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Mine warfare, in its various forms, is a favoured weapon used by insurgents against government forces. By June 1966, when the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) arrived in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong and People’s Army of Vietnam forces were well entrenched in the province and used mines extensively. The mine campaign risked few enemy lives and was a powerful statement to everyone, including civilians, that the Viet Cong were still in the war and not a spent force. The intense patrolling practised by 1ATF inevitably put its men in close contact with enemy mines. Indeed, 1ATF suffered more casualties from the Viet Cong mine warfare campaign than from any other single cause, yet enemy casualties were minimal. So why did the enemy mine campaign collapse in the period July to December 1970 and continue its rapid decline until 1ATF ended combat operations in September 1971? Counterinsurgency has been described as a competition in learning and, facing a well-organised mine campaign against them, 1ATF learned and adapted to the enemy’s mine warfare techniques. Supported by statistical analyses of operational research data, this book details the complex tactics adopted by 1ATF to eventually defeat the Viet Cong mine campaign, and how enemy forces were reduced to a negligible military presence in Phuoc Tuy Province.
This volume is the first of two addressing the legal regime governing the use of force during armed conflicts. Traditionally labeled 'Hague Law', today the norms it examines are commonly referred to as 'conduct of hostilities rules'. At the heart of this body of law is the principle of distinction, which requires that civilians and civilian objects be distinguished from combatants and military objectives during military operations. It is the purest expression of the foundational balance between humanitarian considerations and military necessity that has underpinned international humanitarian law since its inception. The essays selected consider the theoretical and practical difficulties of maintaining the balance in the face of evolving means and methods of warfare and competing perspectives as to how it is best achieved. Also addressed is the law governing warfare at sea and in the air. Essays focusing on the former examine early norms and analyze their continuing relevance to today's maritime operations whilst those exploring the latter inject much needed clarity into the subject, an essential task in light of the centrality of aerial warfare in modern combat operations.
In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for “tactical” nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a “special reminder” of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a “long-route” policy of providing Saigon with a “decent chance” of survival for a “decent interval” after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to unravel this intricate story of the October 1969 nuclear alert. They place it in the context of nuclear threat making and coercive diplomacy since 1945, the culture of the Bomb, intra-governmental dissent, domestic political pressures, the international “nuclear taboo,” and Vietnamese and Soviet actions and policies. It is a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.
In 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) coordinated the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. As of mid-2005, 145 states had signed the agreement. The ICBL's efforts were in large part a response to the careless use of landmines in the previous fifty years. The history of mine use in warfare, however, goes back much further than the World Wars of the 20th century and includes both land and sea use. This first comprehensive study traces the technical, tactical, and ethical developments of mine warfare, from ancient times to the present. Beginning with mine warfare's roots in ancient Assyria and China, Youngblood takes the reader through the centuries of debate about how these hidden weapons should be used. A look at 19th-century developments explores the intertwined development of land and sea mines and the inventors behind them, including Robert Fulton, Samuel Colt, and Immanuel Nobel, father of Alfred Nobel. Subsequent chapters examine the use of mines in the American Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War, both World Wars, and the battlefields of the Cold War, and chart key battles and technical innovations, such as the development of air-delivered munitions. Finally, the author addresses the ethical concerns raised by the careless mining, namely the impact on civilians and the difficulties of de-mining, and the treaties that regulate landmine use.