Download Free Msf And Srebrenica 1993 2003 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Msf And Srebrenica 1993 2003 and write the review.

The case study ‘MSF and Srebrenica 1993-2003’ explores the constraints and dilemmas raised when MSF spoke out about the events that occurred in Srebrenica’s Muslim enclave. The enclave was besieged in 1993 and then seized by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. 8,000 men over the age of 16 were massacred, despite the presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces supposedly providing protection in what had been declared a ‘security zone’. With teams present in the enclave throughout, Médecins Sans Frontières testified to what happened and called on the various countries involved to hold inquiries and establish where military and political responsibility lay for the fall of the enclave and abandon of the people of Srebrenica. By agreeing to provide a minimally acceptable level of relief to a besieged population, wasn’t MSF contributing to the strategy of the besieging troops while concurrently softening their image? Could MSF call for the evacuation of civilians who wished to leave thereby risking abetting the ethnic cleansing policy of the besieging army? Having trusted the UN Protection Force’s commitment to protect the enclave and its population, must MSF accept partial culpability for or complicity in the UN’s abandonment of the enclave and the ensuing massacre of the population? Didn’t MSF give the population the false impression that it would be safe as long as the team was present? Is it the role of a humanitarian medical organisation to issue an appeal for an investigative parliamentary commission then, once it is established, to actively monitor it with a critical eye? Contrarily, how can MSF not try to understand the circumstances and responsibilities, which, at the global level, led to the abandonment and massacre of a population to which its teams had provided relief? Can MSF be content with calling for a parliamentary investigation without ensuring that it asks the types of questions likely to elicit answers that shed light on the events? Should Srebrenica be viewed as an accident of history or as a clear-cut example of the impossibility of protecting populations under international mandates established by the UN?
On 14 December 1995, the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords ended the separatist war in former Yugoslavia and created the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Twenty years on, MSF reveals how the organization spoke out about a conflict marked by ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, targeted assaults of humanitarian organizations and individuals, and the unfulfilled promises by the International Community. MSF claimed that mass distributions of aid were simply a ‘humanitarian alibi’ of the international community that lacked the will to take political and military measures to end the conflict. Some MSF leaders even called for an armed intervention against the Bosnian-Serb artillery bombing Sarajevo. In December 1992, MSF published a report describing the Bosnian Serb policy of ethnic cleansing. They denounced the Bosnian Serbs for hindering supplies to Srebrenica and Gorazde Muslim besieged enclaves. They raised awareness and denounced the lack of protection of the population when the enclaves came under attack in 1994 and 1995 despite being declared safe zones by the UN. In August 1995, MSF denounced a lack of access to the Serb refugees and from 2000, MSF advocated for parliamentary commissions to be set up to investigate the military and political responsibilities of the States involved in the Srebrenica crisis. This Speaking Out Case Study explores the variety of questions and dilemmas MSF faced, Among them: to what extent should MSF risk the lives of its staff in order to operate in conflict zones? Should MSF condemn obstacles set up to limit the access to the population if it meant no longer having any access at all? Should MSF denounce the fact that humanitarian aid was presented by the international political leaders as the only solution to the conflict and call for military force, an action that would lead to loss of human life?
When Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was founded in 1971, it was founded with both international and associative dimensions. International because it wouldn’t have made sense for MSF France, on its own, to aid threatened populations around the world and associative because civil law in France, especially the 1901 law governing charitable bodies, was perfectly suited to the MSF organisation’s guiding precepts, which are democratic and selfless in nature. Yet, MSF’s development from a small, purely French organisation to an international associative movement was never carefully planned or particularly smooth. MSF’s development was the result of various compromises between the movement’s leaders, with their individual agendas, and the integration of fait accomplis when necessary. The evolving modifications were debated at length to ensure that concerns raised were legitimate and that there was agreement for decisions made. The nature and the validity of MSF’s leadership were regularly challenged, as was the question of how MSF should grow while remaining true to its humanitarian precepts. This case study elaborates the history of the MSF movement from inception in 1971 through 2011, when MSF legitimised an international governance system and architecture. The study is divided in two episodes. Episode One reviews MSF’s first three decades (1971-2000). Episode Two is about the challenges of the early 21st, century, from 2001 to 2011.
The Promise and Perils of " Silence" or " Temoignage" During Humanitarian Crises provides readers with a nuanced study of what happens when historical and 21st century medical humanitarian communities, armed with their idealistic rhetorics, choose whether to speak out or remain silent during various military or medical crises. The author uses a series of case studies from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century to illustrate the politicized nature of these decisions. Unlike some that focus on the prescriptive need to follow certain universal medical humanitarian principles during crises, this book highlights the precarious nature of what some scholars call “medical advocacy/witnessing” or what the French call “témoignage.” The author argues that regardless of whether we are talking about lack of action during colonial crises or the Holocaust, it is oftentimes the lack of political will that determines how like “neutrality” or “impartiality” are interpreted. The book also acquaints readers with some of the challenges that have been recently posed to the “new” humanitarian Doctors Without Borders personnel, who have witnessed the targeting of medical hospitals and clinics. What researchers call the weaponization of medical care affects many in need living in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Syria. The author concludes the book by underscoring the point that it is the presence or absence of political will, and not the inherent epistemic value of medical humanitarian principles, that dictates when this advocacy succeeds or fails.
British Foreign Policy in former Yugoslavia 1989-1999: Brotherhood and Unity Lost, gives a broad analysis of Britain’s foreign policy during the wars of Yugoslav secessions from 1992 to 1999. Normative approaches to Britain’s foreign policy during this period ‘have tended to place it’ in to two halves. The notion, there was a new morality in Britain’s foreign policy appeared after New Labour‘s election landslide on 1 May 1997. Robin Cook declared shortly after the victory there would be an ‘ethical dimension’ to Labour‘s foreign policy, and this appeared to chart new territory. As a result, this would be a departure from what former US Assistant Secretary of State, James Rubin, believed was the hyper-realism of the traditional British kind under British Prime Minister, John Major. The book includes interviews with key actors, provides new archive material and re-examines claims by the ‘New Orthodoxy’ which became prevalent after 1999.
How do international organizations change? Many organizations expand into new areas or abandon programmes of work. Advocacy and Change in International Organizations argues that they do so not only at the collective direction of member states. Advocacy is a crucial but overlooked source of change in international organizations. Different actors can advocate for change: national diplomats, international bureaucrats, external experts, or civil society activists. They can use one of three advocacy strategies: social pressure, persuasion, and 'authority talk'. The success of each strategy depends on the presence of favourable conditions related to characteristics of advocates, targets, issues, and context. Institutionalization of new issues in international organizations as a multi-stage process, often accompanied by contestation. This book demonstrates how the advocacy-focused framework explains the origins of three workstreams of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations: communication, protection, and reconstruction. The issue of strategic communications was promoted by UN officials through the strategy of persuasion. Protection of civilians emerged due to a partially successful social influence campaign by a coalition of elected Security Council members and a subsequent (and successful) persuasion efforts by Canada. Quick impact projects entered peacekeepers' practice as the result of 'authority talk' by an expert panel. The three issues illustrate the diversity of pathways to change in international organizations, representing the top-down, bottom-up, and outside-in pathways. Moreover, they have achieved different degrees of institutionalization in UN's policies, structures, and frameworks: protection of civilians is the most institutionalized, as evidenced by measures to hold peacekeepers accountable for non-implementation, while quick impact projects are the least institutionalized.
Since the end of the Bosnia War in 1995, a tradition was embraced by the West of vilifying the Serbs as the villains, and the Muslims as their victims. This necessitated the military intervention of the U.S. and NATO on the Muslim side, which caused an untold travesty of justice to the Serbs. For indeed, there was enough blame to go around to condemn all parties in that war, including Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, of committing massacres and huge abuses of the other parties. To single out the Serbs as the bad guys simply distorts the facts. This collective volume, which is the product of a Commission of Inquiry, worked 18 months on this project, redressing the balance based on a meticulous and well-documented report about the process of this inquiry, step by step.
A funny and fascinating exploration of our reliance upon swear words, insults, and the artfully placed expletive, damn it. We use salty or artful language to win arguments, slander, cheat, and bully, as well as to express feelings of joy or frustration by swearing or “blowing off steam.” Rik Smits delves into the magic of oaths and profanity, art and advertising, the lure of fake news and propaganda, as well as invective and off-color jokes the world over. This book shows why conversation dies in crowded elevators and what drives us to curse at our laptops. The Art of Verbal Warfare is, when all is said and done, the story of how we can get through life without coming to physical blows.
In April 1992, a handful of young physicians, not one of them a surgeon, was trapped along with 50,000 men, women, and children in the embattled enclave of Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. There the doctors faced the most intense professional, ethical, and personal predicaments of their lives. Drawing on extensive interviews, documents, and recorded materials she collected over four and a half years, doctor and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Sheri Fink tells the harrowing--and ultimately enlightening--story of these physicians and the three who try to help them: an idealistic internist from Doctors without Borders, who hopes that interposition of international aid workers will help prevent a massacre; an aspiring Bosnian surgeon willing to walk through minefields to reach the civilian wounded; and a Serb doctor on the opposite side of the front line with the army that is intent on destroying his former colleagues. With limited resources and a makeshift hospital overflowing with patients, how can these doctors decide who to save and who to let die? Will their duty to treat patients come into conflict with their own struggle to survive? And are there times when medical and humanitarian aid ironically prolong war and human suffering rather than helping to relieve it?