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This Festschrift was "presented" in electronic form to Buchanan on the occasion of his eightieth birthday on October 3, 1999, after dinner in Fairfax, Virginia. As one might have expected, the response to our call for papers was vo luminous. In looking over the many contributions, we felt that a "published" Festschrift was also possible and fitting for the eightieth birthday of so prodi gious and influential a scholar as Professor Buchanan. To that end we have assembled the following volume. In selecting the papers to be included here we have basically tried to choose those papers which in some way bear on Buchanan's contributions. Perfectly good papers about issues not related to Buchanan's research agenda or not referring directly to Buchanan's work were not included. Space constraints did not allow universal coverage, so choices had to be made. It should be stated clearly that these were our choices based on the criterion that the contribution be relevant to Buchanan's work. Buchanan had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of papers for this volume. Once choices had been made, we arranged the papers by subject matter ranging from various aspects of Buchanan's work in economics, political science, philosophy, and related areas, to some more personal recollections of Jim as a professor, friend, and colleague. Including the latter material was also our decision, and this probably represents a choice with which Jim would not have agreed. We think, however, that the reader will find these pieces interesting and informative.
Stefan Voigt examines the emergence of constitutions and how and why they change. He proposes that they are based on spontaneously-developed institutions and presents predictions on the scope of change under various setting and factors.
Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M Buchanan. In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary study of economics and to the work of James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the field of constitutional political economy... (His) insistence on the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics, and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become apparent." The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: foundational issues; the method of constitutional economics; incentives and constitutional choice; constitutional order; market order; distributional issues; fiscal and monetary constitutions; reform. For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do, says Robert D Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be changed."
The book goes on to explore and expound the Founders¿ desire to promote respect for the moral law, their appreciation of the reciprocal relationship between morality and law, andtheir commitment to the promotion of justice in the sense of impartial institutions; ideas which find expression in contractarian, constitutional political economy.
. . . Roth s book is useful and valuable. Using modern secular thought as his starting point, he reaches roughly the same conclusions that one would reach reasoning from the older Christian tradition. There is certainly much to like about that effort. Paul A. Cleveland, Markets & Morality This book is one of the best discussions of welfare economics since Murray Rothbard s classic paper of 1956 Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics . David Gordon, The Mises Review Timothy Roth shows that social welfare theory, as currently defended by welfare economists and policymakers, is based on a confused and untenable moral theory, is incompatible with a rights-based legal order and is bound to promote unjust and arbitrary redistributions. By advocating a return to the Kantian conception of the moral agent, Roth shows the way to a normative economics that harmonizes with both intuitive morality and the American legal and constitutional tradition. Roger Scruton, Writer and Philosopher, formerly University Professor and Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, US The moral imperative of individual autonomy, embodied in the Kantian Rawlsian perspective on social order, cannot be reconciled with the utilitarian presuppositions that inform normative applications of modern economics. This book exposes the contradictions that are present when the basic philosophical foundations are ignored, a stance that is, unfortunately, characteristic of much modern discourse as well as political practice. James M. Buchanan, George Mason University, US and a Nobel Laureate At a time when technical economics dominates the thinking of much of the profession, it is important to be reminded that economics has roots in moral philosophy. Certainly this book, which deftly explores the ethical prior commitments underlying economic analysis, succeeds in bringing philosophical issues to the forefront. But it does more. Roth s closely reasoned study provides a clear exposition of the Kantian Rawlsian approach to public policy, and thus is able to establish a convincing critique of orthodox welfare theory. In general, the book offers a valuable change of perspective on social questions. Eirik G. Furubotn, Texas A&M University, US Because it is technically flawed and morally bankrupt, the author argues, the economist s consequence-based, procedurally detached theory of the state has contributed to the growth of government. As part of the Kantian Rawlsian contractarian project, this book seeks to return economics to its foundations in moral philosophy. Given the moral equivalence of persons, the greatest possible equal participation must be promoted, persons must be impartially treated and, because it is grounded in consequentialist social welfare theory (SWT), the economist s theory of the state must be rejected. Ad hoc deployment of SWT has facilitated discriminatory rent seeking and contributed to larger government. In contrast, this book argues that equal political participation and a constitutional impartiality constraint minimize rent seeking, respect individual perceptions of the public good and underwrite the legitimacy of government. Economists, moral philosophers and political scientists will find this book a unique contribution to the literature.
Based on papers from a conference sponsored by the Heritage Foundation."A Heritage Foundation book"--Jacket. Includes bibliographical references.
Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes.
Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.
This book examines the institutional dimension of markets and the rules and institutions that condition the operation of market economies.