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Uncertain Allies looks at the U.S. military’s experience in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater during World War II through the eyes of Joseph Stilwell, the commanding general of all American forces in those three countries. Accomplished historian Eric Setzekorn, focuses on two key themes: uncertain allies and ambiguous missions. Despite being allies, relationships between the Americans and Chinese, as well as the Americans and the British, were marked by a profound lack of trust in the CBI theater. This was particularly problematic because most combat personnel under Stilwell’s command were Chinese. As a result, the lack of trust directly impacted tactical and operational planning. The second reoccurring theme, ambiguous missions, refers to the poorly defined goals for the theater. The CBI’s mission was vague, and Stilwell lacked clear objectives or benchmarks of success. Underlying both themes is the key flaw in Stilwell’s conduct in the CBI theater: a failure to understand the American political context in which he operated. Stilwell advocated for a transactional military and political relationship despite clear indications that President Roosevelt, other political leaders, and the American public at large desired a long-term cooperative relationship. In this context of deep and widespread public support for forging a close and lasting alliance with China, Stilwell’s proposals to make military aid and American support on a quid pro quo basis was an isolated position that inevitably ran into staunch opposition. The result was a dangerous disconnect between American military operations and national policy. Setzekorn, who is fluent in Chinese, relied on a wide variety of sources when writing this penetrating account of the U.S. military’s time in the CBI theater, including Chinese and Japanese language archival material. The declassification of numerous U.S. government sources over the past fifteen years also enables Setzekorn to make a full assessment and analysis of World War II-era strategic thinking and military policy.
Field Marshal William J. Slim is considered by many historians to be one of the finest generals of World War II. His accomplishments were truly extraordinary. He commanded a polyglot army, consisting of six different nationalities speaking eight different languages, that fought in some of the most inhospitable, disease-ridden country in the world against the war’s toughest opponent, the Japanese. In March 1942, he assumed command of a British-Indian force in Burma half way through the longest retreat in the British Army’s history. Even though he was unable to reverse the disaster, he kept his force intact and led it to safety. Over the next three and one half years, despite very limited resources and several inept senior commanders, he rebuilt his force into an army that was able to inflict on the Japanese their greatest land defeat of World War II. In the process, he conducted four of the most classic operational campaigns of the war—the battle of the Second Arakan; the battles of Kohima and Imphal; the capture of Mandalay and Meiktila; and the pursuit to Rangoon. Throughout his career, but especially during World War II, Slim met all the criteria for a great general and strategic leader as set forth in Lord Wavell’s Generals and Generalship. Despite these great accomplishments, Slim ran into several “glass ceilings” during World War II. Twice he was relieved of command, once immediately after his greatest battlefield victory. This study examines Field Marshal Slim’s leadership. It takes a brief look at his biography, then compares him against Wavell’s standards for generalship by highlighting events from his career that illustrate each standard. Finally, it addresses the issue of the “glass ceiling”—what it is, the events surrounding Slim’s encounters with it, and how Slim was able to overcome it. The intent is to show that Slim was not only a great World War II general, but is still a model of leadership worthy of study by the U.S. Army.
In 1974 Frederick W. Winterbotham's book The Ultra Secret disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began—the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers. The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.
An account of the decisive WWII battles that helped shape Asia’s future: “Reminds us of the high stakes at risk for both Allies and Axis powers in Burma.” —Military Review From December 1943 to August 1944, Allied and Japanese forces fought the decisive battles of World War II in Southeast Asia. Fighting centered around North Burma, Imphal, Kohima, and the Arakan, involving troops from all over the world along a battlefront the combined size of Pennsylvania and Ohio. The campaigns brought nations into collision for the highest stakes: British and Indian troops fighting for Empire, the Indo-Japanese forces seeking a prestige victory with an invasion of India and the Americans and Chinese focused on helping China and reopening the Burma Road. Events turned on the decisions of the principal commanders—Admiral Louis Mountbatten and Generals Joseph Stilwell, William Slim, Orde Wingate, and Mutaguchi Renya, among many others. The impact of the fighting was felt in London, Tokyo, Washington, and other places far away from the battlefront, with effects that presaged postwar political relationships. This was also the first U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and Stilwell’s operations in some ways foreshadowed battles in Vietnam two decades later. Nations in the Balance recounts these battles, offering dramatic and compelling stories of people fighting in difficult conditions against high odds, with far-reaching results. It also shows how they proved important to the postwar future of the participant nations and Asia as a whole, with effects that still reverberate decades after the war.
This new, one-of-a-kind volume contains original essays, historical and technical papers, and translations of historical materials and retrospectives concerning the German Enigma Cipher machine. You get a comprehensive view of the Enigma machine's development, uses, role in WWII Allied intelligence, and cryptanalysis. From "The Commercial Enigma: Beginnings of Machine Cryptography" and "An Enigma Chronology" to "The Road to German Diplomatic Ciphers - 1941 -1945" and "The Geheimschreiber", all the papers in this volume are reprints of classic articles that originally appeared in the pages of the distinguished journal, CRYPTOLOGIA. Moreover, the book contains over 100 technical reviews of materials related to Enigma ? materials that have led in the exposure of Enigma related issues over the 28 years of the journal's publication.
Continuing the historical series of the US Air Force. This volume reviews the methods of intelligence in use in World War II.
John F. Kreis, general editor. Focuses on how airmen built intelligence organizations during World War 2 to collect and process information about the enemy and how they produced and disseminated this intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters.