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The paper reviews issues related to the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates and argues that all of the following propositions are invalid: (i) in a ZLB situation, "shaping interest rate expectations is essentially the only tool that central bankers have"(Bernanke, et.al., 2004); (ii) fiscal policy actions such as "helicopter drops" are in theory more effective than monetary policy actions; (iii) the prominent "foolproof way" policy rule of Svensson (2001, 2003) is applicable more generally -i.e., even when exact uncovered interest parity holds- than the alternative exchange-rate rule of McCallum (2000); (iv) both of the exchange-rate strategies described in (iii) are open to the objection that they constitute "beggar-thy-neighbor" approaches, and (v) there is a significant danger of ZLB difficulties stemming from a "deflationary trap" type of equilibrium, as distinct from a "liquidity trap."
Unconventional monetary policy tools are based on the belief that there exists a zero-lower bound on interest rates. This paper argues, based on economic theory and the empirical evidence, that this belief is a myth and not a reality. It is shown that a negative default-free spot rate of interest is consistent with an arbitrage-free term structure evolution in a competitive and nearly frictionless market. It is not frictionless to the extent that consumers, firms, non-bank financial institutions, and banks have some realistic constraints imposed on their trading activities.
The experience of the Great Recession and its aftermath revealed that a lower bound on interest rates can be a serious obstacle for fighting recessions. However, the zero lower bound is not a law of nature; it is a policy choice. The central message of this paper is that with readily available tools a central bank can enable deep negative rates whenever needed—thus maintaining the power of monetary policy in the future to end recessions within a short time. This paper demonstrates that a subset of these tools can have a big effect in enabling deep negative rates with administratively small actions on the part of the central bank. To that end, we (i) survey approaches to enable deep negative rates discussed in the literature and present new approaches; (ii) establish how a subset of these approaches allows enabling negative rates while remaining at a minimum distance from the current paper currency policy and minimizing the political costs; (iii) discuss why standard transmission mechanisms from interest rates to aggregate demand are likely to remain unchanged in deep negative rate territory; and (iv) present communication tools that central banks can use both now and in the event to facilitate broader political acceptance of negative interest rate policy at the onset of the next serious recession.
The federal funds rate has been at the zero lower bound for over four years, since December 2008. According to standard macroeconomic models, this should have greatly reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy and increased the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, these models also imply that asset prices and private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current level of the overnight rate. Thus, interest rates with a year or more to maturity are arguably more relevant for asset prices and the economy, and it is unclear to what extent those yields have been affected by the zero lower bound. In this paper, we measure the effects of the zero lower bound on interest rates of any maturity by comparing the sensitivity of those interest rates to macroeconomic news when short-term interest rates were very low to that during normal times. We find that yields on Treasury securities with a year or more to maturity were surprisingly responsive to news throughout 2008-10, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were likely to have been about as effective as usual during this period. Only beginning in late 2011 does the sensitivity of these yields to news fall closer to zero. We offer two explanations for our findings: First, until late 2011, market participants expected the funds rate to lift off from zero within about four quarters, minimizing the effects of the zero bound on medium- and longer-term yields. Second, the Fed's unconventional policy actions seem to have helped offset the effects of the zero bound on medium- and longer-term rates.
An insightful and original look at why understanding macroeconomics is essential for all investors
There has been much discussion about eliminating the “zero lower bound” by eliminating paper currency. But such a radical and difficult approach as eliminating paper currency is not necessary. Much as during the Great Depression—when countries were able to revive their economies by going off the gold standard—all that is needed to empower monetary policy to cut interest rates as much as needed for economic stimulus now is to change from a paper standard to an electronic money standard, and to be willing to have paper currency go away from par. This paper develops the idea further and shows how such a mechanism can be implemented in a minimalist way by using a time-varying paper currency deposit fee between private banks and the central bank. This allows the central bank to create a crawling-peg exchange rate between paper currency and electronic money; the paper currency interest rate can be either lowered below zero or raised above zero. Such an ability to vary the paper currency interest rate along with other key interest rates, makes it possible to stimulate investment and net exports as much as needed to revive the economy, even when inflation, interest rates, and economic activity are quite low, as they are currently in many countries. The paper also examines different options available to the central bank to return to par when negative interest rates are no longer needed, and the associated implications for the financial sector and debt contracts. Finally, the paper discusses various legal, political, and economic challenges of putting in place such a framework and how policymakers could address them.
There has been much discussion about eliminating the “zero lower bound” by eliminating paper currency. But such a radical and difficult approach as eliminating paper currency is not necessary. Much as during the Great Depression—when countries were able to revive their economies by going off the gold standard—all that is needed to empower monetary policy to cut interest rates as much as needed for economic stimulus now is to change from a paper standard to an electronic money standard, and to be willing to have paper currency go away from par. This paper develops the idea further and shows how such a mechanism can be implemented in a minimalist way by using a time-varying paper currency deposit fee between private banks and the central bank. This allows the central bank to create a crawling-peg exchange rate between paper currency and electronic money; the paper currency interest rate can be either lowered below zero or raised above zero. Such an ability to vary the paper currency interest rate along with other key interest rates, makes it possible to stimulate investment and net exports as much as needed to revive the economy, even when inflation, interest rates, and economic activity are quite low, as they are currently in many countries. The paper also examines different options available to the central bank to return to par when negative interest rates are no longer needed, and the associated implications for the financial sector and debt contracts. Finally, the paper discusses various legal, political, and economic challenges of putting in place such a framework and how policymakers could address them.