Download Free Montgomery And Colossal Cracks Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Montgomery And Colossal Cracks and write the review.

A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines systematically the Colossal Cracks operational technique employed by Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and demonstrates the key significance that morale and casualty concerns exerted on this technique. To ensure a full understanding of the campaign, one needs to look not only at Montgomery's methods but at those of his army commanders, Dempsey and Crerar; thus, this study addresses the scant attention to date paid to these two figures. Hart suggests that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested. In fact, Colossal Cracks, the concentration of massive force at a point of German weakness, represented the most appropriate weapon the 1944 British Army could develop under the circumstances. Previous studies have been characterized by an overemphasis on Montgomery's role in the campaign, rather than a systematic examination of overall British methods. They have ignored the difficulties that the 1944 British Army faced given its manpower shortage, and they have underestimated the appropriateness of Monty's methods to the campaign war aims that Britain pursued: namely, the desire that Britain's modest military forces secure a high profile within a larger Allied effort. The cautious, firepower-laden approach used by the 21st Army Group was both crude and a double-edged sword; however, despite these weaknesses, Colossal Cracks represented an appropriate technique given the nature of British war aims and the relative capabilities of the forces involved. It proved to be just enough to defeat the Germans and keep alive British hopes that her war aims might be achieved.
The Allied campaign for Northwest Europe as seen from a British and Canadian perspective A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group. Rooted in concerns about morale and casualties, "Colossal Cracks" was a cautious, firepower-laden approach that involved the concentration of massive force at points of German weakness. Hart argues that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested and that "Colossal Cracks" represented the most appropriate weapon the British Army could develop under the circumstances.
Operation Market Garden – the Allied airborne invasion of German-occupied Holland in September 1944 – is one of the most famous and controversial Allied failures of the Second World War. Many books have been written on the subject seeking to explain the defeat. Historians have generally focused on the mistakes made by senior commanders as they organized the operation. The choice of landing zones has been criticized, as has the structure of the airlift plan. But little attention has been paid to the influence that combat doctrine and training had upon the relative performance of the forces involved. And it is this aspect that Aaron Bates emphasizes in this perceptive, closely argued and absorbing re-evaluation of the battle. As he describes each phase of the fighting he shows how German training, which gave their units a high degree of independence of action, better equipped them to cope with the confusion created by the surprise Allied attack. In contrast, the British forces were hampered by their rigid and centralized approach which made it more difficult for them to adapt to the chaotic situation. Aaron Bates’s thought-provoking study sheds fresh light on the course of the fighting around Arnhem and should lead to a deeper understanding of one of the most remarkable episodes in the final stage of the Second World War in western Europe.
Jonathan Fennell captures for the first time the true wartime experience of the ordinary soldiers from across the empire who made up the British and Commonwealth armies. He analyses why the great battles were won and lost and how the men that fought went on to change the world.
This book is an innovative study of the Normandy campaign and the perceived failure of British forces there. It is essential reading for all students of military history and general readers with an interest in the subject.
Historian John Buckley offers a radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces during World War Two, challenging the common belief that the British Army was no match for the forces of Hitler’s Germany. Following Britain’s military commanders and troops across the battlefields of Europe, from D-Day to VE-Day, from the Normandy beaches to Arnhem and the Rhine, and, ultimately, to the Baltic, Buckley’s provocative history demonstrates that the British Army was more than a match for the vaunted Nazi war machine. This fascinating revisionist study of the campaign to liberate Northern Europe in the war’s final years features a large cast of colorful unknowns and grand historical personages alike, including Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. By integrating detailed military history with personal accounts, it evokes the vivid reality of men at war while putting long-held misconceptions finally to rest.
This user-friendly reference systematically covers the entire intellectual history of strategy and war, in all cultures and all times. Each culture has had its Machiavelli, its Sun Tzu; its own Mohammed-like or Napoleonic figure. This encyclopedia ranges across the world to provide entries on every significant military and strategic thinker in human history as well as a number of military cultures, covering Chinese, Western, Indian, Islamic, and other cultures. Each entry supplies a brief biography, a synopsis of the writer's theories, their success or failure, and their impact on other thinkers and military practitioners. The unique coverage allows readers to cross cultural barriers and gain access to sources in languages as diverse as Arabic and German, and to note key similarities and contrasts. The relative importance and contribution of each individual to intellectual progress is noted, as is the greater significance of specific schools of thought and debates.
The contributors here consider the multifarious aspects of the Anglo-American approach to war. All the contributors are concerned to base their work on the overall historical context. They explore the relationship between theory and practice in military operations.
Contrary to popular opinion, this nation has always consciously and consistently utilized military force to further its security, as well as its economic and political well-being. Despite the best of intentions to aid others, the reality is that military force has most often been used to serve the national interest in ways that were not always altruistic but rather to serve practical political purpose. In the final analysis, the Canadian military experience has been integral to creating the advanced, affluent, and vibrant nation that exists today. This collection of essays, written by such noted historians and authors as Douglas Delaney, Stephen J. Harris, Ronald Haycock, Michael Hennessy, Bernd Horn, and Sean Maloney, spans the entirety of the Canadian military experience and underlines the reality that the government has consistently used its armed forces to achieve political purpose. More often than not, the "Canadian way of war" has been a direct reflection of circumstance and political will.
• Covers Canadian Harry Crerar, Briton Miles Dempsey, Frenchman Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and the Americans Courtney Hodges, William Simpson, and Alexander Patch • History of the campaign for northwest Europe, including the race across France, the liberation of the channel ports, the battles of the Huertgen Forest and the Bulge, crossing the Rhine, the climactic battle for Germany, and more • Corrects the historical misperception that Patton contributed more to victory than other generals • Assesses commanders' individual performances • Impressively researched in primary and secondary sources • New interpretations and an entertaining narrative will appeal to both general readers and scholars Through the force of his personality and the headline-grabbing advance of his U.S. Third Army, Gen. George S. Patton has eclipsed the other six men who, like him, led field armies in the great Allied campaign to liberate northwest Europe in 1944-45. Certain to rank among the lassics of World War II history like Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell Weigley, Patton's Peers presents a masterful reassessment of the eleven-month struggle from D-Day to Germany's surrender, shedding long-overdue light on the contributions of these forgotten Allied field army commanders. Seasoned military historian John A. English unearths the vital roles played by these six generals. As the leader of an army of several hundred thousand troops, each had to plan operations days and eeks in advance, coordinate air support, assess intelligence, give orders to corps commanders, manage a staff of sometimes difficult subordinates, and deal with superiors like Eisenhower, Bradley, and Montgomery. Some performed less ably than the rest while others rivaled Patton in their achievements. All deserve to be lifted from Patton's shadow.