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The Great War toppled four empires, cost the world 24 million dead, and sowed the seeds of another worldwide conflict 20 years later. This is the only book in the English language to offer comprehensive coverage of how Germany and Austria-Hungary, two of the key belligerents, conducted the war and what defeat meant to them. This new edition has been thoroughly updated throughout, including new developments in the historiography and, in particular, addressing new work on the cultural history of the war. This edition also includes: - New material on the domestic front, covering Austria-Hungary's internal political frictions and ethnic fissures - More on Austria-Hungary and Germany's position within the wider geopolitical framework - Increased coverage of the Eastern front The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 offers an authoritative and well-researched survey of the role of the Central powers that will be an invaluable text for all those studying the First World War and the development of modern warfare.
The well-respected historian Manfried Rauchensteiner analyses the outbreak of World War I, Emperor Franz Joseph's role in the conflict, and how the various nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy reacted to the disintegration of this 640-yearold empire in 1918. After Archduke Franz Ferdinand"s assassination in Sarajevo in 1914, war was inevitable. Emperor Franz Joseph intended it, and everyone in Vienna expected it. How the war began and how Austria-Hungary managed to avoid capitulation only weeks later with the help of German troops reads like a thriller. Manfried Rauchensteiner"s book is based on decades of research and is a fascinating read to the very end, even though the final outcome, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, is already known. Originally published in German in 2013 by Böhlau, this standard work is now available in English.
Swastika over the Acropolis is a new, multi-national account which provides a new and compelling interpretation of the Greek campaign of 1941, and its place in the history of World War II. It overturns many previously accepted English-language assumptions about the fighting in Greece in April 1941 – including, for example, the impact usually ascribed to the Luftwaffe, German armour and the conduct of the Greek Army Further, Swastika over the Acropolis demonstrates that this last complete strategic victory by Nazi Germany in World War II is set against a British-Dominion campaign mounted as a withdrawal, not an attempt to ‘save’ Greece from invasion and occupation. At the same time, on the German side, the campaign revealed serious and systemic weaknesses in the planning and the conduct of large-scale operations that would play a significant role in the regime’s later defeats.
This book provides a concise and accessible introduction to modern military history. The collection is a clear and up to date survey of the significant debates, interpretations and historiographical shifts for a series of key themes in military history. Each chapter is supported by notes and a brief bibliography outlining further reading.
A prize-winning, magisterial history of World War I from the perspective of the defeated Central Powers For the Central Powers, the First World War started with high hopes for an easy victory. But those hopes soon deteriorated as Germany's attack on France failed, Austria-Hungary's armies suffered catastrophic losses, and Britain's ruthless blockade brought both nations to the brink of starvation. The Central powers were trapped in the Allies' ever-tightening Ring of Steel. In this compelling history, Alexander Watson retells the war from the perspective of its losers: not just the leaders in Berlin and Vienna, but the people of Central Europe. The war shattered their societies, destroyed their states, and imparted a poisonous legacy of bitterness and violence. A major reevaluation of the First World War, Ring of Steel is essential for anyone seeking to understand the last century of European history.
Careful review of microfilmed German operational records led the author to solve a World War II mystery involving Field Marshall Albert Kesselring and the Italian campaign he directed. Facts about two events in March 1944, the Ardeatine Cave Massacre and the failed GINNY II mission, were manipulated. Kesselring's 1947 defense was accepted without challenge until 1997, when Dr. Raiber found irrefutable evidence that Kesselring had misled the court in order to hide his involvement in the murder of fifteen U.S. soldiers who had been captured in uniform behind enemy lines. Kesselring claimed he was present in his Monte Soratee headquarters north of Rome on 23 March 1944 when he received and passed on Hitler's 10-for-1 retaliatory order against the Via Rasella partisan, resulting in the massacre at the Ardeatine Cave. A day earlier, on the Ligurian coast, members of an OSS operational group, GINNY II, landed north of La Spezia. Captured behind German lines, these U.S. soldiers were interrogated, and summarily shot on 26 March. Thereafter Kesselring ordered the destruction of all records bearing on GINNY II to conceal his presence in La Spezia and his confirmation of the execution order but surviving documents clearly place him there at noon on 24 March. - Publisher.
20 July 1944 is usually associated with the bomb plot to murder Hitler. However, what distinguishes Colonel Stauffenberg’s plan from all others is that the attempt on the Führer’s life was only to be the initial stage of a full military coup d’état. The aim was to overthrow the murderous regime, and to end the war as soon as possible. The conspiracy has long been analyzed from political, social, religious, or moral points of view. This book asks what the military dimension of the plan was. What traditions in the German army were at work, how was planning and preparation done, and why did the plot fail eventually? What is more: how did the conspiracy affect the German armies created in East and West after World War II, and also the Austrian Army? As the politicians among the conspirators thought in categories of Imperial Germany or at least the Weimar Republic, the officers among them were conditioned by the Reichswehr. Yet, Stauffenberg and some others were also bright intellectuals who were willing to incorporate their war experience into their plans, rendering them surprisingly modern at times. The coup d’état had been planned as meticulously as circumstances in war-torn Berlin allowed. However, as most officers had foreseen, once it became public knowledge that Hitler had survived Stauffenberg’s bomb, army units refused to act. The myth surrounding the "Führer" effectively prevented any military action against him. Still, the failed uprising had its effects: the regime took the opportunity to tilt the balance of power further in favor of Himmler and his fiefdom (SS, Gestapo, Police), to the detriment of the army which Hitler felt was too reactionary anyway. The leadership of the West German Bundeswehr always saw the failed uprising as part of its tradition, but it took time for this attitude to percolate down to the rank and file. For decades, some of the former Wehrmacht soldiers viewed Stauffenberg and his friends as "traitors". The book is the first to approach this important event in German history from a specifically military point of view, and that results in some surprising new results.
Hoarding New Guinea provides a new cultural history of colonialism that pays close attention to the millions of Indigenous artifacts that serve as witnesses to Europe's colonial past in ethnographic museums. Rainer F. Buschmann investigates the roughly two hundred thousand artifacts extracted from the colony of German New Guinea from 1870 to 1920. Reversing the typical trajectories that place ethnographic museums at the center of the analysis, he concludes that museum interests in material culture alone cannot account for the large quantities of extracted artifacts. Buschmann moves beyond the easy definition of artifacts as trophies of colonial defeat or religious conversion, instead employing the term hoarding to describe the irrational amassing of Indigenous artifacts by European colonial residents. Buschmann also highlights Indigenous material culture as a bargaining chip for its producers to engage with the imposed colonial regime. In addition, by centering an area of collection rather than an institution, he opens new areas of investigation that include non-professional ethnographic collectors and a sustained rather than superficial consideration of Indigenous peoples as producers behind the material culture. Hoarding New Guinea answers the call for a more significant historical focus on colonial ethnographic collections in European museums.
The existence of the Schlieffen Plan has been one of the basic assumptions of 20th-century military history. Terence Zuber challenges this assumption and presents a different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914. He concludes that there never really was a Schlieffen Plan.