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The official historian of the Army Transportation Corps provides a great history of the Transportation Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (OIF-2) and the April 2005 Uprising. By the second rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF 2), commercial contracts played a greater role in the line haul mission. Two truck medium truck battalions conducted long haul from the TDC to logistic support areas either at Anaconda or Mosul, Iraq. Theater trucks ran the Sustainer Push mission while a Corps truck battalion pushed supplies to the forward operating bases. From there, the truck companies of forward or corps support battalions delivered cargo to the units. HETs hauled unit equipment to and from their final destinations. The Army had abandoned of old system of supply where they built mountains of supplies in favor of the system used by commercial businesses. To eliminate the cost of warehousing, companies only ordered what they needed, when they needed it and produced only what was ordered. In an efficiently managed commercial company, items would only remain in the warehouse for a few days. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld hoped to get the Army to adopt the "just-in-time" delivery concept. This would eliminate the need for a large logistical foot print. He also planned to turn the logistics over to contract companies and have the Army focus on combat. While this system worked well and reduced costs in the commercial industry, Federal Express and UPS did not have insurgents try to ambush their trucks. Because of the attacks on convoys during 2003, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) required military escorts of one "green" military truck to three "white" commercial trucks. Earning $75,000, three KBR drivers would not drive in Iraq unless a Soldier making less than $20,000 a year escorted him. Originally, convoys required two MP HMMVs as escort. Any HMMV with a SAW was considered an escort vehicle. The 181st Battalion's Skunk Werks originated the armoring of HMMVs. The 181st Transportation Battalion had pioneered what they called the "Tiger Team" concept. Two HMMV gun trucks ran ahead of the convoy searching for IEDs and blocking traffic at intersections. Other units called it by its original term, "Rat Patrols." Because of drive-by shootings, doctrine had evolved to where convoys did not permit civilian traffic to pass convoys.
Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security is the 13th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. Transportation Corps Historian Richard Killblane's manuscript on convoy security is another case study modern military professionals can use to prepare themselves and their soldiers for operations in the current conflict. This work examines the problems associated with convoy operations in hostile territory and the means by which units can ensure they are ready to deal with an enemy ambush or assault. Killblane provides a brief overview of the US Army's experience in convoy operations and convoy protection from the period of the War with Mexico up to and including the current conflict. He then presents an indepth look at the development of “hardened convoy” tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), focusing on the 8th Transportation Group's experiences in Vietnam. That group had the dubious honor of conducting its missions along Highway 19, arguably the most dangerous stretch of road during the Vietnam War. Killblane describes the group's initial experiences and how, over time, various commanders and soldiers developed methods and means of defeating the enemy's evolving tactics. The hardened-convoy concept is one that, frankly, receives little attention by Army leaders in peacetime—the lessons from which each new generation of soldiers seems painfully destined to relearn. Logisticians, contractors, and those military leaders responsible for such operations in the current struggle against terrorism will gain useful knowledge for developing hardened-convoy TTPs from this occasional paper. More important, we at CSI desire that this study be read by future generations of leaders, before they have to conduct such operations, so that their mission and the soldiers entrusted to them will prosper from the lessons of the past.~