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We document that firms making seasoned equity offerings during 1975-1989 substantially under-performed a sample of matching firms from the same industry and of similar size that did not issue equity. Specifically, returns in the five-year period following a seasoned equity offering are, on average, 31.2 percent lower than those of non-issuing matched firms. This long-run underperformance persists even after controlling for trading system, firm book-to-market ratio, firm size, and firm age. It is similar to that previously documented for initial public offerings, implying that managers may be able to take advantage of overvaluation in both the initial and seasoned equity offerings markets.
I investigate the long-term performance of firms that issue seasoned equity relative to a variety of benchmarks. I find that these firms significantly underperform all of my benchmarks over the five years following the equity issues. Across SEOs, I find similar levels of underperformance for both small firms and large firms, and both growth firms and value firms. The paper also shows that factor-model benchmarks are misspecified. Hence inferences on SEO underperformance based on such benchmarks are misleading. I also find that SEOs underperform their benchmarks by twice as much within earnings announcement windows as they do outside these windows.
We examine the long-run stock price and operating performance of companies that withdraw seasoned equity offerings. Firms that withdraw an offering provide an opportunity to examine the long-run impact of the intent to issue shares, independent of any agency problems that might be intensified by the actual acquisition of equity capital. As in completed SEOs, long-horizonstock returns to sample firms are substantially lower than returns to control firms. Long-run operating performance is similarly poor. Long run stock price performance is worst among high market-to-book assets firms that withdraw equity issues in hot SEO markets. The evidence is consistent with a model in which firms attempt to sell overvalued shares to a market that doesn't react sufficiently to the implications of the action, even if the shares are not actually issued.
We examine the long-run stock price and operating performance of companies that withdraw seasoned equity offerings. Firms that withdraw an offering provide an opportunity to examine whether markets fully adjust to the information conveyed when managers announce the intent to issue shares, independent of any agency problems that might be intensified by the completion of the offering. As in completed seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), long-horizon event-time operating and stock price performance in sample firms is substantially lower than what is observed among control firms. Underperformance is also observed in an equal-weighted calendar-time analysis. Results are consistent with overpricing among small firms that attempt, but then withdraw, SEOs.
For firms conducting initial or seasoned equity offerings, recent studies document that their stock returns are lower than those of non-issuers for about five years following the issue, and this underperformance is greater for small issuers. This study shows that analysts' earnings forecasts have greater optimistic bias for issuers than for non-issuers during the five year period. Moreover, the incremental optimistic bias is greater for small issuers. This result is consistent with the Loughran and Ritter (1995) conjecture that one of the reasons for the long-run underperformance of issuers' stocks is optimistic bias in the market's expectations of these firms' earnings.
Existing estimates of the long-run abnormal performance after initial public offerings in Germany differ between +1.54 % and -19.85 % for holding periods of 36 months. We discuss the methodological problems of these studies and the peculiarities of the German market. Using a large sample, alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks), and a simulation study we conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios, mainly because IPO stocks typically have a small or medium market capitalization and a size effect in stock returns exists. The new listing bias, discussed intensively by Barber/Lyon (1997) seems to be of minor importance in the German market. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on the average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6 % in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran/Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). For stocks involved in a SEO the underperformance is statistically significant, for IPO stocks it is not. This is the first estimate of the abnormal performance after SEOs for the German market. We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988-1990 IPO cohort discovered by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size portfolios, instead of market portfolios. Since we have a relatively small number of observations per event, the use of matching firms as benchmarks in the calculation of long-run abnormal returns is associated with a much higher variance of the average long-run abnormal performance estimate than the use of size portfolios in both, the actual event studies and the simulations.