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Dr. Richard Gatling invented the world’s first practical machine gun in 1862. Between that weapon and subsequent improved designs, the world’s armies had roughly 50 years to adopt the machine gun and perfect its employment before it helped wreak the carnage of World War I. However, for some reason or combination of reasons, none of the armies of the day saw fit to do so. This thesis explores the potential explanations behind this phenomenon by using the Russo-Japanese War as a case study. The Russo-Japanese War should have demonstrated to the world how the machine gun fundamentally altered the conduct of land warfare, especially since the major world powers all sent military observers to report on the war’s events. This thesis will show, however, that because of a complex combination of the prevalent military tactical culture, bureaucratic pragmatism and logistical concerns, the five major protagonist armies of World War I generally failed to apply the lessons they learned about machine-gun employment from the Russo-Japanese War and as a result were completely surprised by the weapon’s impact on the battlefield ten years later.
Dr. Richard Gatling invented the world's first practical machine gun in 1862. Between that weapon and subsequent improved designs, the world's armies had roughly 50 years to adopt the machine gun and perfect its employment before it helped wreak the carnage of World War I. However, for some reason or combination of reasons, none of the armies of the day saw fit to do so. This thesis explores the potential explanations behind this phenomenon by using the Russo-Japanese War as a case study. The Russo-Japanese War should have demonstrated to the world how the machine gun fundamentally altered the conduct of land warfare, especially since the major world powers all sent military observers to report on the war's events. The author shows that because of a complex combination of the prevalent military tactical culture, bureaucratic pragmatism, and logistical concerns, the five major protagonist armies of World War I failed to apply the lessons they learned about machine gun employment from the Russo-Japanese War and, as a result, were completely surprised by the weapon's impact on the battlefield 10 years later. Chapters 2-6 focus on each of the five major participant armies of the Great War: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States. They concentrate on how these armies used machine guns prior to the Russo-Japanese war; what their observers reported about the machine gun and its employment; and what effect those reports had on changing their doctrine, tactics, procedures, acquisition strategies, and organizations. The final chapter offers a summation of why these five armies were less than fully effective at adapting their practices. The paper also contains two appendices: Appendix A contains a basic timeline and area map of the Russo-Japanese War, and appendix B is a weapons compendium of the machine guns in common use at the time and referred to throughout the thesis.
Characterized by some authors as a rehearsal for the First World War, the Russo-Japanese War was arguably the world's first modern war. During this war, the lethality of weapons on the 20th Century battlefield was clearly demonstrated. Recording the events of the Russo-Japanese War were military and civilian observers from every major power of the time. These observers wrote voluminous accounts of the war that clearly illustrated this new battlefield destructiveness. The research question of this thesis is what tactical lessons were available to the observer nations of the Russo-Japanese War that were not used in their preparations for World War I. This paper will look at both observer accounts of the war and professional journal articles written soon after the war to consider this question. To answer this question, the stationary Siege of Port Arthur and the maneuver Battle of Mukden are used as representative battles of this war. Reports from these two battles clearly demonstrate the lethality of modern warfare and foreshadow the combined effects of hand grenades, mortars, machine guns, and field artillery in World War I.
Characterized by some authors as a rehearsal for the First World War, the Russo-Japanese War was arguably the world’s first modern war. During this war, the lethality of weapons on the 20th Century battlefield was clearly demonstrated. Recording the events of the Russo-Japanese War were military and civilian observers from every major power of the time. These observers wrote voluminous accounts of the war that clearly illustrated this new battlefield destructiveness. The research question of this thesis is what tactical lessons were available to the observer nations of the Russo-Japanese War that were not used in their preparations for World War I. This paper will look at both observer accounts of the war and professional journal articles written soon after the war to consider this question. To answer this question, the stationary Siege of Port Arthur and the maneuver Battle of Mukden are used as representative battles of this war. Reports from these two battles clearly demonstrate the lethality of modern warfare and foreshadow the combined effects of hand grenades, mortars, machineguns, and field artillery in World War I.
Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars
This book explores the attitudes of the Spanish army officer corps towards the evolution of warfare during the early decades of the twentieth century, and their influence on the armies of the Spanish Civil War. It examines how the Spanish military coped with technological innovations such as the machine gun and the tank, how it adapted the army ́s battlefield doctrine to changes in warfare before the Civil War, and the influence of this doctrine on the outcome of the conflict. Of the different armed forces that fought in the Spanish Civil War, it is paradoxically the Spanish army that remains most forgotten - especially its military doctrine. Scholarship on the Spanish military in this period focuses on its politics, ideology and institutional reforms, touching upon 'hard' professional issues only superficially, if at all. Based on original research and using largely unstudied Spanish primary sources, this book fills a major scholarly gap in the history of the Spanish army and the Spanish Civil War.
Index to selected publications of the Combined Arms Center.