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This is the first of two volumes on a theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible. Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives within different institutional settings, drive policy-making and the behaviour of policy-makers. The approach explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies are implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy, such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition and central bank independence.
Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.
Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches.
Institutions aimed at constraining policy discretion to promote sound fiscal policies are once again at the forefront of the policy debate. Interest in “fiscal councils,” independent watchdogs active in the public debate, has grown rapidly in recent years. This paper presents the first cross-country dataset summarizing key characteristics of fiscal councils among IMF members. The data documents a surge in the number of fiscal councils since the crisis. It also illustrates that well-designed fiscal councils are associated with stronger fiscal performance and better macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. Key features of effective fiscal councils include operational independence from politics, the provision or public assessment of budgetary forecasts, a strong presence in the public debate, and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal policy rules.
Across a sample of thirty four emerging countries, the evidence shows the frequent existence of a pro-cyclical fiscal impulse. However, the scope for countercyclical policy increases with the availability of international reserves as it enhances credibility and mitigates concerns about the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the cost of borrowing and debt service. The paper also examines the effectiveness of the fiscal policy in emerging countries in the short- and long-run and its underlying conditions, which does not appear to be uniform. In some cases, contractionary fiscal policy could stimulate growth in the short-run, if fiscal tightness lowers the cost of borrowing and debt service, and mitigates concerns about debt sustainability. However, an increase in international reserves is evident to mitigate these concerns. On the other hand, high inflation increases concerns about the impact of fiscal spending on inflationary expectations and the cost of borrowing, countering the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus on output growth in the short-run. Where the debt burden is high, fiscal expansion has a longlasting negative effect on real growth.
What are fiscal policy rules? What are the principal benefits and drawbacks associated with various fiscal rules, particularly compared with alternative approaches to fiscal adjustment? Can fiscal rules contribute to long-run sustainability and welfare without sacrificing short-run stabilization? If so, what characteristics of fiscal rules make this contribution most effective? And in what circumstances and contexts, if any should the IMF encourage its member countries to adopt fiscal rules? This paper seeks to identify sensible fiscal policy rules that can succeed, if chosen by a member country, as an alternative to descretionary fiscal rules.
Fiscal discipline is essential to improve and sustain economic performance, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce vulnerabilities. Discipline is especially important if countries, industrial as well as developing, are to successfully meet the challenges, and reap the benefits, of economic and financial globalization. Lack of fiscal discipline generally stems from the injudicious use of policy discretion. The benefits of discretion are seen in terms of the ability of policymakers to respond to unexpected shocks and in allowing elected political representatives to fulfill their mandates. But discretion can be misused, resulting in persistent deficits and procyclical policies, rising debt levels, and, over time, a loss in policy credibility. The authors first explore the role of discretion in fiscal policy, and the extent, consequences, and causes of procyclicality, particularly in good times. They then examine how a variety of institutional approaches—fiscal rules, fiscal responsibility laws, and fiscal agencies—can help improve fiscal discipline. While each of these approaches can play a useful role, the authors suggest that a strategy combining them is likely to be particularly beneficial. Although such a strategy requires political commitment and effective fiscal management, at the same time, the strategy itself can bolster political commitment by highlighting the restraints on government and raising the costs of failing to respect them.
The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing.
The results of macroeconomic policy are often unpredictable. One of the major reasons for this is the importance of confidence and expectations in economic affairs. Confidence, Credibility and Macroeconomic Policy explores this interaction between confidence and expectations, and the credibility of the government's financial policies. The volume is divided into three parts. * An overview of the inter-relationship between fiscal policy, credibility and inflation * Empirical research on the importance of public confidence and expectations to the success of fiscal and monetary policy. * The definition and functions of consumer confidence as it is measured today. Confidence, Credibility and Macroeconomic Policy will be an invaluable guide for all those interested in macroeconomic policy.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent need for policy support have called the traditional separation between fiscal and monetary policies into question. Based on simulations of an open economy DSGE model calibrated to emerging and advance economies and case study evidence, the analysis shows when constraints are binding a more integrated approach of looking at policies can lead to a better policy mix and ultimately better macroeconomic outcomes under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, such an approach entails risks, necessitating a clear assessment of each country’s circumstances as well as safeguards to protect the credibility of the existing institutional framework.