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Using data on long-term interest rates for 17 industrial countries, this paper develops some simple measures of monetary policy credibility and then tests if such measures improve the out-of-sample forecasts of conventional models of the inflation-unemployment process. The results provide some evidence in favor of the Lucas critique by showing that the short-run unemployment-inflation trade-off tends to improve in countries that are successful in providing low and stable inflation.
Using data on long-term interest rates for 17 industrial countries, this paper develops some simple measures of monetary policy credibility and then tests if such measures improve the out-of-sample forecasts of conventional models of the inflation-unemployment process. The results provide some evidence in favor of the Lucas critique by showing that the short-run unemployment-inflation trade-off tends to improve in countries that are successful in providing low and stable inflation.
This paper examines the impact of the introduction of inflation targeting on the unemployment-inflation trade-off in OECD countries. Theoretical models suggest that the credibility-enhancing effects of the adoption of inflation targeting should cause an improvement in the unemployment-inflation trade-off, i.e., that reducing inflation by a given amount should occur with a smaller rise in unemployment. The empirical evidence examined for OECD countries adopting inflation targeting supports this hypothesis. Using a smooth transition regression model, it is shown that the improvement in this trade-off does not take place immediately after the adoption of inflation targeting; rather, it improves over time as the credibility of the central bank is established.
Edited and with an introduction by Benjamin M. Friedman The connection between price inflation and real economic activity has been a focus of macroeconomic research--and debate--for much of the past century. Although this connection is crucial to our understanding of what monetary policy can and cannot accomplish, opinions about its basic properties have swung widely over the years. Today, virtually everyone studying monetary policy acknowledges that, contrary to what many modern macroeconomic models suggest, central bank actions often affect both inflation and measures of real economic activity, such as output, unemployment, and incomes. But the nature and magnitude of these effects are not yet understood. In this volume, Robert M. Solow and John B. Taylor present their views on the dilemmas facing U.S. monetary policymakers. The discussants are Benjamin M. Friedman, James K. Galbraith, N. Gregory Mankiw, and William Poole. The aim of this lively exchange of views is to make both an intellectual contribution to macroeconmics and a practical contribution to the solution of a public policy question of central importance.
This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.
Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources, thereby raising productivity. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and ’80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations, and which propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. In the decades since, the immediate cause of the period’s rise in inflation has been the subject of considerable debate. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Here, contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on the ways in which the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today’s global and increasingly complex economic environment.
Wage setters take into account the future consequences of their current wage choices in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities. Several interesting implications arise. First, a closed-form solution for a long-run Phillips curve relates average unemployment to average wage inflation; the curve is virtually vertical for high inflation rates but becomes flatter as inflation declines. Second, macroeconomic volatility shifts the Phillips curve outward, implying that stabilization policies can play an important role in shaping the trade-off. Third, nominal wages tend to be endogenously rigid also upward, at low inflation. Fourth, when inflation decreases, volatility of unemployment increases whereas the volatility of inflation decreases: this implies a long-run trade-off also between the volatility of unemployment and that of wage inflation.
Over the past decade, inflation has become less responsive to domestic demand pressures in many industrial countries. This development has been attributed, in part, to globalization forces. A small macroeconomic model, estimated on UK data using Bayesian estimation, is used to analyze the monetary policy implications of this structural change. The focus is on the implications of a globalization-related flattening of the Phillips curve for the trade-off between inflation and output gap variability and for the efficient monetary policy response rule.
What monetary policy framework, if adopted by the Federal Reserve, would have avoided the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s? The authors use counterfactual simulations of an estimated model of the U.S. economy to evaluate alternative monetary policy strategies. The authors document that policymakers at the time both had an overly optimistic view of the natural rate of unemployment and put a high priority on achieving full employment. They show that in the presence of realistic informational imperfections and with an emphasis on stabilizing economic activity, an optimal control approach would have failed to keep inflation expectations well anchored, resulting in highly volatile inflation during the 1970s. Charts and tables.