Download Free Monetary And Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equlibria Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Monetary And Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equlibria and write the review.

The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary-macroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives.
The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary-macroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives.
The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetarymacroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives.
This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies mainly in the context of the non-cooperation among policy authorities. Each policy authority's optimal response is to tighten its policy measures when other authorities' policy measures are loosened. This indicates that the two policies are substitutes for each other. This result still holds when an additional financial stability mandate is assigned to the central bank. The condition for the response functions to converge to a Nash equilibrium state is analyzed along with the speed of convergence, showing that they depend on the authorities' preferences and the number of mandates assigned to policy authorities. If the financial supervisory authority (FSA) assigns greater importance to the output gap or a stronger financial stability mandate is assigned to the central bank (CB), the probability of nonconvergence increases and the speed of convergence declines even when the condition of convergence is satisfied. Meanwhile, if the CB considers output stability as an important task, the probability of convergence and the speed of converging to a state of equilibrium are high. Finally, when a single mandate or small number of mandates is/are assigned to each authority, stability is more quickly restored as compared to when many mandates are assigned.
We argue that a stronger emphasis on macrofinancial risk could provide stabilization benefits. Simulations results suggest that strong monetary reactions to accelerator mechanisms that push up credit growth and asset prices could help macroeconomic stability. In addition, using a macroprudential instrument designed specifically to dampen credit market cycles would also be useful. But invariant and rigid policy responses raise the risk of policy errors that could lower, not raise, macroeconomic stability. Hence, discretion would be required.
This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies with different levels of cooperation among policy authorities: non-cooperation, full cooperation, and leader-follower relation.In non-cooperation, each policy authority's optimal response is to tighten its policy measures when the inflation gap, the output gap and the credit gap expand, and when other authorities' policy measures are loosened. This indicates that the two policies are substitutes for each other. The condition for the response functions to converge to a Nash equilibrium and the speed of convergence depend on the authorities' preferences and the economic structure. If the financial supervisory authority (FSA) puts greater importance on the output gap, the probability of non-convergence increases and the speed of convergence declines even when the condition of convergence is satisfied. When the policy authorities fully cooperate with each other, they can establish an optimal combination of policy responses to each of the three gaps.
This book explores the challenges faced by central banks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the events that followed. It further emphasises the asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy in the Eurozone economies and among major advanced economies. The book also highlights the advances in the monetary policy debate towards an efficient resource allocation. The author argues that the canonical model of macroeconomic stabilization, which assigns the main burden of stabilization to monetary policy, is outdated primarily because of the absence of financial frictions. Further, she highlights the urgency of pushing risky activities outside the perimeters of regulation in face of rapidly evolving financial markets. The book provides an analytical framework in the context of intense globalisation and increased interdependence across economies, irrespective of the recent re-examining of supply-chains and trade relationships, as well as a policy framework thoroughly amended after the global financial crisis and the crises that followed it. Presenting policy proposals, the book discusses how policymakers must try to develop a set of policies that the public will have confidence in and take into account in forming expectations about future inflation and spending. It will be useful to central banking practitioners, monetary and fiscal policymakers, as well as students and scholars in economics and, in particular, financial economics.
This paper takes a new approach to assess the costs and benefits of using different policy tools—macroprudential, monetary, foreign exchange interventions, and capital flow management—in response to changes in financial conditions. The approach evaluates net benefits of policies using quadratic loss functions, estimating policy effects on the full distribution of future output growth and inflation with quantile regressions. Tightening macroprudential policy dampens downside risks to growth stemming from loose financial conditions, and is beneficial in net terms. By contrast, tightening monetary policy entails net losses, calling for caution in the use of monetary policy to “lean against the wind.” These findings hold when policies are used in response to easing global financial conditions. Buying foreign-exchange or tightening capital controls has small net benefits.
This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries