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Much research into financial contagion and systematic risks has been motivated by the finding that cross-market correlations (resp. coexceedances) between asset returns increase significantly during crisis periods. Is this increase due to an exogenous shock common to all markets (interdependence) or due to certain types of transmission of shocks between markets (contagion)? Darolles and Gourieroux explain that an attempt to convey contagion and causality in a static framework can be flawed due to identification problems; they provide a more precise definition of the notion of shock to strengthen the solution within a dynamic framework. This book covers the standard practice for defining shocks in SVAR models, impulse response functions, identitification issues, static and dynamic models, leading to the challenges of measurement of systematic risk and contagion, with interpretations of hedge fund survival and market liquidity risks Features the standard practice of defining shocks to models to help you to define impulse response and dynamic consequences Shows that identification of shocks can be solved in a dynamic framework, even within a linear perspective Helps you to apply the models to portfolio management, risk monitoring, and the analysis of financial stability
This book is an authoritative account of the economic and political roots of the 2008 financial crisis. It examines why it was triggered in the United States, why it morphed into the Great Recession, and why the contagion spread with such ferocity around the globe. It also examines how and why economies - including the Eurozone, Russia, China, India, East Asia, and the Middle East - have been impacted and explores their response to the unprecedented challenges of the crisis and the effectiveness of their policy measures. Global Financial Contagion specifically looks at how the Obama administration's policy missteps have contributed to America's huge debt and slow recovery, why the Eurozone's response to its existential crisis has become a never-ending saga, and why the G-20's efforts to create a new international financial architecture may fall short. This book will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.
What can the international community do to prevent financial contagion?
One important cause of the 2007-2009 crisis was illiquidity combined with exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field.
This paper investigates the factors behind the 1994 and 1997 crises and whether these can explain the 1998 crisis. The study reveals that: (i) variables used in an Early Warning System model developed by IMF staff scored well in predicting the 1998 crisis out-of-sample; (ii) all three crisis episodes can be well explained by a parsimonious set of core fundamentals and liquidity related variables; and (iii) the presence of an IMF-supported program significantly reduced the depth of crises. The results suggest that as a rule of thumb countries should hold reserves to the tune of short-term debt to avoid contagion-related crises, provided their current deficits are modest and their real effective exchange rates are not significantly misaligned.
This paper presents a novel approach to investigate and model the network of euro area banks’ large exposures within the global banking system. Drawing on a unique dataset, the paper documents the degree of interconnectedness and systemic risk of the euro area banking system based on bilateral linkages. We develop a Contagion Mapping model fully calibrated with bank-level data to study the contagion potential of an exogenous shock via credit and funding risks. We find that tipping points shifting the euro area banking system from a less vulnerable state to a highly vulnerable state are a non-linear function of the combination of network structures and bank-specific characteristics.
The financial crisis has highlighted the importance of various channels of financial contagion across countries. This paper first presents stylized facts of international banking activities during the crisis. It then describes a simple model of financial contagion based on bank balance sheet identities and behavioral assumptions of deleveraging. Cascade effects can be triggered by bank losses or contractions of interbank lending activities. As a result of shocks on assets or on liabilities of banks, a global deleveraging of international banking activities can occur. Simple simulations are presented to illustrate the use of the model and the relative importance of contagion channels, relying on bank losses of advanced countries’ banking systems during the financial crisis to calibrate the shock. The outcome of the simulations is compared with the deleveraging observed during the crisis suggesting that leverage is a major determinant of financial contagion.
Financial markets are today so interconnected that they are fragile to contagion. Massive investment funds with very short horizons in -and out- flows can generate contagion effects between markets. Since 2010, investors are willing to get a liquid exposure to the EM sovereign debt. As a consequence, some asset management firms started to propose products to track the performance of this asset class. However in that case, the fund manager faces a mismatch of liquidity between assets and liabilities and needs some tools to manage the liquidity of his investments. The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of contagion looking at common market liquidity problems to detect funding liquidity problems. Using the CDS Bond Spread basis as a liquidity indicator and a state space model with time-varying volatility specification, we show that during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, there exist pure contagion effects both in terms of price and liquidity on the emerging sovereign debt market. This result has strong implication since the main risk for an asset manager is to get stuck with an unwanted position due to a dry-up of market liquidity.
This volume presents a unified mathematical framework for the transmission channels for damaging shocks that can lead to instability in financial systems. As the title suggests, financial contagion is analogous to the spread of disease, and damaging financial crises may be better understood by bringing to bear ideas from studying other complex systems in our world. After considering how people have viewed financial crises and systemic risk in the past, it delves into the mechanics of the interactions between banking counterparties. It finds a common mathematical structure for types of crises that proceed through cascade mappings that approach a cascade equilibrium. Later chapters follow this theme, starting from the underlying random skeleton graph, developing into the theory of bootstrap percolation, ultimately leading to techniques that can determine the large scale nature of contagious financial cascades.
November 1998 Recent events in East Asia highlighted the risks of weak financial institutions and distorted incentives in a financially integrated world. These weaknesses led to two sources of vulnerability: East Asia's rapid buildup of contingent liabilities, and overreliance on short-term foreign borrowing. The buildup of vulnerabilities in East Asia is shown here to be mainly the result of weaknesses in financial intermediation, poor corporate governance, and deficient government policies, including pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy responses to large capital inflows. Weak due diligence by external creditors, fueled partly by ample global liquidity, also played a role but global factors were more important in triggering the crises than in causing them. The crisis occurred partly because the economies lacked the institutional and regulatory structure to cope with increasingly integrated capital markets. Trouble arose from private sector decisions (by both borrowers and lenders) but governments created incentives for risky behavior and exerted little regulatory authority. Governments failed to encourage the transparency needed for the market to recognize and correct such problems as unreported mutual guarantees, insider relations, and nondisclosure of banks' and companies' true net positions. Domestic weaknesses were aggravated by poorly disciplined foreign lending. The problem was not so much overall indebtedness as the composition of debt: a buildup of short-term unhedged debt left the economies vulnerable to a sudden loss of confidence. The same factors made the crisis's economic and social impact more severe than some anticipated. The loss of confidence directly affected private demand-both investment and consumption-which could not be offset in the short run by net external demand. The effect on corporations and financial institutions has been severe because of the high degree of leveraging and the unhedged, short-term nature of foreign liabilities, which has led to a severe liquidity crunch. Domestic recession, financial and corporate distress, liquidity constraints, and political uncertainty were self-reinforcing, leading to a severe downturn. This paper-a joint product of the Economic Policy Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network and the Central Bank of Chile-was presented at the CEPR/World Bank conference Financial Crises: Contagion and Market Volatility, May 8-9, 1998, London, and at the PAFTAD 24 conference, Asia Pacific Financial Liberation and Reform, May 20-22, 1998, in Chiangmai, Thailand. Pedro Alba may be contacted at [email protected].