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This volume contains the proceedings of the virtual AMS Special Session on Mathematics of Decisions, Elections and Games, held on April 8, 2022. Decision theory, voting theory, and game theory are three related areas of mathematics that involve making optimal decisions in different contexts. While these three areas are distinct, much of the recent research in these fields borrows techniques from other branches of mathematics such as algebra, combinatorics, convex geometry, logic, representation theory, etc. The papers in this volume demonstrate how the mathematics of decisions, elections, and games can be used to analyze problems from the social sciences.
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
This volume contains the proceedings of two AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games, held January 4, 2012, in Boston, MA, and January 11-12, 2013, in San Diego, CA. Decision theory, voting theory, and game theory are three intertwined areas of mathematics that involve making optimal decisions under different contexts. Although these areas include their own mathematical results, much of the recent research in these areas involves developing and applying new perspectives from their intersection with other branches of mathematics, such as algebra, representation theory, combinatorics, convex geometry, dynamical systems, etc. The papers in this volume highlight and exploit the mathematical structure of decisions, elections, and games to model and to analyze problems from the social sciences.
Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is a unique blend of decision theory and game theory. From classical optimization to modern game theory, authors Charalambos D. Aliprantis and Subir K. Chakrabarti show the importance of mathematical knowledge in understanding and analyzing issues in decision making. Through an imaginative selection of topics, Aliprantis and Chakrabarti treat decision and game theory as part of one body of knowledge. They move from problems involving the individual decision-maker to progressively more complex problems such as sequential rationality, auctions, and bargaining. By building each chapter on material presented earlier, the authors offer a self-contained and comprehensive treatment of these topics. Successfully class-tested in an advanced undergraduate course at the Krannert School of Management and in a graduate course in economics at Indiana University, Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is an essential text for advanced undergraduates and graduate students of decision theory and game theory. The book is accessible to students who have a good basic understanding of elementary calculus and probability theory.
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
THIS book or some related work has occupied me spasmodically over rather a long period, in fact ever since I listened to the class lectures of Professor A. K. White on the possibility of forming a pure science of Politics. Mter an earlier version of Part I had failed to obtain publication in 1947, some chapters appeared as articles, and I am obliged to the editors of the journals mentioned below for permission to reprint this material, sometimes in a modified form. When I first attempted publication I was unacquainted with the earlier history of the theory, and, indeed, did not even know that it had a history; and the later additions to the book have largely been by way of writing the present Part II. This historical section does not include the important recent work, Social Ohoice and Individual Values (1951), of Professor Kenneth J. Arrow; but it does include all the mathematical work on committees and elections appearing before the middle of this century which has come to my notice, although the last item in it is dated 1907. No doubt there is much important material which I have failed to see. The theorizing of the book grew out of a reading of the English political philosophers and of the Italian writers on Public Finance. At a very early stage I was helped to find the general lines of development by discussion with my colleague Professor Ronald H.
The author takes the general reader on a tour of the mathematical puzzles and paradoxes inherent in voting systems, such as the Alabama Paradox, in which an increase in the number of seats in the Congress could actually lead to a reduced number of representatives for a state, and the Condorcet Paradox, which demonstrates that the winner of elections featuring more than two candidates does not necessarily reflect majority preferences. Szpiro takes a roughly chronological approach to the topic, traveling from ancient Greece to the present and, in addition to offering explanations of the various mathematical conundrums of elections and voting, also offers biographical details on the mathematicians and other thinkers who thought about them, including Plato, Pliny the Younger, Pierre Simon Laplace, Thomas Jefferson, John von Neumann, and Kenneth Arrow.
Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
This volume contains the proceedings of the conference Recent Advances and New Directions in the Interplay of Noncommutative Algebra and Geometry, held from June 20–24, 2022, at the University of Washington, Seattle, in honor of S. Paul Smith's 65th birthday. The articles reflect the wide interests of Smith and provide researchers and graduate students with an indispensable overview of topics of current interest. Specific fields covered include: noncommutative algebraic geometry, representation theory, Hopf algebras and quantum groups, the elliptic algebras of Feigin and Odesskii, Calabi-Yau algebras, Artin-Schelter regular algebras, deformation theory, and Lie theory. In addition to original research contributions the volume includes an introductory essay reviewing Smith's research contributions in these fields, and several survey articles.
This monograph offers a systematic quantitative approach to the analysis, evaluation, and design of electoral systems. Today, electoral reform is of concern to newborn democracies as well as many old ones. The authors use mathematical models and automatic procedures, when possible, to solve some of the problems that arise in the comparison of existing systems as well as in the construction of new ones. One distinctive feature of the book is the emphasis on single- and multiple-criteria optimization methods. This powerful tool kit will help political researchers evaluate and choose an appropriate electoral system. A general formal model is included as well as a coding system to describe, identify, and classify electoral systems. Evaluation criteria and the corresponding performance indicators are discussed.