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This report examines the changes in military strategy necessitated by changes in the international strategic environment since 1945. It discusses the nature of military strategy and the constraints that act upon it. The report considers the nature of the present international environment and the trends which impact on it. Finally, it assesses the predicted strategic environment of the 21st century and its effect on US strategy and force structure. (Author).
Current NATO military strategy is based on the policy of flexible response that U.S. and European politicians endorsed in 1967; for over 15 years, no fundamental changes in NATO's defense strategy have occurred. If NATO cannot stop a Warsaw Pact aggression conventionally, it continues to threaten a gradual and controlled nuclear escalation of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts now question the fundamental principles underlying NATO's policy and strategy, given the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic environment between 1967 and 1984. The contributors to this book examine the recent proposal by Samuel Huntington, who advocates that NATO adopt a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy based on offensive military actions deep into Eastern Europe. In evaluating this new proposal, the authors analyze the potential impact that it would have on U.S. and NATO military doctrine, assess probable European and Soviet reactions to NATO adopting a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy, and address the linkages existing between conventional and nuclear strategy. In the final chapter, the editors consider the policy, strategy, and force structure questions raised in the book and recommend policy options for the United States.
“You offer yourself to be slain,” General Sir John Hackett once observed, remarking on the military profession. “This is the essence of being a soldier.” For this reason as much as any other, the British army has invariably been seen as standing apart from other professions—and sometimes from society as a whole. A British Profession of Arms effectively counters this view. In this definitive study of the late Victorian army, distinguished scholar Ian F. W. Beckett finds that the British soldier, like any other professional, was motivated by considerations of material reward and career advancement. Within the context of debates about both the evolution of Victorian professions and the nature of military professionalism, Beckett considers the late Victorian officer corps as a case study for weighing distinctions between the British soldier and his civilian counterparts. Beckett examines the role of personality, politics, and patronage in the selection and promotion of officers. He looks, too, at the internal and external influences that extended from the press and public opinion to the rivalry of the so-called rings of adherents of major figures such as Garnet Wolseley and Frederick Roberts. In particular, he considers these processes at play in high command in the Second Afghan War (1878–81), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), and the South African War (1899–1902). Based on more than thirty years of research into surviving official, semiofficial, and private correspondence, Beckett’s work offers an intimate and occasionally amusing picture of what might affect an officer’s career: wealth, wives, and family status; promotion boards and strategic preferences; performance in the field and diplomatic outcomes. It is a remarkable depiction of the British profession of arms, unparalleled in breadth, depth, and detail.
This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining great powers during the twenty-first century. The book’s point of departure is that analyses of countries’ defence strategies should acknowledge that states come in various shapes and sizes and that their strategic choices are affected by their perceptions of their position in the international system and by power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. This creates a diversity in strategies that is often overlooked in theoretically oriented analyses. The book examines how five major powers – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia – have adjusted their strategies to improve or maintain their relative position and to manage power asymmetries during the twenty-first century. It also develops and applies an analytical framework for exploring and categorising the strategies pursued by the five major powers which combines elements of structural realism with research on power transition theory and status competition. The concluding chapter addresses questions related to stability and change in the present international system. This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations.
Strategic leader transitions constitute narrow windows of opportunity marked by high pressure, high expectations and general lack of organization awareness for many new leaders. During the transition period, an incoming leader must effectively utilize the existing time to develop a keen understanding of the organization and its environment while developing strategies for organizational success. If managed properly, transitions can enable organizational improvement in a number of ways. On the other hand, poorly managed leader transitions have significant ramifications. The Army's transition team methodology is excellent in assisting strategic leader transitions. Without transition teams, it is unlikely that any incoming commander, regardless of experience, could develop an equivalent situational understanding or command strategy. Thus, transition teams are important for the Army because they provide essential assistance to strategic leaders although few are aware of the Army's transitional methodology. This monograph fills an existing literature gap on military transitions while reinforcing the importance of Army transition teams. Its purpose is to inform readers about Army transition teams to include its general processes and products created. This monograph captures key aspects of the Army's methodology based upon first-hand experience by the author during the CG TRADOC Transition Team in the fall of 2005. After modeling the CG TRADOC transitional processes and products, the monograph explores the environment and lessons learned from presidential and corporate transitions in order to identify and incorporate relevant lessons into the Army transition process and develop recommendations for improved transition team operations in the future. The methodology traces critical elements of the environment for both presidential and corporate transitions. It captures lessons learned in the form of best practices, critical outcomes and common pitfalls associated with each type of transition. Identification of commonalities enables comparison of the lessons learned and the refinement and improvement of the modeled processes and products. The resulting transition model provides both products and processes based upon an improved understanding of the lessons learned from strategic leader transitions in other environments. The monograph concludes with recommendations for improved future Army transition operations that include codifying the Army's transitional process and training it in the AMSP program.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Strategic leader transitions constitute narrow windows of opportunity marked by high pressure, high expectations and general lack of organization awareness for many new leaders. The Army's transition team methodology is excellent in assisting strategic leader transitions. Without transition teams, it is unlikely that any incoming commander, regardless of experience, could develop an equivalent situational understanding or command strategy. However, the process could improve by incorporating lessons learned from transition operations in other environments. This monograph models the Army's methodology based upon first-hand experience by the author during the CG TRADOC Transition Team in the fall of 2005. The monograph then explores the environment and lessons learned from presidential and corporate transitions in order to identify and incorporate relevant lessons into the Army transition process and develop recommendations for improved transition team operations in the future. It captures lessons learned in the form of best practices, critical outcomes and common pitfalls associated with each type of transition and infuses relevant lessons in a revised transition model. The monograph concludes with recommendations for improved future Army transition operations that include codifying the Army's transitional process and training it in the AMSP program.
"The U.S. Army again faces a major turning point. Having proven in the Gulf War that it has fully recovered from its post-Vietnam low, it must adapt to the high-technology challenges of the Information Age in a post-Cold War world of reduced defense expenditures. The last time the Army was drastically downsized - just after World War II - the result was the nearly catastrophic rout of its forces in Korea. This is a lesson that forward-thinking soldiers, such as the author of The U.S. Army in Transition II, have not forgotten. Former chief of the Army's armor forces and coauthor of the landmark 1973 work The United States Army in Transition (I), Lt. Gen. Frederic J. Brown was one of the key thinkers behind the Army's recent successes. His latest book establishes the next creative framework for dealing with the tough issues facing today's custodians of U.S. landpower. It will stimulate discussion among all concerned with America's security at this watershed in world history."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved