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This is an introduction to the foundations of economic property rights t- ory (EPRT). In this volume, a ?rst step in the EPRT research program, rules concerningeconomicpropertyrights(e. p. r. s),entrepreneurialagreements,and enterprises are discussed. Introduced concept of e. p. r. s is an extension of the traditional concept of pairing of residual rights of control and residual rights of returns in the economic theory. Its importance in economics is generated fromageneralimpossibilityofmakingacompletecontract,concerninge. p. r. s, for any nontrivial economic transaction. The volume o?ers a theoretical - tension of mathematical economics, applying recent results of Hopf algebras, quasi-Hopf algebras, representation theory, theory of categories, and defor- tion theories, in looking for suitable mathematical methodology of economic property rights theories and foundations of general theory of economic agr- ments. The idea is to construct a kind of mathematical application in which any fundamental formal entity and/or operation has an empirical economic interpretation. This approach is seen as a way to cope with an extreme c- plexity of economic phenomena under consideration and requests for precise formulationofmodelswheremeaningfulanswersandsolutionsofproblemsare only those which are obtained rigorously. The proposed extensions in ma- ematical economics and property rights theory are to provide rich enough foundations to follow complexity of economic property rights in the exact way, and to identify where there is an appropriate method providing a- quate solution, and also to ?nd problems where in general there is no such methodology.
The standard neoclassical model of economics is incapable of explaining why one form of organization arises over another. It is a model where transaction costs are implicitly assumed to not exist; however, transaction costs are here defined as the costs of strengthening a given distribution of economic property rights, and they always exist. Economic Analysis of Property Rights is a study of how individuals organise resources to maximise the value of their economic rights over these resources. It offers a unified theoretical structure to deal with exchange, rights formation, and organisation that traditional economic theory often ignores. It explains how transaction costs can be reduced through reorganization and, in the end, how the distribution of property rights that exists is the one that maximizes wealth net of these transaction costs. This necessary hypothesis explains much of the puzzling organizations and institutions that exist now and have existed in the past.
Property rights form the relationship between individuals and their goods. They are the cornerstone of the pricing, supply and fair allocation of scarce resources between people. This is a collection of writings from the founders of the field, including James M. Buchanan and Douglass C. North.
This is a study of the way individuals organise the use of resources in order to maximise the value of their economic rights over these resources. Property rights and all forms of organisation result from people's deliberate actions. In the tradition of Coase, this study offers a unified theoretical structure to deal with exchange, rights formation and organisation which traditional economic theory assumes away. A person's economic property rights over an asset are defined here as the person's ability to gain from the asset by direct consumption or by exchange. It is prohibitively costly to measure accurately all assets' attributes; therefore, rights to them are never fully delineated. Property is consequently in danger of appropriation by others. Individuals enhance their rights by such actions as the protection and better delineation of their assets. In this new edition, Professor Barzel introduces the central role of equity capital as a guarantor of the activities of the firm and elaborates on the distinction between economic rights and legal rights.
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - History, grade: 1,7, Humboldt-University of Berlin, 6 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: The paper will give a general overview on Douglass C. North's theoretical work during the last twenty years on economic history as well as on new institutions economics and institutional change. While the paper is more concerned on how North approaches the origin and development of the state via property rights it also will take his theory of institutional change and the way he emphasizes economies of scale and transaction costs into account. Part One of this paper will give a short introduction into the topic of the philosophy of the state. This will be followed by North's argumentation and thus his philosophy of the state derived in his numerous works. To begin with, Part Two of this paper gives an introduction into North's argumentation on the role of property rights for economic growth. Part Three will then explain what role government has in economic organization. The role of economies of scale for property rights and fiscal policies will be looked upon thereafter in Part Four. The circle will then be closed by linking economic growth and property rights with the development of the state. Analogously to North's argumentation in his book "The Rise of the Western World" the paper takes a section of ten millennia in economic history in order to explain the tension between property rights and the role of government as North sees it. North's model of the state will then be introduced in Part Six, followed by a short introduction into his Theory of Institutional Change in Part Seven of this paper. A short critique will be given at the end.
Economic property rights are the fundamental unit of economic analysis, necessary to resource allocation, organizations, and institutions.
Competition and efficiency is at the core of economic theory. This volume collects papers of leading scholars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settings is proven under very general preference assumptions. The model is extended to include geographical location choice, a commodity space incorporating manufacturing imprecision and preferences for club-membership, schools and firms. Inefficiencies arising from household externalities or group membership are evaluated. Core equivalence is shown for bargaining economies. The theory of risk aversion is extended and the relation between risk taking and wealth is experimentally investigated. Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.