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CMH Publication 70-30. Edited by Frank N. Schubert and TheresaL. Kraus. Discusses the United States Army's role in the Persian Gulf War from August 1990 to February 1991. Shows the various strands that came together to produce the army of the 1990s and how that army in turn performed under fire and in the glare of world attention. Retains a sense of immediacy in its approach. Contains maps which were carefully researched and compiled as original documents in their own right. Includes an index.
Twenty years ago, the Persian Gulf War captured the attention of the world as the first test of the U.S. Army since the Vietnam War and the first large-scale armor engagement since World War II. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent ouster by the U.S.-led coalition are keys to understanding today's situation in the Middle East. The coalition partnerships cemented in that initial operation and in the regional peacekeeping operations that followed provided the basis for a growing series of multinational efforts that have characterized the post-Cold War environment. Moreover, the growing interoperability of U.S. air, sea, and land forces coupled with the extensive employment of more sophisticated weapons first showcased in Desert Storm have become the hallmark of American military operations and the standard that other nations strive to meet.
CONTENTS: CASCOM Support for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM; Total Army CSS: Providing the Means for Victory; Logistics Automation Support for Desert Storm; Building the DESERT Logistics force; Depot operations Supporting DESERT SHIELD; The Readiness Group's Role in Mobilization; Legal Assistance for Those Who Go in Harm's Way; Medical Operations and the Law of War; The Officer Corps: Unduly Distant From Military Justice?; CSS Units and Rear Area Protection; Corps and Division Passage Operations: El Alamein, 1942; World War II Almanac--The Steel Pot, A World War II Veteran; Insights: Combat Casualty Care: Ready for the Last War?
CMH Publication 70-30. Edited by Frank N. Schubert and TheresaL. Kraus. Discusses the United States Army's role in the Persian Gulf War from August 1990 to February 1991. Shows the various strands that came together to produce the army of the 1990s and how that army in turn performed under fire and in the glare of world attention. Retains a sense of immediacy in its approach. Contains maps which were carefully researched and compiled as original documents in their own right. Includes an index.
Without oil, no engine can run. "Movement" is the oil that enables America's military forces to sustain an operation, and nothing happens until something moves! As America's military priorities are reordered, the ability to move quickly, sustain forces anywhere in the world, and pre-position equipment and materiel near likely areas of crisis is more important than ever. Because of the apparent ease of movement during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, however, decision makers may be prone to misinterpret the lessons of the Gulf War and fail to address movement capabilities properly for the future. A good example is a recent Congressional decision to divert funds from slated improvements to the Army's afloat pre-positioning capability to the building of an amphibious assault ship. The capacity to foster global stability and defend our national interests depends upon correct long-range planning for transport. Logistics, especially mobility, has long been a bill payer for combat equipment, so perhaps a reappraisal is in order. Lessons from the Gulf War can help reshape America's defense transportation system for the post-Cold War era. Commitment to a balanced and unified mobility strategy should provide the most cost-effective, rapidly deployable, and sustainable combat capability. Regional focus, particularly in a multiple-conflict scenario, and reduced forward presence will significantly increase America's reliance on movement in the future. Careful restructuring of military movement capabilities will lessen the risks of distance and time in an unstable world and contribute to the economic well-being of the nation. To do less might invite confrontation with adversaries willing to test the substance and purpose of U.S. reach.
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.