience working with the Russians and lessons on astronaut safety assurance of the Soyuz spacecraft. This report on Soyuz history was conceived as a possible analogy relevant to domestic commercial spaceflight vehicles. The question of how to human-rate new spacecraft has been asked many times throughout the history of human spaceflight. The U. S., Russia, and, now China have each separately and successfully addressed this question. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station (ISS). NASA's latest developmental experience includes Constellation, but also encompasses X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, the Soyuz vehicle would be another relevant example of the methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and how to work with commercial spacecraft providers. As known from history, the first U.S. astronaut to orbit on a Soyuz spacecraft was Thomas P. Stafford on July 17, 1975, during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) mission. Norman E. Thagard was the first U.S. astronaut to launch on a Soyuz launch vehicle, Soyuz TM-21, on March 14, 1995, on a flight to the Russian Mir Space Station. This flight was associated with the U.S./Russian - Shuttle/Mir Program. The first Soyuz launched to ISS included astronaut William M. Shepherd, Soyuz TM-31, on October 31, 2000. Prior to this, NASA studied Soyuz as an assured crew return vehicle (ACRV) for Space Station Freedom (SSF) to be launched on the Space Shuttle. Presently, in preparation for Space Shuttle retirement, all U.S. astronauts are being transported to and from ISS in the Russian Soyuz spacecraft, which is launched on the Soyuz launch vehicle. In the case of Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices have had to be adapted. For a variety of external reasons, NASA has taken a "trust but verify" approach to Soyuz and international cargo vehicles. The verify approach was to perform joint safety assurance assessments of the critical spacecraft systems. For Soyuz, NASA's primary assurance was (and continues to be) its long and successful flight history. The other key measure relied on diverse teams of NASA's best technical experts working very closely with their foreign counterparts to understand the essential design, verification, and operational features of Soyuz. Those experts used their personal experiences and NASA's corporate knowledge (in the form of agency, program, center, and other standards) to jointly and independently assess a wide range of topics.
Rex Hall and Dave Shayler provide a unique history of the Soyuz spacecraft programme from conception, through development to its use, detailed in the only English language book available on this topic. Planned for publication in 2003, it will celebrate 40 years since the original concept of the Soyuz craft.
The U. S., Russia, and, China have each addressed the question of human-rating spacecraft. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. NASA s latest developmental experience includes Constellation, X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, Soyuz is another example of methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and to work with commercial spacecraft providers. For Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices were adapted. Building on NASA's Soyuz experience, this report contends all past, present, and future vehicles rely on a range of methods and techniques for human-rating assurance, the components of which include: requirements, conceptual development, prototype evaluations, configuration management, formal development reviews (safety, design, operations), component/system ground-testing, integrated flight tests, independent assessments, and launch readiness reviews. When constraints (cost, schedule, international) limit the depth/breadth of one or more preferred assurance means, ways are found to bolster the remaining areas. This report provides information exemplifying the above safety assurance model for consideration with commercial or foreign-government-designed spacecraft. Topics addressed include: U.S./Soviet-Russian government/agency agreements and engineering/safety assessments performed with lessons learned in historic U.S./Russian joint space ventures Johnson Space Center LESSONS LEARNED; SAFETY; SOYUZ SPACECRAFT; AEROSPACE SAFETY; MANNED SPACECRAFT; CERTIFICATION; COMMERCIAL SPACECRAFT; FLIGHT TESTS; GROUND TESTS; APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT; SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
The U. S., Russia, and, China have each addressed the question of human-rating spacecraft. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. NASA s latest developmental experience includes Constellation, X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, Soyuz is another example of methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and to work with commercial spacecraft providers. For Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices were adapted. Building on NASA's Soyuz experience, this report contends all past, present, and future vehicles rely on a range of methods and techniques for human-rating assurance, the components of which include: requirements, conceptual development, prototype evaluations, configuration management, formal development reviews (safety, design, operations), component/system ground-testing, integrated flight tests, independent assessments, and launch readiness reviews. When constraints (cost, schedule, international) limit the depth/breadth of one or more preferred assurance means, ways are found to bolster the remaining areas. This report provides information exemplifying the above safety assurance model for consideration with commercial or foreign-government-designed spacecraft. Topics addressed include: U.S./Soviet-Russian government/agency agreements and engineering/safety assessments performed with lessons learned in historic U.S./Russian joint space ventures.
The awe-inspiring Sunday Times Bestseller from astronaut Tim Peake Shortlisted for the British Book Award 2018 'Amazing . . . A brilliant book' Chris Evans, BBC Radio 2 Have you ever thought of becoming an astronaut? Ask an Astronaut is Tim Peake's personal guide to life in space, based on his historic Principia mission, and the thousands of questions he has been asked since his return to Earth. How does it feel to orbit the earth ten times faster than a speeding bullet? What's it like to eat, sleep and go to the toilet in space? And where to next - the moon, mars or beyond? From training to launch, historic spacewalk to re-entry, Tim has a fascinating answer to everything you ever wanted to know. He reveals for readers of all ages the extraordinary secrets, cutting-edge science, and everyday wonders of life onboard the International Space Station. 'Everything you ever wanted to know about life in space' Times
As the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) retires the Space Shuttle and shifts involvement in International Space Station (ISS) operations, changes in the role and requirements of NASA's Astronaut Corps will take place. At the request of NASA, the National Research Council (NRC) addressed three main questions about these changes: what should be the role and size of Johnson Space Center's (JSC) Flight Crew Operations Directorate (FCOD); what will be the requirements of astronaut training facilities; and is the Astronaut Corps' fleet of training aircraft a cost-effective means of preparing astronauts for NASA's spaceflight program? This report presents an assessment of several issues driven by these questions. This report does not address explicitly the future of human spaceflight.