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Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler were two of history's greatest dictators. In this ground-breaking study, Desmond Seward finds striking parallels between their careers and their roles in shaping the destiny of modern Europe. He also shows how Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise On War - a penetrating analysis of the Napoleonic campaigns read and re-read by Hitler- provides a crucial link between the two men. Napoleon and Hitler demonstrates in an entirely new way how history can repeat itself - and gives new and unexpected insights into these two terrible giants of modern times. "A careful study, clearly written, easy to read. He takes us through the careers of both men in turn, side by side, noting the similarities as he goes along. I am reminded of Plutarch's 'parallel lives' of the great Greeks and Romans... His interesting book deserves to be read both by those who would 'demonise' Hitler and those who are dazzled by Napoleon." Hugh Trevor-Roper - Sunday Telegraph 'Desmond Seward is right to draw attention to their similarities, and to their differences. We should study both: both are among the possibilities inherent in our civilisation.' Independent 'Solid historical biography with a compelling historical slant.' Booklist 'A clever and cohesive look at megalomania in action.' Kirkus Review
Did Napoleon provide the model for Hitler's Final Solution?140 years before the Holocaust, Napoleon used gas to exterminate the civil population of the Antilles, he created concentration camps in Corsica and Alba, and he re-established the slave trade, provoking the deaths of over 200,000 Africans in the French colonies. In this riveting and controversial expose, Ribbe reveals Napoleon's shocking legacy to the atrocities of the twentieth century.
A mystery of the Nazi occupation of France is at last explained by new research.
Controversial Concordats offers an engaging survey of the relationship of the Roman Catholic Church with three dictatorial figures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler.
The seer Nostradamus died in 1566, but devotees are still ferreting out the meanings of his cryptic prophecies today. No one has been more committed to that goal that Mario Reading, the author of five books on the occult master. The latest probes perhaps the ultimate questions about Nostradamus' prognostications: Who are the three Antichrists mentioned in his quatrains and how soon will the final events unfold? In this Sterling Publishing paperback, Reading conclusively identifies the first two Antichrists and explicates crucial passages and timelines in the works of this legendary oracle. Inexpensively priced.
Despite appearances, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin have a few things in common. Each of them belonged to aminority from the country he tyrannized: Napoleon was Corsican ("I could recognize Corsica with closedeyes, only by her perfume"), Hitler was an Austrian born in the Habsburg Empire, and Stalin was Georgian.Historiography was generous with them, not to mention some sophisticated medical and psychiatric analyses.Yet it often went unnoticed that they suffered from the minority syndrome, characterized by the wish to actfor the "good" of the greater majority (French, German, Russian). Thus, they imposed authoritarian regimeson their peoples, whom they attempted to endow with new territories, through violent expansionist politics.
While in exile on St Helena, Napoleon dictated a commentary on the wars of Julius Caesar, later published in 1836. In each chapter he summarized the events of one campaign, then added comments from the standpoint of his own military knowledge. Over the nearly two millennia between Caesar and Napoleon some aspects of warfare had changed, notably the introduction of firearms. But much remained the same: the rate of movement of armies (at the foot pace of horse or man); human muscle power as the main source of energy for construction work; some military techniques, notably bridge construction; as well as the actual territory fought over by Caesar and later by Napoleon. Napoleons commentary thus provides a fascinating and highly authoritative insight into Caesars wars, as well as providing a window into Napoleons own thinking and attitudes. Napoleon in places detects mistakes on the part of Caesar and his enemies, and says what they should have done differently. Remarkably, this is thought to be the first full English translation of Napoleon's work.Napoleon Bonaparte was born to an obscure Corsican family but rose through the ranks of the French army to become Emperor of France, conqueror of most of Europe and acknowledged military genius. He wrote this book while in exile on St Helena.The translator. RA Maguire, is a former civil engineer with a long-standing interest in military and ancient history.
This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's 'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.
Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.
In Becoming Hitler, Thomas Weber continues from where he left off in his previous book, Hitler's First War, stripping away the layers of myth and fabrication in Hitler's own tale to tell the real story of Hitler's politicization and radicalization in post-First World War Munich. It is the gripping account of how an awkward and unemployed loner with virtually no recognizable leadership qualities and fluctuating political ideas turned into thecharismatic, self-assured, virulently anti-Semitic leader with an all-or-nothing approach to politics with whom the world was soon to become tragically familiar. As Weber clearly shows, far from the picture of afully-formed political leader which Hitler wanted to portray in Mein Kampf, his ideas and priorities were still very uncertain and largely undefined in early 1919 - and they continued to shift until 1923.