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This is a study of the impact of inter-war naval arms control policy-making on the domestic politics of Japan, especially the areas of civil-military, inter-military (Army/Navy) and especially intra-military (Navy) relations and on the professional and political career of one leading naval figure, Admiral Kato Kanji (1873-1939). In this re-appraisal of Kato's career, the author challenges the conventional and negative interpretation of both Kato's role in the naval politics and factions within the Imperial Navy, utilizing Kato's involvement in the domestic political debate as a focal device for studying two key areas of Japanese civil-military relations: civilian control and the phenomenon of massive, overt naval intervention in domestic politics.
This is a study of the impact of inter-war naval arms control policy-making on the domestic politics of Japan, especially the areas of civil-military, inter-military (Army/Navy) and especially intra-military (Navy) relations and on the professional and political career of one leading naval figure, Admiral Kato Kanji (1873-1939). In this re-appraisal of Kato's career, the author challenges the conventional and negative interpretation of both Kato's role in the naval politics and factions within the Imperial Navy, utilizing Kato's involvement in the domestic political debate as a focal device for studying two key areas of Japanese civil-military relations: civilian control and the phenomenon of massive, overt naval intervention in domestic politics.
Sub-titled Admiral Kato Kanji and the 'Washington System', this volume offers a new, critical appraisal of one of Japan's most influential pre-war naval minds and the extent to which Kato in his various roles, influenced the thinking of the naval officer corps and Japanese naval policy during the crucial international inter-war naval arms limitation talks, as well as the approach to policy-making within the arena of domestic politics, especially the areas of civil-military, inter-military (Army/Navy) and intra-military (Navy) relations.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
The story of the bitter political struggles within a factionalized military elite, released in the 1920's from the constraints of the informal but unified system of Imperial leadership which had characterized the military in the Meiji era.
This book investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan’s foreign policy during the interbellum. In the mid-1930s, Japan withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable in the mid-1930s, while Washington was pursuing a policy of accommodation toward Tokyo. By rejecting arms control and engaging in unfettered naval expansion, Japan overbalanced against the United States and began its rush to the Pacific War. The book explains Japan’s overbalancing with a neoclassical realist model that combines the literatures on threat perception and civil-military relations. Amid the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, as the Japanese government collaborated with the military institution to address the situation in China, military influence on the formulation of foreign policy surged. The perceptual and policy biases of the military, which include the tendency to distrust other countries’ intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, gradually penetrated the decision-making process. Dysfunctions in the preexisting structure of Japanese civil-military relations, engendered by an over-depoliticization of the military institution, allowed the navy to convince policymakers that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, hence the necessity to prepare for war. The government was brainstormed, adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Japan overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.
Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War—the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.–China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past.
Japan at War, 1914–1952 is a synthetic and interpretive history that highlights the centrality of war to the modern Japanese experience. The author argues that war was central to Japanese life in this period—the era when Japan rose and fell as a world power. The volume examines how World War I set off profound changes that led to the rise of a politicized military, aggressive imperial expansion, and the militarization of Japanese social, political, and economic life. War was extraordinarily popular, which helped confirm Japan’s aggressive imperialism in the 1930s and war across the Asia-Pacific in the 1940s. It took a defeat by 1945 and occupation through 1952 to undo war as a national concern and to remake Japan into a peaceful nation-state. In telling this story of Japan in war and peace, this book highlights the importance of Japan in the creation of the modern world. This study of political power and its influences in domestic and foreign affairs will be of great value to nonspecialist readers who are interested in this period, undergraduate and postgraduate students in introductory classes, and scholars interested in Japanese history and political, military, and international history.
A new annotated edition of a shocking Japanese paperback, published in 1933, which foreshadowed a surprise attack on the US Pacific Fleet. Learn why the original Japanese version was confiscated and banned in the US. The government went as far as to collect books that had already been sold. The original novel was endorsed by two admirals in the Imperial Japanese Navy, both of whom provided forewords for the book. Although explicitly a work of fiction, the book was implicitly a statement of real IJN strategy.