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Selected papers from the Second Annual International Conference on Socio-Economics, held at George Washington U., Washington, DC, March 1990, provide a snapshot of the current state of research being pursued across a range of established academic disciplines with respect to this emerging movement, formally launched by the publication of Amitai Etzioni's book The moral dimension in 1988. Paper edition (unseen), $17.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
A groundbreaking exploration of the critical ethical issues in financial theory and practice Compiled by volume editor John Boatright, Finance Ethics consists of contributions from scholars from many different finance disciplines. It covers key issues in financial markets, financial services, financial management, and finance theory, and includes chapters on market regulation, due diligence, reputational risk, insider trading, derivative contracts, hedge funds, mutual and pension funds, insurance, socially responsible investing, microfinance, earnings management, risk management, bankruptcy, executive compensation, hostile takeovers, and boards of directors. Special attention is given to fairness in markets and the delivery of financial services, and to the duties of fiduciaries and agents Rigorous analysis of the topics covered provides essential information and practical guidance for practitioners in finance as well as for students and academics with an interest in finance ethics Ethics in Finance skillfully explains the need for ethics in the personal conduct of finance professionals and the operation of financial markets and institutions.
Walter J. Schultz illustrates the deficiencies of theories that purport to show that markets alone can provide the basis for efficiency. He argues that markets are not moral-free zones, and that achieving the economic common good does indeed require morality. He demonstrates that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without moral normative constraints and then goes on to specify a set of normative conditions that make these positive outcomes possible.
This book develops and defends a version of utilitarianism, including expected-utility theory, as a normative model of decision making. The defense, based on the idea of utility as achievement of goals, considers the endorsement of a norm as a decision and asks what reasons we have to endorse norms for decision making. The reasons derive from our pre-existing goals, so any norm we endorse must not fly in the face of these goals, although it must not be selfishly biased, either. This approach is further clarified by drawing distinctions between decisions for the self, for a single other person, for several others, and for the self and others. The book discusses the implications of this argument for the psychological study of decision making, the act--omission distinction, moral education, decision analysis, risk analysis, and other questions of public policy. The final chapter sketches a prescriptive approach to group decision making.
A clear and original perspective on Kantian ethics that focuses on the dignity, vulnerability and perfectibility of human rational agency.
The papers in this collection were selected from nearly 200 that were presented at the 50 sessions of the second annual International Conference on Socio-Economics held at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. March 1990. They reflect the great interest that socio-economics has inspired in the few years since the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics was founded in 1989. The papers represent the stimulating dialogue among psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, economists, and students of finance and business administration. The authors are communicating across the frontiers of established disciplines to address enduring questions on economic theory and policy, and they aim to liberate the study of economics from the straitjacket of the neoclassical approach.
Discusses how standard economics may be improved by an understanding of moral philosophy.
A systematic guide to Kant's ethical work and the debates surrounding it, accessible to students and specialists alike.
This book integrates the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant—particularly the concepts of autonomy, dignity, and character—into economic theory, enriching models of individual choice and policymaking, while contributing to our understanding of how the economic individual fits into society.
Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: Normative Naturalism, Quasi-Realist Expressivism, and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism, which Derek Parfit now calls Non-Realist Cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word 'reality' in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use 'reality' in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths-such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths-raise no difficult ontological questions. Parfit discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Though Peter Railton is a Naturalist, he has widened his view by accepting some further claims, and he has suggested that this wider version of Naturalism could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Railton is right, since these theories no longer deeply disagree. Though Allan Gibbard is a Quasi-Realist Expressivist, he has suggested that the best version of his view could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Gibbard is right, since Gibbard and he now accept the other's main meta-ethical claim. It is rare for three such different philosophical theories to be able to be widened in ways that resolve their deepest disagreements. This happy convergence supports the view that these meta-ethical theories are true. Parfit also discusses the views of several other philosophers, and some other meta-ethical and normative questions.