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This Element discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the challenge to explain the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs ('the justificatory challenge'), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the challenge to explain their reliability ('the reliability challenge'), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The Element shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, and that they cannot be dispensed with, contra Field. However, it argues that they might be so plentiful that our knowledge of them is unmysterious. The Element concludes with a complementary 'pluralism' about modality, logic and normative theory, highlighting its surprising implications. Metaphysically, pluralism engenders a kind of perspectivalism and indeterminacy. Methodologically, it vindicates Carnap's pragmatism, transposed to the key of realism.
To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the genealogy of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together — and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual areas like logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.
Thinking about Mathematics covers the range of philosophical issues and positions concerning mathematics. The text describes the questions about mathematics that motivated philosophers throughout history and covers historical figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. It also presents the major positions and arguments concerning mathematics throughout the twentieth century, bringing the reader up to the present positions and battle lines.
This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology (including logical empiricism, phenomenology, and ordinary language philosophy). The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience.
The definitive mission of metaphilosophy is to facilitate an understanding of how philosophy works—the aim of the enterprise, the instrumental and procedural resources for its work, and the prospect of its success. Nicholas Rescher unites two facets of metaphilosophy to show that historical perspective and forward-thinking normative, or systematic, metaphilosophy cannot be independent of one another. The descriptive, or historical, metaphilosophy provides an account of what has been thought regarding the conduct of philosophical inquiry, and the prescriptive, or normative, metaphilosophy which deliberates about what is to be thought regarding the conduct of philosophizing. Rescher argues that metaphilosophy forms a part of philosophy itself. This is a unique feature of the discipline since the philosophy of biology is not a part of biology and the philosophy of mathematics is not a part of mathematics. Ultimately, the salient features of philosophizing in general—including the inherently controversial and discordant nature of philosophical doctrines—are also bound to afflict metaphilosophy. Thus, only by a careful analysis of the central issues can a plausible view of the enterprise be developed. Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective challenges the static, compartmentalized view of metaphilosophy, providing insight for scholars and students of all areas of philosophy.
For Wittgenstein mathematics is a human activity characterizing ways of seeing conceptual possibilities and empirical situations, proof and logical methods central to its progress. Sentences exhibit differing 'aspects', or dimensions of meaning, projecting mathematical 'realities'. Mathematics is an activity of constructing standpoints on equalities and differences of these. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mathematics (1934–1951) grew from his Early (1912–1921) and Middle (1929–33) philosophies, a dialectical path reconstructed here partly as a response to the limitative results of Gödel and Turing.
More Precisely is a rigorous and engaging introduction to the mathematics necessary to do philosophy. Eric Steinhart provides lucid explanations of many basic mathematical concepts and sets out the most commonly used notational conventions. He also demonstrates how mathematics applies to fundamental issues in various branches of philosophy, including metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, and ethics. This second edition adds a substantial section on decision and game theory, as well as a chapter on information theory and the efficient coding of information.
This Festschrift contains numerous colorful and eclectic essays from well-known mathematicians, philosophers, logicians, and linguists celebrating the 90th birthday of Reuben Hersh. The essays offer, in part, attempts to answer the following questions set forth by Reuben himself as a focus for this volume: Can practicing mathematicians, as such, contribute anything to the philosophy of math? Can or should philosophers of math, as such, say anything to practicing mathematicians? Twenty or fifty years from now, what will be similar, and what will, or could, or should be altogether different: About the philosophy of math? About math education? About math research institutions? About data processing and scientific computing? The essays also offer glimpses into Reuben’s fertile mind and his lasting influence on the mathematical community, as well as revealing the diverse roots, obstacles and philosophical dispositions that characterize the working lives of mathematicians. With contributions from a veritable “who’s who” list of 20th century luminaries from mathematics and philosophy, as well as from Reuben himself, this volume will appeal to a wide variety of readers from curious undergraduates to prominent mathematicians.
Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.