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This book explores the important economic and legal questions of market manipulation that have arisen in restructured energy markets, paying particular attention to the actions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
With twenty-two chapters written by leading international experts, this volume represents the most detailed and comprehensive Handbook on electricity markets ever published.
How the interplay between government regulation and the private sector has shaped the electric industry, from its nineteenth-century origins to twenty-first-century market restructuring. For more than a century, the interplay between private, investor-owned electric utilities and government regulators has shaped the electric power industry in the United States. Provision of an essential service to largely dependent consumers invited government oversight and ever more sophisticated market intervention. The industry has sought to manage, co-opt, and profit from government regulation. In The Power Brokers, Jeremiah Lambert maps this complex interaction from the late nineteenth century to the present day. Lambert's narrative focuses on seven important industry players: Samuel Insull, the principal industry architect and prime mover; David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), who waged a desperate battle for market share; Don Hodel, who presided over the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in its failed attempt to launch a multi-plant nuclear power program; Paul Joskow, the MIT economics professor who foresaw a restructured and competitive electric power industry; Enron's Ken Lay, master of political influence and market-rigging; Amory Lovins, a pioneer proponent of sustainable power; and Jim Rogers, head of Duke Energy, a giant coal-fired utility threatened by decarbonization. Lambert tells how Insull built an empire in a regulatory vacuum, and how the government entered the electricity marketplace by making cheap hydropower available through the TVA. He describes the failed overreach of the BPA, the rise of competitive electricity markets, Enron's market manipulation, Lovins's radical vision of a decentralized industry powered by renewables, and Rogers's remarkable effort to influence cap-and-trade legislation. Lambert shows how the power industry has sought to use regulatory change to preserve or secure market dominance and how rogue players have gamed imperfectly restructured electricity markets. Integrating regulation and competition in this industry has proven a difficult experiment.
The current distribution of power markets around intermediate structures that fall between the two extremes of full integration and unbundling suggests that there has not been a linear path to power market structure reform. Rather, many developing countries may retain intermediate structures into the foreseeable future. This possibility exposes a gap in the understanding of power market structures, since most theoretical work has focused on the two extreme possibilities and there is limited evidence of the impact of unbundling for developing countries. Power Market Structure takes a novel analytical approach to modeling market structure, together with ownership and regulation, in determining performance across several indicators, including access, operational and financial performance, and environmental sustainability. Its conclusions--which will be of particular interest to policy makers, academics, and development practitioners--reflect evidence drawn from statistical analysis and a representative sample of 20 case studies, selected based on initial conditions such as income and power system size. The key result of the analysis is that unbundling delivers results when used as an entry point to implementing broader reforms, particularly introducing a sound regulatory framework, and reducing the degree of concentration of the generation and distribution segments of the market by attracting additional public and private players and greater private sector participation. In addition, there seems to be a credible empirical basis for selecting a threshold power system size and per capita income level below which unbundling of the power supply chain is not expected to be worthwhile. Partial forms of vertical unbundling do not appear to drive improvements. The most likely reason is that the owner was able to continue exercising control over the affairs of the sector and hinder the development of competitive pressure within the power market.
Whilst financial rights have appeared as a successful ingredient in North-American power markets, they have their shortcomings both theoretically and in practice. Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospects present a systematic and comprehensive overview of financial transmission rights (FTRS). Following a general introduction to FTRs, including chapters to explain transmission pricing and the general properties of FTRS, experts in the field provide discussions on wide scope of topics. These include: Varying perspectives on FTRS: from electrical engineers to economists, Different mathematical formulations of FTRS Financial Hedging using FTRS, and Alternative solutions to FTRs The detail, expertise and range of content makes Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospect an essential resource for electricity market specialists both at academic and professional levels. “This is THE BOOK we were all expecting to address all key ‘Financial Transmission Rights’ issues. It is comprehensive and reader friendly. You can pick at will in its menu: more or less theory, a bit of maths or none, empirical review of real cases or numerical simulations of many feasible options. Big names rally there to delight you like: Hogan , Oren, Perez-Arriaga, Smeers, Hobbs and... Rosellón. More than a must read: a light house, a map and a survival kit.” Jean – Michel Glachant, Director Florence School, Holder Loyola de Palacio Chair, Chief-editor Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. "In the last two decades, economists have developed a better understanding of the impact of financial rights on risk management, market power and network expansion in electricity markets, while power systems have experimented with such rights. Striking a good balance between academics and practitioners, always at the frontier of the field, written by the best experts, this volume is essential reading for all those- power systems’ managers and users, regulators, students and researchers- who want to understand the new electricity environment and predict its evolution." Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Industrial Economics (IDEI) Further comments inside.
This timely study evaluates four generic proposals for allowing free market forces toreplace government regulation in the electric power industry and concludes that none of thederegulation alternatives considered represents a panacea for the performance failures associatedwith things as they are now. It proposes a balanced program of regulatory reform and deregulationthat promises to improve industry performance in the short run, resolve uncertainties about thecosts and benefits of deregulation, and positions the industry for more extensive deregulation inthe long run should interim experimentation with deregulation, structural, and regulatory reformsmake it desirable.The book integrates modern microeconomic theory with a comprehensive analysis ofthe economic, technical, and institutional characteristics of modern electrical power systems. Itemphasizes that casual analogies to successful deregulation efforts in other sectors of the economyare an inadequate and potentially misleading basis for public policy in the electric power industry,which has economic and technical characteristics that are quite different from those in otherderegulated industries.Paul L. Joskow is Professor of Economics at MIT, author of ControllingHospital Costs (MIT Press 1981) and coauthor with Martin L. Baughman and Dilip P. Kamat of ElectricPower in the United States (MIT Press 1979). Richard Schmalensee, also at MIT, is Professor ofApplied Economics, author of The Economics of Advertising and The Control of Natural Monopolies, andeditor of The MIT Press Series, Regulation of Economic Activity.
After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide