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Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction Timelines
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that works for Congress. The GAO watches over Congress, and investigates how the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. The Comptroller General of the United States is the leader of the GAO, and is appointed to a 15-year term by the U.S. President. The GAO wants to support Congress, while at the same time doing right by the citizens of the United States. They audit, investigate, perform analyses, issue legal decisions and report anything that the government is doing. This is one of their reports.
The military buildup on Guam is likely to cost about $7.5 billion in military construction funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2016, according to the latest estimates by DOD. However, DOD has yet to fully identify some costs associated with the buildup. For example, DOD has not developed cost estimates for the air and missile defense task force that may be placed on Guam. In addition, construction for future facilities for the Air Force Guam Strike initiative is expected to occur over a 16-year period, which extends beyond the current costs that the Air Force has estimated through fiscal year 2015. In addition, the Government of Japan is expected to provide up to an additional $6.09 billion in funding for infrastructure and facilities to support the Marine Corps relocation, which includes directly funding up to $2.8 billion in military construction projects on Guam, including utilities and site improvements for future facilities. Japan is also expected to fund up to $3.29 billion in special purpose entity loans and equity investments for installation support infrastructure for utilities and for military family housing, and, according to DOD officials, Japan is expected to recoup most of these funds over time in the form of repayments from the U.S. government and rents paid by Marine Corps servicemembers through their housing allowances. The Government of Guam is largely responsible for obtaining funding for needed off-installation infrastructure projects, such as off-base roads and utilities, and it estimated that it needs approximately $3.2 billion for buildup-related projects and programs. In addition, we found that DOD, the Government of Japan, and the Government of Guam total cost estimates for the Guam-based military buildup are almost $23.9 billion to date, including the $3.29 billion that Japan is expected to recoup over time. We also found that DOD had bid savings of about $93 million for 11 of the 13 military construction projects for which it had awarded contracts in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to support the Guam buildup. However, bid savings may often be used to offset cost overruns on other projects or future requirements for a specific military construction project or for other projects around the world without further congressional authorization. In the cases we examined, most of the bid savings were applied to offset the impact of rescissions of military construction appropriations or had been transferred or reprogrammed to other projects as of the time of our report. DOD continues to update but has not yet finalized its Guam Joint Military Master Plan (master plan) for the military buildup on Guam and faces certain unresolved challenges which may delay some construction projects, although it has taken some steps to address many of these challenges. Delays in finalizing the master plan may lead DOD to make budget requests for military construction projects for the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam without reasonable assurances that the funds are needed in the time frame in which they are being requested. Challenges that could delay some construction projects include the Navy's deferral of decisions on (1) selection of a site for the live-fire training range complex on Guam to support needed Marine Corps training, (2) selection of a site for the transient aircraft carrier berth within Apra Harbor, and (3) the potential deployment of an air and missile defense task force on Guam and the construction of associated infrastructure to support the task force.
The rapid modernization of the Chinese Navy is a well-documented reality of the post-Cold War world. In two decades, the People's Liberation Army Navy has evolved from a backward force composed of obsolete platforms into a reasonably modern fleet whose growth is significantly shaking the naval balance in East Asia. The rationale behind China's contemporary rise at sea remains, however, difficult to grasp and few people have tried to see how the current structure of the international system has shaped Chinese choices. This book makes sense of Chinese priorities in its naval modernization in a 'robust' offensive realist framework. Drawing on Barry Posen's works on sources of military doctrine, it argues that the orientation of Beijing's choices concerning its naval forces can essentially be explained by China's position as a potential regional hegemon. Yves-Heng Lim highlights how a rising state develops naval power to fulfil its security objectives, a theoretical perspective that goes farther than the sole Chinese case.