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The Ministry of Defence is buying more inventory than it uses and not consistently disposing of stock it no longer needs. Between the end of March 2009 and the end of December 2011 the total value of the inventory held by the armed forces and in central depots of non-explosives increased by 13 per cent, from £17.2 billion to £19.5 billion. The Department estimates that for raw material and consumable inventory, such as clothing or ammunition, it has spent £4 billion between April 2009 and March 2011, but did not use £1.5 billion (38 per cent) worth. The NAO estimates that the costs of storing and managing inventory were at least £277 million in 2010-11. Furthermore, over £4.2 billion of non-explosive inventory has not moved at all for at least two years and a further £2.4 billion of non-explosive inventory already held is sufficient to last for five years or more. During 2010 and 2011, the MOD identified inventory worth a total of £1.4 billion that could either be sold or destroyed, but it was unable to information on the value of the stock that had been destroyed. MOD has already introduced improvements but strategies and performance reporting do not yet focus on effective inventory management. There are also few targets for monitoring the efficiency of inventory management. The Department has commissioned a review to establish and sustain more cost effective inventory management and plans to implement its recommendations by March 2013
The National Audit Office report on this topic published as HC 190, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780102975529)
This report assesses the Ministry of Defence's performance in managing the supply chain to front line troops. The MoD rightly puts a strong emphasis on ensuring troops get the supplies they need. Equally, providing an efficient supply chain would release resources for the front line. The Committee believes there should be greater emphasis on securing value for money and that there is room for it to find efficiencies in the supply chain without jeopardising operational effectiveness. Previous reports have identified persistent problems with late deliveries, unnecessary costs and missed targets. At present, the MoD does not have the information to identify where savings could be made. It does not know the full costs of its current activities or the cost of alternative supply options. The failure to collect basic data about where supplies are stored has directly contributed to the MoD accounts being qualified for three consecutive years. The MoD is now seeking to resolve these information problems through a major initiative known as the Future Logistics Information Services project, expected to be implemented by 2014. Until then, the Department will continue to store data in systems that are at critical risk of failure. It is vital that the MOD sustains its programme in order to secure value for money. Measures which could improve the efficiency of supply operations include putting more pressure on suppliers to deliver on time, keeping stocks at lower levels to reduce the risk of them deteriorating, and benchmarking performance against relevant comparators such as other armed forces.
his first volume in the Security and Defence Management Series focuses on practical aspects of democratic defence management through the eyes of practioners. Outlining in simple terms the key issues defence professionals must address to ensure good governance of the defence sector from within the defence establishment, the book provides an introduction to these issues for new defence professionals in transition democracies.
The National Offender Management Service directly manages 117 public prisons, manages the contracts of 14 private prisons, and is responsible for a prisoner population of around 86,000. It commissions and funds services from 35 probation trusts, which oversee approximately 165,000 offenders serving community sentences. For 2012-13, the Agency's budget is £3,401 million. The Agency achieved its savings targets of £230 million in 2011-12 and maintained its overall performance, despite an increase in the prison population. However, the Agency's savings targets of £246 million in 2012-13, £262 million in 2013-14 and £145 million in 2014-15 are challenging. The Agency believes it has scope to make the prison estate more efficient by closing older, more expensive prisons and investing in new ones. These plans, however, assume the prison population will stay at its current level. Furthermore, the Agency has not yet secured the up-front funding for the voluntary redundancies needed to bring down prison staffing costs. Unless overcrowding is addressed and staff continue to carry out offender management work it is increasingly likely that rehabilitation work needed to reduce the risk of prisoners reoffending will not be provided. The Agency has not done enough to address the risks to safety, decency and standards in prisons and in community services arising from staffing cuts implemented to meet financial targets. The Agency plans to increase the role of private firms and the third sector in probation but the probation trusts don't appear to have the infrastructure and skills they need to commission probation services from these providers effectively
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has an extensive and complex estate of some 24,000 hectares, and after the Forestry Commission, is the second largest landowner in the UK. The estate is valued at over £18 billion and costs some £3.3 billion to operate. The estate is seen as essential to the delivery of military capability and the welfare and morale of Service personnel. This report, from the Committee of Public Accounts, has taken evidence from the MoD on the standard of living accommodation, the Department's ability to prioritise estate projects effectively, and its response to staff shortages. It follows on from an NAO report (HCP 154, session 2006-7), Managing the Defence Estate: Quality and Sustainability (ISBN 9780102944679). It sets out 9 recommendations, including: more than half of single living accommodation and over 40% of family accommodation does not meet the Department's definition of high-quality accommodation and is therefore substandard; that poor accommodation has a negative impact on retention rates; there is no information on when poor accommodation is to be upgraded, with some military personnel and their families having to continue to live in substandard housing for the next 20 years; there are gaps in the Department's understanding of estate costs; the Department employs only 56% of safety works staff and 57% of quantity surveyors that it needs; that implementing energy saving measures at its' defence sites would bring environmental benefits and savings of more than £2 million annually.
For the sixth successive year, the Ministry of Defence Accounts were qualified. The Qualifications covered non-compliance with international reporting standards on the treatment of some contracts; lack of audit evidence on the valuation of inventory (worth some £3 billion) and of capital spares (worth some £7 billion); and on the regularity of the Accounts because of the failure to obtain approval for the remuneration package of the Chief of Defence Materiel. The MoD was also five months late in submitting its audited accounts to Parliament. The National Audit Office had found errors in its sample examination of accruals and so the MoD decided to resolve these problems before submitting the accounts. The MoD said they did not have the necessary expertise to manage the financial complexity that featured in the implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review so sought assistance. The MoD should ensure its people have the right skills to deal with all financial problems so that they do not need to bring in expensive external accountants. There is also concern about the MoD's reluctance to estimate the full costs of its operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The NAO did not consider that the MoD has adequate information, especially with respect to recording the cost of its activities and outputs, to run its business effectively. The MoD should set out its commitment to improving its management information. It is also vital that defence spending remains at more than 2 per cent of GDP in line with the UK's NATO commitment.
The question that faces governments and militaries the world over is how best to allocate resources for management of defence in the new age. This book, by Shri A.K. Ghosh who has an economics background, explores the framework for change in resource allocation and capability building. It emphasises the importance of introducing programming in Indian defence to serve as a link between defence planning and budgeting. Them is match between defence planning and budgeting needs to be connected by the introduction of resource constrained budgeting, having a multi-year perspective. The RMA, force modernisation, cost-benefit analysis,management of risks, and internal and external audits are among the many issues the author has provided a perspective on. It is argued by the author that defence needs to be viewed as a giant business and, where possible, business practices should be introduced. The book is recommended reading forth planners and decision-makers of defence management and will benefit readers from the armed forces as well. The lay readers interested in the subject of national defence and security will also find it useful and interesting.
Academies are funded directly by central government, directly accountable to the Department for Education, and outside local authority control. They have greater financial freedoms than maintained schools. By September 2012 the number of open academies had increased tenfold, from 203 to 2,309. Academies are the Department's chosen vehicle for school reform, but increasing schools' autonomy and removing them from local authority control gives the Department responsibility for ensuring value for money. The Department has incurred significant costs from the complex and inefficient system it has used for funding the Academies Programme and its oversight of academies has had to play catch-up with the rapid growth in academy numbers. In the two years from April 2010 to March 2012, the Department spent £8.3 billion on Academies; £1 billion of this was an additional cost to the Department not originally budgeted for this purpose, some of which was not recovered from local authorities. The Department must improve the efficiency of its funding mechanisms and stop the growth in other costs. Furthermore, the Department has yet to establish effective school-level financial accountability for academies operating within chains. What will determine whether the Department ultimately achieves value for money is academies' impact on educational performance relative to the investment from the taxpayer. If the Department is to be held properly to account for its spending on academies, it must insist that every Academy Trust provides it with data showing school-level expenditure, including per-pupil costs, and with a level of detail comparable to that available for maintained schools.