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Minority Rights, Majority Rule seeks to explain a phenomenon evident to most observers of the US Congress. In the House of Representatives, majority parties rule and minorities are seldom able to influence national policy making. In the Senate, minorities quite often call the shots, empowered by the filibuster to frustrate the majority. Why did the two chambers develop such distinctive legislative styles? Conventional wisdom suggests that differences in the size and workload of the House and Senate led the two chambers to develop very different rules of procedure. Sarah Binder offers an alternative, partisan theory to explain the creation and suppression of minority rights, showing that contests between partisan coalitions have throughout congressional history altered the distribution of procedural rights. Most importantly, new majorities inherit procedural choices made in the past. This institutional dynamic has fuelled the power of partisan majorities in the House but stopped them in their tracks in the Senate.
In his latest book, Presidential Elections and Majority Rule, Edward Foley asks how the American electoral system can better represent the people. What kind of winner truly reflects the nation's votes: the plurality winners of winner-takes-all elections, as currently used, or the majority-preferred winners of a reformed system? How do third-party candidates affect American presidential elections? What, if anything, would change in a two-candidate run-off?And how can electoral reform be implemented without sowing chaos? Ultimately, Foley outlines a solution in which the Electoral College can be restored to its original majoritarian ideals through state law rather than Constitutional amendment.
Explores the emergence of majority rule in the elected assemblies of early modern Britain and its Atlantic colonies over two centuries.
Examines the influence of precedent on the behavior of the US Supreme Court justices.
The election of populist politicians in recent years seems to challenge the commitment to democracy, if not its ideal. This book argues that majority rule is not the problem; rather, the institutions that stabilize majorities are responsible for the suppression of minority interests. Despite the popular notion that social choice instability (or “cycling”) makes it impossible for majorities to make sound legislation, Yuhui Li argues that the best part of democracy is not the large number of people on the winning side; it is that the winners can be easily divided and realigned with the losers in the cycling process. He shows that minorities’ bargaining power depends on their ability to exploit division within the winning coalition and induce its members to defect, an institutionalized uncertainty that is missing in one-party authoritarian systems. Dividing the Rulers theorizes why such division within the majority is important and what kind of institutional features can help a democratic system maintain such division, which is crucial in preventing the “tyranny of the majority.” These institutional solutions point to a direction of institutional reform that academics, politicians, and voters should collectively pursue.
In the wake of national crises and sharp shifts in the electorate, new members of Congress march off to Washington full of intense idealism and the desire for instant change—but often lacking in any sense of proportion or patience. This drive for instant political gratification concerned one of the key Founders, James Madison, who accepted the inevitability of majority rule but worried that an inflamed majority might not rule reasonably. Greg Weiner challenges longstanding suppositions that Madison harbored misgivings about majority rule, arguing instead that he viewed constitutional institutions as delaying mechanisms to postpone decisions until after public passions had cooled and reason took hold. In effect, Madison believed that one of the Constitution's primary functions is to act as a metronome, regulating the tempo of American politics. Weiner calls this implicit doctrine "temporal republicanism" to emphasize both its compatibility with and its contrast to other interpretations of the Founders' thought. Like civic republicanism, the "temporal" variety embodies a set of values—public-spiritedness, respect for the rights of others—broader than the technical device of majority rule. Exploring this fundamental idea of time-seasoned majority rule across the entire range of Madison's long career, Weiner shows that it did not substantially change over the course of his life. He presents Madison's understanding of internal constitutional checks and his famous "extended republic" argument as different and complementary mechanisms for improving majority rule by slowing it down, not blocking it. And he reveals that the changes we see in Madison's views of majority rule arise largely from his evolving beliefs about who, exactly, was behaving impulsively-whether abusive majorities in the 1780s, the Adams regime in the 1790s, the nullifiers in the 1820s. Yet there is no evidence that Madison's underlying beliefs about either majority rule or the distorting and transient nature of passions ever swayed. If patience was a fact of life in Madison's day—a time when communication and travel were slow-it surely is much harder to cultivate in the age of the Internet, 24-hour news, and politics based on instant gratification. While many of today's politicians seem to wed supreme impatience with an avowed devotion to original constitutional principles, Madison's Metronome suggests that one of our nation's great luminaries would likely view that marriage with caution.
Examines minority governments to show they are not exceptional or unstable.
Little does Nick Taft know when he arrives to serve his Congressman in Washington, he would stumble upon a human smuggling cartel insulated by powerful Capitol Hill interests. He soon falls for the beguiling Lisa Castile, an ambitious staffer of the opposing party who works for a committee chairman with suspect ties to the trafficking venture. The relationship of these two opposites and the enterprise they unveil trails immigration reform legislation, controlled by the nefarious chairman. The young staffers find themselves swept into a Justice Department investigation of the illegal operation, uncertain as to whether it is to deter them or protect them. Majority Rules moves the reader through the halls of Congress with an insider's view of currently relevant political history. In between colorful power schemes, the story highlights the majority/minority mindset that has entrapped Washington for decades.