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The slowness with which the Highways Agency's PFI contract to widen the M25 was taken forward resulted in higher financing costs in the credit crisis. Moreover, the Agency was slow to investigate a potentially cheaper alternative to widening. An 18-month delay in preparing and finalizing the widening procurement meant that the contract was let in May 2009 at the height of the credit crisis. This increased the net present cost of the deal by £660 million (24 per cent) to £3.4 billion. The case for PFI was less convincing than the Agency thought owing to shortcomings in its cost estimation process. The Government had announced in 2003 its intention to reduce congestion on the M25. The Agency was starting to carry out trials at that time of an alternative, potentially cheaper solution of hard shoulder running (allowing drivers to use the hard shoulder at times of peak congestion), first tested in Europe in 1996. The NAO estimates the savings from a conventionally procured hard shoulder running solution might range between £400 million and £1.1 billion. The Agency, however, doubted the technique's suitability for one of the sections of the M25 being widened which has high traffic flow and whether operation and maintenance savings could be achieved through conventional procurement
In May 2009 the Highways Agency signed a 30 year private finance contract for widening two sections of the M25 motorway, including the Dartford Crossing, and maintaining the entire 125 mile length of the road, and 125 miles of connecting roads and motorways. The Committee makes eight points in conclusion of its review of the contract: they do not agree that the PFI contract represents value for money; the £80 million spent on consultants over six years for this project was excessive; the Agency lacks the capacity to assess whether its advisers are providing value for money; the Agency significantly over-estimated the market rate for operation and maintenance; the invitation to tender was too narrowly drawn as it excluded hard should running as a solution for traffic congestion; the Agency persisted with its preferred solution of widening the M25 because of the time taken to trial hard shoulder running; the Agency appeared to be committed to a single procurement route & justified a widening deal through a flawed and biased cost estimation; evidence could not be taken from the Senior Responsible Owner of the project as he had left the Agency and was employed by one of the project's major contractors and investors. Ultimately the Committee believe that the project was mishandled at a potential extra cost to the taxpayer of around £1 billion
The highly-anticipated sixth edition of Norman Flynn's Public Sector Management continues to provide students with an insightful, jargon-free description, analysis and critique of the management of the public sector by the UK government. New to the sixth edition: Fully updated to take account of the coalition government and the impact of the financial crisis on public spending. Four new chapters on managing public finance, e-government, regulation and public-private partnerships. Expanded learning features including:, additional boxed examples, annotated suggestions for further reading and suggestions for discussion topics and references to journal articles. New companion website with free access to full-text journal articles, policy documents, links to useful websites, and relevant multimedia and social media resources. www.sagepub.co.uk/flynn6 Public Sector Management will prove invaluable reading for students studying public sector management as part of a business, management, social policy, politics or sociology degree.
For decades now we have been told that we are living through a governance revolution. Gone are the days when government agencies and bureaucrats told us what to do and how to do it. We are no longer clients of the state but empowered citizens who are able to take greater control over our own lives and the activities of those who govern in our name. Across the world the prevailing narrative has become one of Good Governance, devolution, liberation, and freedom of expression. In policy fields as diverse as development planning, healthcare, and public transport a neo-pluralist rhetoric has emerged based on the principles of ’co-production’ and partnership working. And yet at the same time a curious paradox is emerging. Whilst the prevailing zeitgeist is one of openness and citizen empowerment, this book will show that in reality new modes of governance are emerging in which state controls have actually been expanded into many spheres of life that were previously left unregulated. For some a new political economy of ’regulatory capitalism’ has emerged and this, in turn, has ushered in unprecedented forms of state-led privatisation under which democratically-elected politicians have voluntarily handed over their powers, responsibilities, and resources to new corporate elites who promise to deliver services in more efficient and equitable ways. As the discussion will show, in reality the rhetoric of Good Governance has, therefore, been used to legitimate the wholesale transfer of welfare assets and services beyond the democratic control of state actors and the citizens that they represent. Privatisation has become a new utopianism that involves a revolution in ways of thinking about democracy, governance, and urban management, the implications of which will be felt by current and future generations.
Dated May 2011. The reports published as HC 651 (ISBN 9780215556232); HC 688 (ISBN 9780215556363); HC 721 (ISBN 9780215556424); HC 687 (ISBN 9780215556530); HC 667 (ISBN 9780215556646); HC 668 (ISBN 9780215556745); HC 741 (ISBN 9780215556851); HC 765 (ISBN 9780215556882)
This report examines the Department for International Development's financial management capability, its increasing focus on value for money, and the challenges it faces in managing its increasing programme budget while reducing its overall running costs. DFID is protected from overall expenditure reductions as the Government has committed to increasing the UK's aid spending to 0.7% of gross national income by 2013. The Department faces a substantial challenge to improve its financial management while reducing its administration costs by a third over the next four years. The Committee welcomes the planned introduction, in 2011, of a finance improvement plan. DFID must now keep up the focus on better financial management. There is concern that the Department does not quantify the likely level of leakage through fraud and corruption. And DFID is only considering fraud risk at the level of delivery method rather than at a country level. Management of fraud risk will require a stronger framework for ensuring money is properly spent on the ground, with effective monitoring and pro-active anti-fraud work. The likely increase in funding via multilateral organisations (which then determine how to distribute the aid worldwide) might not ensure value for money as DFID does not have the same visibility over the cost and performance of multilaterals' programmes as it does over its own bilateral programmes. Finally, the Committee is concerned that the Department still has insufficient data to make informed investment decisions based on value for money.
The Ministry has improved its financial management since the Committee's last report in January 2011 (HC 574, ISBN 9780215556042). Many of the Ministry's processes have improved, including modelling and forecasting, but the Ministry has not achieved significant improvements in the delivery of key financial outcomes and therefore has much still to do. The most serious issue is the Ministry's inability to report its financial affairs on a timely and accurate basis. The Ministry's own resource accounts for 2010-11 were delivered late and there were significant problems with the accounts produced by two of its major arm's length bodies, the Legal Services Commission and HM Courts Service's Trust Statement. The Ministry faces significant accounting challenges for the 2011-12 financial year, due to the required earlier publication of the accounts. The Ministry needs to break the cycle of continuing failure to produce accurate and timely accounts. It also faces considerable challenges in meeting its tough spending review commitments, but without a full understanding of its costs, the Ministry risks unnecessarily cutting frontline services, which are critical to the poorest in the community, rather than ensuring savings are achieved through genuine efficiencies. Maximising the income it obtains will help the Ministry and fine collection is improving, but it is being outpaced by the growth in fines outstanding. Excellent financial management is critical to the Ministry's future success as it seeks to achieve significant efficiency gains while coping with workload pressures, such as increases in the prison population, that are largely outside its control.
Lessons from the experience of using PFI can be applied to improve other forms of procurement and help Government achieve its aim of securing annual infrastructure delivery cost savings of £2 billion to £3 billion. To secure the best value for money from all types of procurement, the public sector needs to develop skills the NAO has identified. These are collecting better data to inform decision-making; ensuring projects have the right skills; establishing effective arrangements to test, challenge and, if necessary, stop projects; and using commercial awareness to obtain better deals. The case for using private finance in public procurement needs to be challenged more. Also, privately financed projects will often still be off balance-sheet which may continue to act as an incentive to use PFI. There has not been a systematic value for money evaluation of operational PFI projects by departments. So there is insufficient data to demonstrate whether the use of private finance has led to better or worse value for money than other forms of procurement. The Treasury and departments should identify alternative methods for delivering infrastructure and related facilities services to maximise value for money for government. The NAO welcomes the current plans of the Treasury and Cabinet Office to strengthen project assurance. The report highlights the need for independent challenge capable of stopping projects which do not give the prospect of value for money. This is particularly important as there is still a shortage of the skills needed to manage and oversee complex major projects.
This report examines the progress on repaying taxpayer support and maintenance of financial stability following action taken in the 2007 crisis in the financial markets. Action included nationalisation, the purchase of a large number of shares in RBS and Lloyds, establishing sector-wide schemes to guarantee banks' debt-funding and protect their assets, and indemnifying the Bank of England against losses for providing temporary liquidity. The level of explicit support has gone down from nearly £1 trillion to £512 billion, and estimates of the size of the implicit subsidy vary - from as high as £100 billion to just below £10 billion in 2009 alone. The explicit subsidy includes the fees paid by banks for their use of the Credit Guarantee Scheme which, to date, have been at least £1 billion less than the benefit received by the banks. These subsidies enable private gains to be made at the expense of public risk, and some of these gains have been used to pay bonuses to staff and dividends to shareholders, rather than enhancing the financial sustainability of the sector. This causes the Committee and the wider public much concern. For the taxpayer to obtain value for money from exiting from the support depends heavily on a successful sale of the shares in RBS and Lloyds. The government shareholding is far greater than in previous share sales and will require extraordinarily careful handling to protect the taxpayers' interest. Regulatory and political uncertainty over the banking sector will remain until the Government has responded to the recommendations from the Independent Commission on Banking.
Over the last five years student numbers and income have grown annually by 2 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. As the sector has begun the transition to a new system of funding in which Funding Council grants to institutions will be replaced by higher tuition fees the Higher Education Funding Council's role in the allocation of funds & influence will diminish. The Department for Education will need to provide new powers for the Funding Council to regulate these institutions and the Funding Council must monitor risks as they emerge and respond quickly. All the indications are that more institutions will charge significantly higher fees than was anticipated by the Department. The Office for Fair Access has yet to agree the measures universities will adopt to widen participation where the proposed fees are above the £6000 level. However it is likely that a significant funding gap of hundreds of millions of pounds for the taxpayer will occur. The Funding Council also has a responsibility for promoting value for money, although it does not assess the value for money of institutions. In future, prospective students will need better information to make an informed choice about where they will study, including comparable information on the financial health of, and value for money provided by, individual institutions. The Funding Council does not normally publish the names of institutions it judges to be at financial risk, so as to protect them while they are in recovery. Now that students are required to make a substantial financial investment in their degree, the Funding Council needs to strike a suitable balance between the interests of institutions and those of prospective students