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“For anyone seeking a full understanding of the end of the Napoleonic era this book is a must read . . . [a] tour de force of research.” —Clash of Steel On the morning of 3 July 1815, the French General Rémi Joseph Isidore Exelmans, at the head of a brigade of dragoons, fired the last shots in the defense of Paris until the Franco-Prussian War sixty-five years later. Why did he do so? Traditional stories of 1815 end with Waterloo, that fateful day of 18 June, when Napoleon Bonaparte fought and lost his last battle, abdicating his throne on 22 June. But Waterloo was not the end; it was the beginning of a new and untold story. Seldom studied in French histories and virtually ignored by English writers, the French Army fought on after Waterloo. Many commanders sought to reverse that defeat—at Versailles, Sevres, Rocquencourt, and La Souffel, the last great battle and the last French victory of the Napoleonic Wars. Marshal Grouchy, much maligned, fought his army back to Paris by 29 June, with the Prussians hard on his heels. On 1 July, Vandamme, Exelmans and Marshal Davout began the defense of Paris. Davout took to the field in the north-eastern suburbs of Paris along with regiments of the Imperial Guard and battalions of National Guards. For the first time ever, using the wealth of material held in the French Army archives in Paris, along with eyewitness testimonies from those who were there, Paul Dawson brings alive the bitter and desperate fighting in defense of the French capital. The 100 Days Campaign did not end at Waterloo, it ended under the walls of Paris fifteen days later.
THE GENERALS is the compelling second novel in Simon Scarrow's bestselling Wellington and Napoleon quartet. A must read for fans of Bernard Cornwell. In the turbulent aftermath of the French Revolution Napoleon Bonaparte stands accused of treachery and corruption. His reputation is saved by his skill in leading his men to victory in Italy and Egypt. But then he must restore order in France and find peace or victory over her enemies: England - and Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington). Wellesley is leading a vast army in India, where British interests are under threat. The campaign will result in the creation of the Raj - the jewel in the British Empire's crown. Wellesley returns to England a hardened veteran and more determined than ever to end France's domination of Europe. Both Wellesley and Napoleon intend to win - whatever the cost. Who will ultimately succeed?
Renowned for its accuracy, brevity, and readability, this book has long been the gold standard of concise histories of the Napoleonic Wars. Now in an updated and revised edition, it is unique in its portrayal of one of the world's great generals as a scrambler who never had a plan, strategic or tactical, that did not break down or change of necessity in the field. Distinguished historian Owen Connelly argues that Napoleon was the master of the broken play, so confident of his ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy that he repeatedly plunged his armies into uncertain, seemingly desperate situations, only to emerge victorious as he "blundered" to glory. Beginning with a sketch of Napoleon's early life, the book progresses to his command of artillery at Toulon and the "whiff of grapeshot" in Paris that netted him control of the Army of Italy, where his incredible performance catapulted him to fame. The author vividly traces Napoleon's campaigns as a general of the French Revolution and emperor of the French, knowledgeably analyzing each battle's successes and failures. The author depicts Napoleon's "art of war" as a system of engaging the enemy, waiting for him to make a mistake, improvising a plan on the spot-and winning. Far from detracting from Bonaparte's reputation, his blunders rather made him a great general, a "natural" who depended on his intuition and ability to read battlefields and his enemy to win. Exploring this neglected aspect of Napoleon's battlefield genius, Connelly at the same time offers stirring and complete accounts of all the Napoleonic campaigns.
The king of Prussia from 1740 to 1786, Frederick the Great ranks among eighteenth-century Europe's most enlightened rulers. In addition to abolishing serfdom in his domains and promoting religious tolerance, he was an ardent patron of the arts and an accomplished musician. "Diplomacy without arms," he observed, "is like music without instruments." Frederick's expertise at military matters is reflected in his successful defense of his territory during the Seven Years' War, in which he fought all the great powers of Europe. His brilliant theories on strategy, tactics, and discipline are all explained in this vital text. "War is not an affair of chance," Frederick asserted, adding that "a great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well." In this book, he presents the fundamentals of warfare, discussing such timeless considerations as leadership qualities, the value of surprise, and ways to conquer an enemy who possesses superior forces. The soundness of his advice was endorsed by Napoleon himself, who once advised, "Read and re-read the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar . . . and Frederick. This is the only way to become a great captain and to master the secrets of the art of war."
The full story of Napoleon’s legendary escape from Russia under seemingly impossible odds is recounted in this thrillingly vivid military history. In the winter of 1812, Napoleon's army retreated from Moscow under appalling conditions, hunted by three separate Russian armies. By late November, Napoleon had reached the banks of the River Berezina—the last natural obstacle between his army and the safety of the Polish frontier. But instead of finding the river frozen solid enough to march his men across, an unseasonable thaw had turned the Berezina into an icy torrent. Having already ordered the burning of his bridging equipment, Napoleon's predicament was serious enough: but with the army of Admiral Chichagov holding the opposite bank, and those of Kutusov and Wittgenstein closing fast, it was critical. In a gripping narrative that draws on contemporary sources—including letters, diaries and memoirs—Alexander Mikaberidze describes how Napoleon rose from the pit of despair to execute one of the greatest escapes in military history.
Tracing Napoleon's development as both a general and statesman, distinguished historian James Marshall-Cornwall brings to life the career of one of history's greatest military strategists. Focusing on the two decades during which Napoleon achieved his greatest triumphs and suffered his most heartbreaking defeats, this thoroughly researched study keenly analyzes how, like Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon combined strategy and statecraft throughout his career. From his most brilliant campaigns-in particular his conquest of Piedmont and his triumphant invasion of Italy-to the disasters at Trafalgar, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Russia, at Leipzig, and his final downfall at Waterloo, Napoleon as Military Commander tells the story of a general whose defeats were as remarkable as his victories.
The British troops who fought so successfully under the Duke of Wellington during his Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon have long been branded by the duke’s own words—“scum of the earth”—and assumed to have been society’s ne’er-do-wells or criminals who enlisted to escape justice. Now Edward J. Coss shows to the contrary that most of these redcoats were respectable laborers and tradesmen and that it was mainly their working-class status that prompted the duke’s derision. Driven into the army by unemployment in the wake of Britain’s industrial revolution, they confronted wartime hardship with ethical values and became formidable soldiers in the bargain These men depended on the king’s shilling for survival, yet pay was erratic and provisions were scant. Fed worse even than sixteenth-century Spanish galley slaves, they often marched for days without adequate food; and if during the campaign they did steal from Portuguese and Spanish civilians, the theft was attributable not to any criminal leanings but to hunger and the paltry rations provided by the army. Coss draws on a comprehensive database on British soldiers as well as first-person accounts of Peninsular War participants to offer a better understanding of their backgrounds and daily lives. He describes how these neglected and abused soldiers came to rely increasingly on the emotional and physical support of comrades and developed their own moral and behavioral code. Their cohesiveness, Coss argues, was a major factor in their legendary triumphs over Napoleon’s battle-hardened troops. The first work to closely examine the social composition of Wellington’s rank and file through the lens of military psychology, All for the King’s Shilling transcends the Napoleonic battlefield to help explain the motivation and behavior of all soldiers under the stress of combat.
One of the enduring controversies of the Waterloo campaign is the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. Given command of a third of Napoleons army and told to keep the Prussians from joining forces with Wellington, he failed to keep Wellington and Blcher apart with the result that Napoleon was overwhelmed at Waterloo. Grouchy, though, was not defeated. He kept his force together and retreated in good order back to France.Many have accused Grouchy of intentionally holding back his men and not marching to join Napoleon when the sound of the gunfire at Waterloo could clearly be heard, and he has been widely blamed for Napoleons defeat.Now, for the first time, Grouchys conduct during the Waterloo campaign is analyzed in fine detail, drawing principally on French sources not previously available in English. The author, for example, answers questions such as whether key orders did actually exist in 1815 or were they later fabrications to make Grouchy the scapegoat for Napoleons failures? Did General Grard really tell Grouchy to march to the sound of the guns? Why did Grouchy appear to move so slowly when speed was essential?This is a subject which is generally overlooked by British historians, who tend to concentrate on the actions of Wellington and Napoleon, and which French historians choose not to look at too closely for fear that it might reflect badly upon their hero Napoleon.Despite the mass of books written on Waterloo, this is a genuinely unique contribution to this most famous campaign. This book is certain to fuel debate and prompt historians to reconsider the events of June 1815.