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This paper investigates the optimal monetary policy response to a shock to collateral when policymakers act under discretion and face model uncertainty. The analysis is based on a New Keynesian model where banks supply loans to transaction constrained consumers. Our results confirm the literature on model uncertainty with respect to a cost-push shock. Insuring against model misspecification leads to a more aggressive policy response. The same is true for a shock to collateral. A preference for robustness leads to a more aggressive policy. Increasing the weight attached to interest rate smoothing raises the degree of aggressiveness. Our results indicate that a preference for robustness crucially depends on the way different types of disturbances affect the economy: in the case of a shock to collateral the policymaker does not need to be as much worried about model misspecification as in the case of a conventional cost-push shock.
We study the effects of model uncertainty in a simple New-Keynesian model using robust control techniques. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to find closed-form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing both instrument rules and targeting rules under different timing assumptions. In all cases but one, an increased preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to cost shocks but leaves the response to demand shocks unchanged. As a consequence, inflation is less volatile and output is more volatile than under a non-robust policy. Under one particular timing assumption, however, increasing the preference for robustness has no effect on the optimal targeting rule (nor on the economy).
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. The effects of the central bank's concern for robustness can be summarised as follows. First, depending on the shock, robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds either more cautiously or more aggressively. Second, such robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively, but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and the loan rate. Third, if the central bank faces uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation away from inflation.
This paper introduces time-varying uncertainty into a simple New Keynesian model where the central bank seeks a decision rule that is robust to model misspecification. The paper finds that variation in the central bankXs concern for robustness leads to time-varying, nonnormally distributed impulse responses of output gap, inflation, and the interest rate. These predictions are confirmed by the impulse responses estimated from US quarterly data from 1954 to 2015. Quantitatively, the estimates confirm previous findings that a robust decision maker responds more aggressively than the central bank does empirically.
We study whether a central bank should deviate from its objective of price stability to promote financial stability. We tackle this question within a textbook New Keynesian model augmented with capital accumulation and microfounded endogenous financial crises. We compare several interest rate rules, under which the central bank responds more or less forcefully to inflation and aggregate output. Our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy affects the probability of a crisis both in the short run (through aggregate demand) and in the medium run (through savings and capital accumulation). Second, a central bank can both reduce the probability of a crisis and increase welfare by departing from strict inflation targeting and responding systematically to fluctuations in output. Third, financial crises may occur after a long period of unexpectedly loose monetary policy as the central bank abruptly reverses course.
History has shown us the role that financial and banking crises have had in economic transformation. The last crisis in 2008 was particularly significant because of its extent and its effect worldwide. Two aspects hold equal importance. Firstly, governance is a key concept to be clearly defined and enforced, especially within the EU. Both entrepreneurial and financial players must measure the impact of their various actions (transparency in decision-making processes, strategic choices to achieve profit, etc.), maintaining their market position while preserving the social positioning of all partners. Secondly, from a more technical point of view, the relevance of mathematical and quantitative methods should be discussed in order to evaluate asset performance. Securitization has always been a tool used to increase financial institutions’ profit margins but it cannot become their primary goal. The error does not come from the use of this technique but from its misuse at international level. This book aims to provide the reader with a broad discussion of the financial impacts and consequences arising from the last subprime crisis. By means of an international and European analysis, the different contributors intend to stress the relevance of a multi-national solution guaranteeing the stability of the international financial and banking system.