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It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline - enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.There has been little empirical work on the effectiveness of safety nets designed for banks, for lack of data on safety net design across countries. Demirguuml;ccedil;-Kunt and Huizinga examine cross-country data on bank-level interest expense and deposit growth for evidence of market discipline in individual countries. In addition, using cross-country information on deposit insurance systems, they investigate the impact of explicit deposit insurance (and its key features) on bank interest rates and market discipline.They find that:middot; Many countries retain some degree of market discipline, regardless of the type of safety net.middot; The existence of explicit deposit insurance lowers banks' interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk factors, especially bank liquidity.middot; Higher explicit coverage, broader coverage, and the existence of an earmarked insurance fund increase required-deposit rates and reduce market discipline.middot; Government provision of funds lowers deposit rates but also reduces market discipline.middot; Private (especially joint) management of insurance schemes lowers deposit rates and improves market discipline.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Third Edition provides an overview and analysis of developments and research in this rapidly evolving field. Aimed at graduate students of economics, banking, and finance; academics; practitioners; regulators; and policy makers, it strikes a balance between abstract theory, empirical analysis, and practitioner and policy-related material. Split into five distinct parts The Oxford Handbook of Banking is a one-stop source of relevant research in banking. It examines the theory of banking, bank operations and performance, regulatory and policy perspectives, macroeconomic perspectives in banking, and international differences in banking structures and environments. Taking a global perspective it examines banking systems in the United States, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Africa, the European Union, transition countries of Europe, and Latin America. Thematic issues covered include financial innovation and technological change; consumer and mortgage lending; Islamic banking; and how banks influence real economic activity. Fully revised and now including brand new chapters on a range of geographical regions, bank bailouts and bail-ins, and behavioral economics amongst many other topics, this third edition of The Oxford Handbook of Banking provides readers with insights to seminal and contemporary research in banking and an opportunity to learn about the diversity of financial systems around the world.
The behavior of actors in financial systems depends crucially on the incentives that motivate them. The right regulation, supervision, and incentives (including the scope of permissible activities, degree of contestability, and extent of safety net) for financial services can make the sector more resilient in the face of adverse shocks.
This book covers financial sector stability issues in the following areas: risk management and governance in financial institutions; financial crises and contagion; domestic monetary and financial policies; and international cooperation. The papers were presented at the IMF’s eighth Central Banking Seminar by authors from academia, investment banks, government, and international institutions. The papers discuss such subjects as bank soundness, systemic bank restructuring, and the safety and efficiency of systemically important payment systems and their interaction with the macroeconomic environment.
Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.
"Institutions fix the confines of and impose form upon the activities of human beings."-Walton Hamilton, 'Institutions', 1932.The 'World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets' undertakes the complex issue of the basic institutions needed for markets to function properly. This year's 'World Development Report' goes beyond a simple examination of institutional structure and explores the functions of institutions. Recognizing that one size does not fit all, the report asks what do all institutions which support markets do?The answer is simple: Institutions channel information, define and enforce property rights, and increase or prevent competition. Understanding the functions that current institutions and their proposed replacements would provide is the first step. The report contends that once you have identified the institutional functions that are missing, you can then build effective institutions by following some basic principles:- Complement what exists already - in terms of other supporting institutions, human capacities, and technology.- Innovate to suit local norms and conditions. Experimenting with new structures can provide a country with creative solutions that work.- Connect communities of market players through open information flows and open trade. Open trade and information flows create demand for new institutions and improve the functioning of existing structures.- Compete among jurisdictions, firms, and individuals. Increased competition creates demand for new institutions as old ones lose their effectiveness. It also affects how people behave - improving institutional quality.These broad lessons and careful analyses, which links theory with pertinent evidence, are provided in the report. 'World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets' contains selected 'World Development Indicators'.
Contains topics that include the design of a country's financial safety nets, the effective policies of acquiring failed banks in reducing moral hazard problems, the voluntary disclosure of real options by corporate managers, and the interrelationship between the housing and general economic activities.